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SUBSTANTIVE INFLUENCES ON THE USE
OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE I
FREDA F. BEIN" *
To the extent that the end sought is the disposition of the particular case
according to the applicable rule of substantive law, the correct or better
answers to questions of fact should be given.'
While legal scholars may disagree on the primary purpose of the trial, 2
most probably would agree that whether a tribunal seeks "fairness" or
I Copyright © 1982 by Boston College Law School
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University Law School (the author will be join-
ing the faculty of Hofstra University Law School in September, 1982).
• * The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance and encouragement of her
colleagues and friends. Professors Allan Axelrod, John Hyman, Robert Carter, Alan Schwarz,
Arthur Kinoy, John Payne, Mark Roe, Annarnay Sheppard, Victoria Morrison, Paul
Tractenberg, J. Allen Smith of Rutgers University Law School and John J. Slain of New York
University Law School, all reviewed one or more drafts of parts of this article that related to their
respective areas of expertise. All offered insights and suggestions that have been incorporated
herein.
' Michael and Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact: I, 34 CoLum. L. REV. 1224, 1231
(1934).
The primary purpose of the trial is held by some to be an investigation of the truth.
Michael and Adler, supra note 1, at 1228-31. Others, however, declare that the purpose of the
trial is to settle disputes fairly. For example, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has observed:
Our society, including especially the legal profession, is wedded to trial
procedure for finding disputed facts, and the courts have no occasion to reject what
seem to be the democratic desires. The objective is accordingly fair hearing, not
accuracy. Indeed, the legal system often affirmatively reaches for something other
than the truth. A jury is instructed that a defendant it believes guilty should be
found not guilty unless it finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction is
inconsistent with accuracy, and so is the extra burden of proof in a deportation
case under Woodby a. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966). When conclusive evidence has
been illegally obtained, the known truth is rejected. On nonfactual issues, the ob-
jective often is not truth; great decisions are often policy-motivated departures
from historical intent embodied in a writing a court or agency is interpreting.
K. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, S 10.4, at 319 (2d ed. 1979).
It is probably simplistic to assume that an emphasis on either "truth" or "fairness" as
the primary goal of the trial system necessarily excludes the recognition or desirability of the
other aim. Cf. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV.
177 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Morgan, Hearsay Dangers] ("Certainly a lawsuit is not, and can-
not be made, a scientific investigation for the ascertainment of truth, but rather is, and must con-
tinue to be, a proceeding for the orderly settlement of a dispute between litigants. But just as cer-
tainly its objective must be to discover a basis for that settlement which is as close an approxima-
tion of the truth as is possible in the circumstances in which the court has to function." Id. at
184-85).
855
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"truth," its results should, in most instances, settle disputes according to the
substantive law.' To realize this goal, the rule governing the admissibility of
hearsay, like all rules of evidence and procedure, is designed to assist in the set-
tlement of disputes according to the substantive law.* Thus, the general ban on
hearsay operates properly when it keeps the Trier from considering proof that
would defeat the aim of dispute settlement in accordance with the substantive
law. Exceptions to the hearsay rule also serve the end of proper dispute settle-
ment by allowing the Trier to gain knowledge of hearsay necessary to imple-
ment the substantive Iaw. 5
That both the general rule banning hearsay and the exceptions allowing in
some hearsay evidence ultimately serve the same end may seem counter-
intuitive to the student who narrowly focuses on the usual rationales for the ban
3 While a detailed treatment of jurisprudential thought is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, the statement in the text seems axiomatic. Some of those who might argue for "fairness" as
the primary aim of dispute settlement would presumably also argue that in those few instances in
which the substantive law is itself perceived as "unfair," the result of a given case should not
conform to that law. Manipulation of results might presumably be accomplished by manipulat-
ing a rule of procedure to accomplish a "fairer" result than that commanded by the substantive
law (and the latter manipulation might, of course, undermine the substantive law itself). An in-
teresting discussion of cases which take this approach is found in Cover, For James Wm. Moore:
Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 722-40 (1975).
4 This article does not attempt to set forth any new theory about the relationship be-
tween laws of procedure, evidence and substance. Rather, old learning and commonly held
beliefs form the basis of much of this article. These principles, however, are rearranged and
reconsidered for the purpose of stimulating further research, discussion and debate. To the ex-
tent that the ideas expressed herein are commonplace, no attempt is made to cite every source in
which the same or similar ideas may be found.
This article also does not attempt to define the terms "substance" and "procedure" in
any novel way, nor does it purport to choose among the many definitions that have been pro-
posed. An understanding of the discussion herein requires only the usual intuitive meanings of
these terms. "[R]ules of substantive law govern the rights and duties of men in their ordinary
relations with each other or the body politic, while procedural rules govern the means whereby
these rights may be maintained or redressed." F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 2 (1st
ed. 1965). See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring) (deter-
mining whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or state law should govern the manner of serv-
ice in a diversity suit). A rule may be properly characterized as substantive where it might
"substantially affect . . . primary decisions respecting human conduct," id, at 475, and pro-
cedural where it has "no effect on primary stages of private activity." Id. at 477.
Further refinements, when necessary to an understanding of the text, are made ex-
pressly.
Profs. Michael and Adler argue that all adjective rules should serve this purpose. See
Michael and Adler, supra note 1.
There is a dilemma here that in a few instances may be resolved when exceptions to the
hearsay rule are created. Prof. Robert Cover put the dilemma succinctly in the context of a
discussion of Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813). The plaintiffs in Hepburn
were held in servitude. Id. at 294. They claimed descent from a free maternal ancestor and
sought to introduce multiple hearsay under the exception for statements of pedigree to prove the
fact. Id. The Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that the statement was inadmissible
under the exception. Id. at 295. Prof. Cover observes that whether to relieve the plaintiffs of the
problem of lack of proof by admitting the evidence involves "trading off the disutility of 'im-
properly' adjudicating someone a slave because no evidence save hearsay exists as to the freedom
of an ancestor against the disutility of possible incorrect adjudications of freedom on the basis of
unreliable evidence." Cover, supra note 3, at 731 (footnote omitted). Prof. Cover then observes
in a footnote, "Insofar as the exceptions to the hearsay rule relate to rational goals, they are
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and its exceptions,. The usual rationales for exceptions almost always seem to
conflict with the justification for the hearsay ban. 6
Generally, the ban on hearsay is justified by reference to the need for
adversarial cross-examination.' While not perfect, cross-examination is the
only means available for probing the accuracy of a witness' perception,
memory, sincerity and narrational skills.° This probing, in turn, has been
justified by the assumption, somewhat verified by social scientists, that each
person gathers and communicates impressions of the world around him in a
unique fashion. 9 Cross-examination allows the adversary the opportunity to
largely representative of this trade-off." Id. at 731 n.34. See also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
1420, at 251-52 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (suggesting that the trade-off is accomplished by
reference to the "reliability" of the hearsay.) Examples of exceptions that were originally created
with these trade-offs in mind are cited in note 26 infra.
In this article it is suggested that even if a rational trade-off was not made at the crea-
tion of exceptions (or if no special trade-off was contemplated when the exception was created)
that for substantive policy reasons trade-offs must and, in some of the examples given, are being
properly made on a case-by-case basis. A reading of the whole of Prof. Cover's article suggests
agreement that such an approach by the courts is desirable.
6 See Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1794
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Theoretical Foundation].
7 See, e.g., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 5 245, at 583 (2d
ed. 1972); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, $ 1362, at 3, 1367, at 32-33; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers,
supra note 2 at 183-85. While absence of the oath and demeanor observation are also normally
cited as reasons for the general ban on hearsay, the contribution of these testimonial conditions to
the accuracy of the fact-finding process may be questioned, MCCORMICK, supra, 5 245, at
582-83; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra note 2, at 179-83.
There is more than one way of defining hearsay. See, e.g., R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To EVIDENCE 340-51 (1977); MCCORmiCK, supra, 55
246-251, at 584-604; 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 1766, at 250-53 (Chadbourn rev. 1978);
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra note 2; Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957,
958-61 (1974). A very interesting and instructive discussion of the differences in these commen-
tators' definitions is found in Park, McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay: A Critical
Analysis Followed by Suggestions to Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 423 (1981).
In this article, the definition of hearsay used — one that emphasizes limits on the oppo-
nent's opportunity to cross-examine, is a definition that Prof. Park would undoubtedly
characterize as a "declarant-oriented" definition. Park, supra, at 424. This definition is used
because the author believes that a hearsay definition is most useful to the goals of the trial process
when it serves as a mechanism for the express recognition of any limitation on the opportunity to
cross-examine. Careful identification of such limitations serves to best insure an intelligent ap-
praisal of the desirability and need for admitting a statement under an exception. A detailed ex-
planation of the author's opinion on the matter is found in Bein, Prior Inconsistent Statements: The
Hearsay Rule, 801 (d) (I) (A) and 803 (24), 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 967, 983-95 (1979).
For an explanation of these four hearsay dangers, see Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra
note 2, at 185-88. See also Tribe, supra note 7.
Lie detectors, truth serums, and other similar devices, even if generally accepted as
producing accurate results, apparently only probe the sincerity of the declarant. They cannot
probe for honest inaccuracies in memory, narration and perception. Hypnosis (again, even if
generally accepted as producing accurate results) assumedly only provides a means for reawaken-
ing forgotten perceptions. It could not provide any more certain means than cross-examination
for probing inaccuracies in perception and narrational skills (and hypnosis might result in less
certainty because of the increased risk of suggestion).
See E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Stewart, Perception, Memory and
Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1,
and sources cited therein.
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lay bare all the likely sources of error" that originate in, or are affected by, the
witness' peculiar mental processes." Thus, when a witness' direct testimony is
subject to searching cross-examination, the Trier is afforded the best possible
opportunity to make a realistic assessment of the extent to which the witness'
assertions reflect objective facts.
When the opportunity to cross-examine a testimonial assertion is limited
in any way, the opportunity to provide the Trier with information necessary to
reach correct results is also limited. By forcing the parties to present proof
through live witnesses, subject to cross-examination, the ban on hearsay pro-
tects the integrity of the fact finding process." Even the scope of the hearsay
definition, which purposely excludes "operative facts," assists in this aim.' 3
To the extent that substantive results are made to turn on correct answers to
questions of fact, therefore, the general ban on hearsay helps to assure deci-
sions that dispose of cases in accordance with their substantive mandates.
Contrary to the rationale for the ban, however, exceptions to the hearsay
rule allow into evidence a great deal of proof that is not capable of being cross-
examined. In place of the opportunity to cross-examine, preliminary facts must
10 See supra note 8.
" See generally Stewart, supra note 9, at 22; Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and
Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741.
12 See generally Bein, supra note 7; Tribe, supra note 7; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra
"Operative facts" or "verbal acts" are those words to which the law assigns some
legal significance (for example, words of agreement to form a contract). They are generally ex-
plained as not hearsay precisely "because the fact that they were spoken carries legal conse-
quences," R. LEMPERT S. SALTZBURG, supra note 7, at 342, or because use of the statement to
prove the fact in issue, will not require any reliance upon the declarant's perception, memory,
narrational skills nor sincerity, Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra note 2, at 197. See also McCOR-
tvucK, supra note 7, 5 249, at 588. Whatever the reason given, it is clear that the hearsay rule
could not keep such statements out of the trial because that would defeat substantive laws.
It is interesting to note how the "assertion-oriented" or "declarant-oriented" defini-
tions manage to exclude operative facts from the statements they classify as hearsay. (The quoted
phrases are used with the meaning given them by Prof. Park, who presumably coined them.
Park, supra note 7, at 424. Exclusion of some operative facts from an "assertion-oriented" defini-
tion apparently cannot be justified by the definition itself. Id. Presumably the real reason for the
exclusion, therefore, is the substantive one.
On the other hand, operative facts can be deemed outside the scope of a "declarant-
oriented" definition because none of the four hearsay dangers are involved in their use. It may be
well to ask, however, why the "declarant-oriented" definition includes only four hearsay
dangers. Since the definition is designed to protect cross-examination, protection of cross-
examination presumably would be most complete if the definition recognized every utility of cross-
examination. A fifth utility of cross-examination, not included as a hearsay danger, in the defini-
tion is the opportunity to elicit facts additional to those elicited by the proponent of the witness. 5
J. WIGMORE, supra note 5 at 5 1368, at 36-39. While it might be argued that this is solely a
discovery use of cross-examination, sometimes additional facts elicited on cross-examination will
color or change the meaning of testimony given on direct, (e.g., "Yes, as I said on direct, I clear-
ly saw the knife in the defendant's hand, but his hand was broken in three places so he couldn't
dutch it very well."). If this fifth purpose of cross-examination were included, however, then
presumably all out-of-court statements by anyone in a position to know anything about the litiga-
tion would be classified as hearsay. That would sweep "operative facts," the largest group of
facts not otherwise defined as hearsay, into the declarant-oriented definition. The declarant-
oriented definition, by not including this fifth purpose of cross-uAarnination as a reason for classi-
note 2.
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be shown that a hearsay declaration comports with certain specified "cir-
cumstantial guarantees of reliability" and "necessity. "t' These facts, in turn,
usually are shown without examining the declarant. Indeed, the hearsay
declarant often is not even available in court. Only a few exceptions require
provision of some opportunity to cross-examine.' 6 Most afford the opponent of
the hearsay no opportunity to present information to the Trier about the
peculiar manner in which the declarant of the statement perceived,
remembered and narrated the facts recited in the statement.' 6 In other words,
the precise extent to which the hearsay statement reflects the objective facts (its
absolute reliability) cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. The
allowance of hearsay under an exception, therefore, seems inconsistent with
the aim of the general hearsay ban.
When hearsay is admitted under an exception, it may be argued, the Trier
always can be informed by the hearsay opponent or the court that each person
perceives, understands and reports the world around him differently. Thus,
the Trier can be put on notice that errors are possible and the hearsay offered is
suspect. Without cross-examination of the hearsay declarant, however, there is
no rational way to tie that general caveat to the particular source of the hearsay
involved. Some declarants, it might be supposed, are more accurate than most
other declarants on most occasions. Others may be less accurate than most de-
clarants on most occasions. In most situations there is no proof available to
assist in the characterization of the particular hearsay declarant as either ac-
curate or inaccurate nor to shed light on his proclivities on the relevant occa-
sion." Moreover, there is no reason to suppose, even in the abstract, that most
hearsay declarants fall into one or another category. Transformation of an in-
dividual into a hearsay declarant does not make him more nor less accurate
than the average of humanity as a whole. Likewise, transformation of one of
that declarant's utterances into a hearsay declaration does not make the state-
ment itself any more likely to be accurate or inaccurate than the average of all
fying statements as hearsay thus seems purposely designed to achieve the substantive purpose. (It
should be noted, however, that the last observation is somewhat undercut by the existence of
other assertions that are not classified as hearsay under the declarant-oriented approach that
would be so classified were the fifth purpose of cross-examination added).
14 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 800(02], at 800-13 (1981)
[hereinafter 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE]; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5 SS 1420-1422, at 251-54.
15 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(5) (exceptions for past recollection recorded); Fed. R.
Eyed. 804{b)(1) (prior testimony); and FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (some interpretations of the
recent exceptions for witness' prior inconsistent statements). For a more thorough classification
of exceptions see Tribe, supra note 7. See also 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14 1 800(03],
at 800-16 (Arguing that "since the trial judge must balance the need and the value of the
evidence against the dangers it would pose, he may consider factors affecting either side of the
equation . . . . If the declarant is available, the trial judge in his discretion may condition ad-
missibility upon the declarant's being produced as witness.").
16 It is unlikely that such information would be available from other sources. Maguire,
supra note 11 at 747-48; Stewart, supra note 9, at 22.
" See sources supra cited in note 16.
" McCORmiCK, supra note 7, S 306, at 719-20; 51 WIGMORE, supra note 5, S 1522, at
442-43.
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human utterances. Thus a broad warning against a Trier's reliance on hearsay
admitted under an exception neither satisfies the concern of the hearsay ban,
nor provides a logical principle for the use of•hearsay evidence.
Exceptions to the hearsay rule usually are rationalized as exceptions to the
immediately preceding observations. In certain circumstances, it is reasoned
that observers tend to be more accurate in accounts of their perceptions and
memories of external events than they, or the rest of humanity, would be other-
wise. Under this rationale, for example, business records are admissible
because persons under an employment duty to observe and report generally
will do so accurately." Likewise, declarations against interest are admissible
because people usually do not say things against their interests unless they
believe the statements to be true." Also, statements of pedigree are admissible
because people usually are motivated to accurately discover and report their
blood relationships." And excited utterances are admissible because excite-
ment usually stills the capacity for misstatement." In these instances the hear-
say will be admitted because of the belief that these special circumstances evoke
an acceptable level of accuracy.
This belief, however, is based on a series of assumptions. First, it is
assumed that certain external pressures motivate most people to try to correct,
or suspend, the internal (personality or physical) traits that ordinarily make
their perceptions, memories or narrational skills unique. Second, it is assumed
that most people are aware of the internal differences between themselves and (.
others, and the extent to which their own uniqueness may cause errors in their
perceptions and memories. Third, it is assumed that most people who try to
correct or suspend their capacities for error are successful — that through effort
they achieve accuracy. (Excited utterances are rationalized on the different
premise — that external pressures will cause automatic suspension of the
capacity for misstatement, with no effort on the part of the individual
necessary.)
The assumptions upon which the admissibility of this hearsay is founded,
however, contain within them the seeds of an irreconcilable inconsistency be-
tween the usual rationales for hearsay exceptions and the justification for the
hearsay ban. If, given some common stimulus to accuracy, most people can be
counted upon to adjust their capacities for error and achieve objective ac-
curacy, then certainly it cannot be said that each person or each person's
perception is "unique" — but only that people wilfully err." Cross-
" MCCORMICK, supra note 7, 5 276, at 670; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, 5 1458, at
329.
20 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, 5 322, at 745-47; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, 5 1482, at
373-74.
21 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, 5 297, at 704-09; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, 5 1745, at
91-93.
22
 The rationalization for excited utterances is based on the same premise. If excite-
ment is needed to assure "automatic" suspension of the capacity for misstatement, see FED. R.
EVID. 803(2) advisory committee note, the assumption seems to be that under nonexciting cir-
cumstances people deliberately chose to state the truth or a lie.
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examination, then, has absolutely no utility that cannot be found as readily in
the creation and discovery of sufficient external stimuli to truth-telling. On the
other hand, if people are unique, the series of assumptions cannot be right.
Even if, given a common stimulus, most people will try to overcome their
capacities for error, the very uniqueness with which they perceive and com-
prehend the stimuli, their own capacities, and the meaning of "accuracy" will
cause them to achieve nonidentical results. Exceptions to the opportunity to
cross-examine, then, are never justified.
The inconsistency thus displayed between the rationales for the hearsay
ban and its exceptions, however, may be more illusory than real. Indeed, the
process through which this apparent inconsistency is demonstrated itself re-
quires a certain willingness to pay myopic attention to the meaning of the ac-
cepted rationalizations that are in themselves nothing more than shorthand
slogans. 23
 Somewhere in the process we have lost the starting point: the rela-
tionship between the hearsay rule and the purpose of the trial. The general ban
on hearsay is said to help assure correct or better answers to questions of fact
when the substantive law mandates such a finding. Certainly, exceptions to the
rule may serve the aim of dispute settlement according to the substantive law
without necessarily being rationalized on a basis wholly inconsistent with the
beliefs that give rise to the ban.
For example, if a substantive law is made to turn on facts which, as a
class, can only or best be proved through the use of out-of-court statements then
exceptions to the ban must be permitted to assure that the best answers to those
questions of fact are given. Indeed, this principle has long been recognized. 24
In practice, however, exceptions once so rationalized now are made applicable
" A recent student note concentrating solely on individual rationales for each hearsay
exception demonstrated by a somewhat different tack the inconsistency of those rationales among
themselves and between their aggregate and the hearsay ban. Note, Theoretical Foundation, supra
note 6. A "cost/benefit" analysis of admitting and excluding hearsay found at the beginning of
the article, however, seems based on either a misconception about the true utility of the hearsay
definition, or simply a distrust of the value of cross-examination and live testimony. The ap-
parent inconsistencies in rationales are used to support the conclusion that the hearsay rule
should be abolished. The misconstruction at the beginning of the article is unfortunate because,
as demonstrated in the sources cited in note 38 infra, it is an unnecessary first step to support the
conclusion. The desirability of abolishing the general ban on hearsay depends not upon finding
or creating errors in theoretical models but upon a variety of practical concerns, including how
much trust we are willing to place in the wisdom of the judiciary to make the sort of distinctions
suggested in the sources cited in note 38 infra and in this article.
2♦ See note 5 supra and sources cited therein. According to Wigmore, several exceptions
were originally rationalized on this basis alone. Examples include the state of mind exception, see
infra text and notes at notes 74-81 and sources cited therein, statements of pedigree, see supra note
20; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, 5 1480, at 363-69, reputation concerning land boundaries; 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra S 1582, at 545-47, and, by inference, declarations against interest. Declarations
against interest until recently were confined to declarations against pecuniary and proprietary
interests by declarants unavailable because of death. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, 55 1455-1476,
at 323-58. While Wigmore claims that the limitation on subjects was arbiti4ry, it seems fairly in-
ferrable from his history of it that it was probably tied to notions of the importance of survival of
debts. Id., 5 1476, at 349-58. Exclusion of operative facts from the hearsay definition also is best
justified on this basis. See supra note 13.
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in cases where the original rationale does not apply . 25 At the same time, new
exceptions have been created which are not expressly tied to any particular
substantive concern. 26 Instead, these expansions and the creation of new ex-
ceptions always seem to be rationalized in the same terms.
Briefly, these now familiar arguments fall within one of two categories.
First, if a hearsay utterance is reliable because of the particular circumstances
under which it was made, statements made under other circumstances that in-
clude an equal stimulus to truth telling are also reliable." Second, if a hearsay
utterance is reliable enough in one case, to prove one matter, it must be equally
reliable in any other case, to prove any other matter. 28
The first of these arguments refers to the likely "absolute reliability" of
two declarations. It compares the likelihood and severity of hearsay dangers in
two assertions and concludes that since the dangers are probably equal the
statements are equally reliable or unreliable as proof of the truth of the asser-
tions contained in them. It may be noticed that the first rationale does not
necessarily include the second rationale, although it might. Statements may
have the same absolute reliability but still have differing degrees of reliability in
relation to the issues they are offered to prove.
The second of the rationales is counter-intuitive. There are radical dif-
ferences between our many substantive laws and the social interests which give
rise to them. Given these differences, one would not expect that hearsay reli-
able enough to prove a particular fact involving one substantive law in one case
would necessarily be reliable enough to prove a different fact involving another
substantive law in another case. Rather, it might be supposed that there would
be differences in the utility of a given item of proof in two cases if different sub-
stantive concerns are involved.
Indeed, the supposition that the reliability of a hearsay statement can be
measured by a single standard, unaffected by the substantive context in which
25 For example, the state of mind exception has been expanded in the manner set forth
infra in text and notes at notes 102-22; the pedigree exception once confined to cases involving in-
heritance is now made applicable in all cases by FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(4); declarations against in-
terest are admissible in cases other than those involving debts, FED. R. EVID. 804(13)(3); and
reputation concerning land boundaries is no longer confined to ancient matters, FED. R. EVID.
803(20).
" Examples are the exceptions for present sense impressions, FED. R. EVID. 803(1); ex-
cited utterances, FED. R. EvID. 803(2); statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment, FED. R. EVID. 803(4); business entries and public reports, FED. R. EVID. 803(6)-(10).
27
 See, e.g., Gichner v. Antonio Troiano Tile & Marble Co., 410 F,2d 238, 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (declarations against interest exception should be expanded to include statements
against employment interest), and Deike v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 3 Ariz. App. 430, 432,
415 P.2d 145, 147 (1966) (statements against penal interest). See also 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5,
S 1476, at 349-58; MCCoRMICK, supra note 7, 5 287, at 673-75; note 25 supra.
28 See, for example, rationalizations for expanding dying declarations exception to
cases other than homicide prosecutions. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, S 283, at 681-82; 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 5, 5 1436, at 285-88. See also rationalizations for expanding statements of
pedigree to cases involving issues other than inheritance. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, 5 1503, at
400-03. Expansion of exceptions by expanding cognizable circumstances also increases the types
of cases in which such declarations will be admissible, see supra text and notes at notes 25-27.
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it is offered, conflicts with at least one basic premise of evidence law. It is ac-
cepted wisdom that correct determinations of the relevancy of offered proof de-
pend on the substantive issues in a case. To avoid undermining substantive
policies, proof held relevant in one case involving one substantive law or issue
may be held irrelevant in another case involving another law or issue. 29 The
recognition of this principle reflects a common understanding that evidence
rules are as capable as are substantive rules of influencing the manner in which
people conduct those everyday affairs governed by substantive law. Just as peo-
ple order their conduct to achieve certain substantive results, they frequently
plan their activities in a way that best preserves evidence of the conduct in the
event of dispute. If courts allowed conduct prescribed by the substantive law to
be proved by evidence of divergent or opposite conduct, people might rational-
ly order their activities in accordance with the evidence rule rather than the
substantive law. To avoid this result, rulings on the relevancy of proof are
regularly adjusted to substantive concerns.
As will be demonstrated herein, similar concerns should influence the ad-
missibility of hearsay under exceptions to the hearsay rule. First, where ap-
propriate use of an exception ascribes an evidentiary effect to conduct that con-
flicts with the effect given the same conduct by the governing substantive law,
hearsay falling within the exception should be banned from the trial for the
same reason that evidence made irrelevant by the substantive law is banned. 3°
Second, it should be recognized that there is a relationship between the
successful operation of some substantive laws and the reliability of evidence
used to prove disputed facts in cases that arise under those laws. 3 ' Not only do
people plan activities with an eye toward preservation of evidence in the event
of dispute, they are sometimes influenced in their planning by their perceptions
of the reliability of the fact-finding process. At the planning stage, the extent of
people's awareness of, and interest in, the reliability of evidence used to prove
or disprove disputed facts varies with the nature of the activity (e.g. planned or
29 James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941). Technically,
the observations in the text might be better described as involving issues of "materiality." The
question whether the proposition sought to be proved by evidence is material to the ultimate
propositions in the case. The term "relevancy" is used because it is assumed to be more familiar
to most readers. See Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the
Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371 (1977). (Wellborn argues that because of Enabling Act and
Erie problems, in federal court diversity cases, state law should be used to determine relevancy
and its countervailing policies. Id. at 397-406. The question is beyond the scope of this article but
some of the substantive distinctions being made and urged herein, should they occur in diversity
cases, might involve similar problems of choice of law). Similar problems with proposed privilege
rules for the federal courts produced a spate of comment and led to major changes in the rules
before they were adopted. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 198-266 and bibliography therein (2d ed. 1977) ]hereinafter cited as S. SALTZBURG &
K. REDDEN.]
" See infra text at 1(A) and (B). The sources cited in note 38 infra argue that all questions
of the admissibility of hearsay can either be analogized to, or are identical to, relevancy ques-
tions.
" See text at Parts I(A), (B) and (C).
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unplanned; avoidable or unavoidable), the perceived possibility of litigation,
the costs of undertaking or avoiding the activity in question, and the costs of an
adverse outcome. In some instances perceived unreliability in the fact-finding
process might influence people to forego activity condoned or encouraged by
substantive law. In others, courts' insistence on a high degree of reliability
might influence people to engage in activity condemned by the substantive law.
Clearly some higher degree of reliability must be demanded of evidence ad-
missible under hearsay exceptions where demanding less will discourage activi-
ty the substantive law intends to encourage. Likewise, some lesser degree of
reliability must be countenanced where demanding more will encourage activi-
ty contrary to substantive law.
This article explores, by example, the extent to which substantive policies
are now influencing the admissibility of hearsay statements under exceptions to
the rule. It shows that usual rationales aside, courts sometimes do, and always
should, use principles of "relative" reliability when determining whether hear-
say should be admitted under exceptions to the rule. For organizational con-
sistency, this article is divided into two parts. First, cases in which the admis-
sion of hearsay under an exception may undermine substantive policy are con-
sidered. Potential conflicts between the law of contracts and the exception for
admissions by silence are demonstrated, as are those between the law of lost
wills and the exception for state of mind declarations. Second, the article turns
to consideration of the concept of the relative reliability of hearsay arguably ad-
missible under an exception. The courts' divergent treatment of identical hear-
say in probate and tort actions involving lost wills is analyzed. Likewise,
courts' differing responses to identical hearsay in general criminal and antitrust
conspiracy cases is considered. Finally, the divergent treatment of hearsay in
cases involving intentional torts and crimes and those involving negligent torts
and crimes is addressed.
To avoid misunderstanding, it must be emphasized that this article does
not suggest that courts should, or are, improperly applying hearsay exceptions
made uniformly applicable in all cases. Rather, the more obvious suggestion is
made: that uniformity of application of evidence rules cannot mean identity of
application in every case. The true objective of uniformity of adjective rules is
to mandate use of the rules to serve uniformly the substantive concerns of each
area of substantive law in which the rules apply. 32
32 Cover, supra note 3, at 718. As Prof. Saltzburg observed:
Technical rules of competency serve numerous purposes; no one theme runs
through all of them, unless it is the notion that relevant evidence may be excluded
from consideration at trial if some social policy outweighs the need for evidence.
Some rules of competency are designed to enhance the reliability of a jury verdict .
. Still others involve questions of reliability as well as other policy considera-
tions. Since rules of competency have different goals, errors in factfinding related
to the rules will have differing impacts on the system of justice.
Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271, 275 (1975)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Saltzburg, Standards of Proof]. (This article argues convincingly
that differing standards of proof must be used in rulings on preliminary facts).
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Whatever may be said of the scope of a trial judge's discretion when ruling
on preliminary questions of fact," it cannot be denied that judges must have
discretion to assure that admissible items of proof do not undermine our
substantive laws and policies."
There is a special utility in exploring these matters at a time when calls for
abolition and redesign of the hearsay rule are gaining currency," and at least
33 The debates on the proposed open-ended hearsay exceptions for federal courts are
filled with different views on the proper role of judicial discretion. Compare Rules of Evidence: Hear-
ings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 202-03 (1973) (testimony of George A.
Spiegelberg, American College of Trial Lawyers); id. at 216 (statement of a Committee of New
York Trial Lawyers); id. at 234 (statement by John J. Cleary on behalf of National Legal Aid &
Defender Association); Rules of Evidence: Hearings an Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 305 (Supp. 1973) (letter to
subcommittee by Jack H. Simmons, Esq., in support of deleting 803(24) and 804(b)(5) because if
adopted, "the Rules of Evidence would differ from Court to Court and from Judge to Judge. ");
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7075, 7079 (House Committee recommends deletion of 803(24) and 804(b)(6) "as inject-
ing too much uncertainty into the law of evidence"); 120 CONG. REC. 40,892 (1974) (Rep.
Holtzman's objections during House debate to giving judges too much discretion); with Federal
Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. .5463 Before Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
36-37 (1974) (testimony by Judge Charles W. Joiner, member of the Standing Comm. on Rules
of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conf. of the United States); id. at 114 (statement of W. Vincent
Rakestraw, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs: "it would seem ill-advised to
adopt a code covering exceptions to the hearsay rule without allowing for some measure of flex-
ibility"); id. at 192-93 (testimony of Richard H. Keatinge, Chairman, Cal. Evid. Law Revision
Commission); id. at 210-12 (testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee
on Rules of Evid., Judicial Conf. of the United States); Rules of Evidence: Hearings on Proposed Rules
of Evid. Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 351 (Supp. 1973) (Department of Justice analysis regarding draft of Proposed Rules of
Evid., recommending readoption of 803(24) and 804(b)(6)); S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 18-19 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7065-66 (Senate Com-
mittee recommends retention of 803(24) and 804(b)(6)).
' 4 One commentator has observed that those antagonistic to vesting broad discretion in
federal judges, see note 33 supra, were concerned that judges would somehow use the power to
erode substantive law. 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 5 3, at 17 (1977)
[hereinafter 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER]. It would clearly subvert the purpose of the
framework ultimately provided if judges did not exercise discretion to assure that such a subver-
sion does not occur within that framework. The same point has been made about application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Cover, supra note 3, at 733-40. Commentators generally
agree that judges must exercise broad discretion, when determining the admissibility of evidence,
to avoid collisions with other policies and to promote the purposes of the trial, S. SALTZBURG &
K. REDDEN, supra note 29, at 14-15; 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T 800[03]; 1 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra 5 3, at 5-13.
It is generally agreed that judges do have discretion to require more reliability in some
circumstances than in others. For example, the character of a proceeding as criminal and civil
may influence the degree of reliability required. See generally 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
supra, 5 4, at 18-22; 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, ¶ 800[03] at 800-16 to -17; and
sources cited infra at note 298. The stakes involved — whether injunctions or damages — may
also influence the admissibility of hearsay. See sources cited infra at note 245. On the use of hear-
say in administrative cases see 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 55 16.1-16,8, at
218-54 (1979) and 5 14.07, at 63-67, 5 14.11, at 69-72 (1980 Supp.).
35 See, e.g. , Ladd, The Relationship Of The Principles Of Exclusionary Rules Of Evidence To
The Problem Of Proof, 18 MINN. L. REV. 506 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Ladd]; Weinstein, Pro-
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one able commentator has concluded that the general ban on hearsay no longer
exists." While it is probably premature to announce the death of the hearsay
rule, no doubt the potential for its redesign is found in the scheme of Article
VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. By exposing the substantive ingredient
of decision-making, this article provides an insight necessary for a rational
refashioning of the rule. Whatever the future of the present rules, the use of
hearsay is steadily increasing and so are the dilemmas and resolutions of them
illustrated in this article." If more hearsay is to be admissible in the future, the
need for careful judicial attention to the impact of the use of hearsay on the
relevant policies of the substantive law will become that much more urgent."
I. CASES IN WHICH USE OF HEARSAY FALLING WITHIN
AN EXCEPTION COULD UNDERMINE THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Admissions by silence offered  to prove the existence
of contracts allegedly formed by express agreement
The intimate, and sometimes subtle relationship between the law of
evidence and the various substantive laws requiring formal writings for con-
tracts, wills, deeds and the like is well noted." The statutes of wills and frauds,
and the parol evidence rule, are examples of substantive rules which are ra-
tionalized in part by the need to preserve evidence of conduct on which
substantive results depend and by the desire to avoid decisions based on
fraudulent or unreliable evidence. 40 These rules are properly characterized as
substantive, however, because they are intended to affect the manner in which
bative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein, Probative
Force]; Note, Theoretical Foundation, supra note 6. As originally proposed the federal rules of
evidence consisted of a general rule excluding hearsay, with illustrative examples instead of ex-
ceptions to guide the judge's discretion. The Advisory Committee's Introductory Note makes
clear that it felt that revamping the usual scheme of the rules (ban and class exceptions) was
necessary, Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 324-91 (1969).
33 Younger, Reflections On The Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1980) (wherein
the author acknowledges that his conclusions are based on incomplete and tentative data, but
that the data he has so far found confirms his hypothesis that "There is no rule against hethay.
Hearsay is usually admitted. The basis of receiving it is its reliability. Thus, there is only a rule
against unreliable evidence." Id. at 293.).
37 The open-ended exceptions to the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R. EVID. 803(24)
and 804(5) are now the most blatant examples of the redesign. The definition of hearsay in the
Federal Rules, FED. R. EVID. 801, however, "bears only the slightest resemblance to the com-
mon law definition." S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 29, at 455. See generally, id. at
455-509 and sources cited at 510-18. See also 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE SS 411 -28 (1980); 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, ¶1 800[01] to
801(dX2)(02].
" See Ladd, supra note 35, at 521 and Weinstein, supra note 35, at 338-41. Both com-
mentators suggest that elimination of the ban on hearsay will place emphasis on preliminary
determinations about probative force.
39 See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE SS 2400-2478 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
" See sources cited infra note 183; J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS S 41, at 83; S 282, at 441-42 (1970).
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people conduct their ordinary affairs.*" Where these rules operate, people who
want the security of enforceable agreements, transactions, or transfers
presumably conform their behavior to the applicable law. To avoid subverting
these substantive rules, courts regularly refuse to admit evidence which might
tend to prove, and thereby make enforceable, a transaction or transfer that
does not conform to the mandates of these statutes. The ground for inad-
missibility is usually characterized as irrelevancy.
Many substantive rules of contracts and wills, however, are not packaged
with such clear warnings about the instances in which their policies may be
subverted by applying normal principles of logical relevance to offered proof.
In some cases, the logical assumptions about the meaning of human conduct
that underlie hearsay exceptions may conflict with the dictates of one or
another of these substantive laws. When the conflicting substantive rule is the
governing law in a case, the conflict is readily apparent and easily avoided by
holding the hearsay inadmissible on relevancy grounds. When the conflicting
substantive rule is not the governing law in a case, however, the possibility of
its subversion through use of the hearsay exception may be easily overlooked
unless careful attention is paid to the relationship between rulings on the ad-
missibility of the hearsay and the substantive law.
This potential for the subversion of substantive policies is illustrated by
considering the interplay between the hearsay exception for parties' admissions
by silence' and the rules relating to contract formation. The hearsay exception
admits into evidence against any party the statement of another person which
may be said to have been "adopted" by the party through his silence. This
41 See supra note 4.
42 Under the federal rules of evidence all party admissions are defined as outside the
scope of the rule prohibiting hearsay, or as "not hearsay." FED. R. EVID, 801(d)(2). There is
some scholarly support for this definition. See 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 1048, at 4 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1972); Strahorn, A Reconsideration Of The Hearsay Rule And Admissions, 85 U. PA. L.
REV. 564, 570 (1937). In this article, however, all admissions are defined as hearsay but are con-
sidered exceptions to the general ban. The reason for this treatment is that while a party by
definition will usually be present in court to explain an alleged admission if he did indeed make
it, if he did not make the statement, or if he has forgotten the perceptions contained in it, the par-
ty cannot possibly explain any defects underlying the statement. Thus, where the party did not
make the alleged admission, he is denied any opportunity to cross-examine the perception or
memory underlying it. Nevertheless, such statements are probably exceptionally admitted in civil
cases, even where the party does not admit making the statement, because of the importance of
guarding against abuse of the system by people who do not believe that they are entitled to
recover. Cf. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 266 (5th ed. 1962). Party admissions
therefore will be considered here as hearsay covered by the rule, but falling within an exception to
the hearsay prohibition. See also infra note 193.
Party admissions alleged to have been made by a silent adoption of the statement of
another introduce a problem of the limitation on cross-examination that is equal to, if not greater
than, that posed when the party denies making the statement itself. The party can still explain
that he did not intend an adoption by his silence or that he had no personal knowledge of the mat-
ter. The author of the alleged silently-adopted statement need not be made available for cross-
examination, however, because it is not, technically, his perception, memory and sincerity on
which the credibility of the statement now rests. The opportunity, therefore, for manufacture of
self-serving evidence is apparent. See generally sources cited infra note 43.
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hearsay exception is based on the assumption that in some circumstances the
normal human reaction would be to deny another's statement if it were untrue.
Thus, a party's failure to respond to such a statement is strong evidence that he
assented to its truth." Once the judge determines that an inference of assent
from the silence is reasonable in the circumstances shown, the statement is ad-
mitted.** Like all other party admissions, a silently adopted statement that in-
dicates a belief inconsistent with the party's position at trial is excepted from
the hearsay ban either because of the adversarial nature of the trial or because
the party is present to explain it away.'"
The hearsay exception for admissions by silence, of course, does not pur-
port to change the law of contracts. Under contract law, absent "special cir-
cumstances," an offeror cannot "cause the silence of an offeree to operate as
an acceptance when the offeree does not intend it to do so."" The offeror,
simply by stipulating that the offeree's silence will be taken as an acceptance,
cannot "force the offeree to take his pen in hand, or to spend a two-cent stamp,
or to open his mouth, under penalty of being bound by a contract if he does
not."'" If A, a stranger to B, sends B an offer to sell a series of books at a cer-
tain price, which offer stipulates that B's silence will be deemed an acceptance,
B is not obliged to respond in order to avoid contractual liability." Consistency
in the law suggests that if A, without more, followed-up his offer with a letter to
B that said, "confirming our prior agreement, you are now bound to pay me
$50.00," B would still not be obliged to respond in order to avoid contractual
liability." If A then sued B alleging breach of an agreement formed by B's
silence, there would be no occasion to reach the question of admissibility of B's
silence in evidence. A's complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a
claim or summary judgment would be granted against him. 5° B's silence in
43
 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 801(d)(2)(B)[01], at 801-145 to -149. See
generally 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 424, at 268-74, 284-88; MCCoRMICK,
supra note 7, 5 270, at 651-55; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 42, 55 1071-1073, at 102-40. For an ex-
cellent example of the circumstances under which silence gives rise to a strong inference of ac-
quiescence in its truth, see United States v. Alker, 255 F.2d 851, 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 817 (1958), reh'g. denied, 359 U.S. 950 (1959).
44 See sources cited supra note 43. In some cases, the jury is instructed about the in-
ferences it may draw from the party's silence to the truth of the statement. See, e.g., Megarry
Bros., Inc. v. United States, 404 F.2d 479, 487 n.2 (8th Cir. 1968).
43
 See, however, analysis in note 42 supra and sources cited therein.
46
 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 5 73, at 310 (1963 & Supp. 1980).
47 I A. CORBIN, supra note 46, 5 73, at 310. The offeree's silence will also not operate as
an acceptance where the offer made no such condition. Id. See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 5 2-21, at 64 (2d ed. 1977).
46 J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, 5 2-21, at 64; 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 46,
5 73, at 310; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 72, comments a and c (1981).
49 See infra note 51. If B intended to accept by his silence, of course, he may still have a
good claim against A, if A later denies that a binding contract was formed. J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 47, 5 2-21, at 64; I A. CORBIN, supra note 46, 5 73, at 310; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 48, 5 72(b).
" See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, 5 2-21, at 64 & n.35, and sources cited
therein; 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 46, 5 73, at 310-12; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
supra note 48, 5 72.
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response to the second letter would be of no help to A. 5 ' In these instances,
then, the substantive law of contracts will forestall any question of the use of
the adoptive admission to prove a contractual relationship.
"Special circumstances," of course, do exist under which contract law
permits silence to operate as an acceptance or estoppe1. 52 Thus, if A's com-
plaint alleged any of these special circumstances, the case would proceed to
trial. B's silence in response to A's offer, or in some circumstances the confirm-
atory letter, would then be admissible in evidence not for its truth, but as an
operative fact." Since B's silence is not technically hearsay in such a case, use
of the exception for a party's admissions by silence would be neither necessary
nor appropriate. 54
In all of the above situations, therefore, the rules of evidence and pro-
cedure work perfectly well to facilitate decisions in accordance with the
51 To be carefully distinguished is the possible use of a confirmatory letter and silence in
response to show a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. Under the UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 2-201 such proof may be admissible if there is other proof that the parties had a
contract required to be in writing. The confirmatory letter cannot itself be the contract. See, e.g.,
Karlin v. Avis, 457 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir.), cm. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). On motion for
summary judgment where there was no proof of a written agreement sufficient to satisfy the New
York statute of frauds, silence in response to offeror's letter confirming the alleged agreement
does not constitute acceptance by the defendant, absent proof of previous oral agreement or
special circumstances that make such silence equivalent to acquiescence. Id. The hypothetical in
the text is designed to avoid the statute of frauds question and the cases examined in the notes in
this section do not contain relevant issues involving the statute of frauds.
52 
" Special circumstances," involving additional facts and circumstances in which an of-
feree's silence reasonably may be interpreted by the offeror as an acceptance, apparently fall into
two groups: those where the offeree silently takes offered goods and services, and those where the
offeror relies (presumably to his detriment) on the offeree's manifestation of an intention that
silence may operate as an acceptance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note
48, S 72 comment a. For example, silence may constitute an acceptance where the parties
mutually agreed in advance that it would so operate; where the parties have an established course
of dealing in which silence in response to the receipt of offered goods has been treated by them
both as acceptance; and where the offeree took offered services or exercised dominion over goods
with reasonable opportunity to reject them, knowing that the offeror expected compensation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 48, 5 72(1)(a)(C) & (2); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 47, 5 2-21, at 64-68; and 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 46, SS 73-76, at 310-28,
and cases cited therein.
53 For an explanation of the operative facts doctrine see note 13 supra and sources cited
therein.
54 The reader should note that the "circumstances" cognizable under the hearsay ex-
ception and the "special circumstance" cognizable in contract law are not the same. The hearsay
exception is not intended to track any body of substantive doctrine. See 4 D. LOuISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 424, at 274-75, making the point that the evidentiary question is
related to, but distinguishable from the substantive question whether silence indicates accept-
ance. The treatise uses an example in which silence would not amount to an acceptance if made
before performance by the plaintiff, but might be an estoppel if the silence occurred after
performance. The treatise concludes that in the latter situation the silence is admissible; in the
former "the evidence would either be excluded as irrelevant on the ground that the law of con-
tracts holds that in such circumstances silence cannot amount to acceptance, or at the very least
held insufficient to establish this point." Id. at 275. As explained more fully in the text at notes
52-53 supra, evidence of an offeree's silence in one of the "special circumstances" under which
contract law permits silence to operate as an acceptance or estoppel would be admissible as an
operative fact (not hearsay at all). See, however, cases cited supra in note 63.
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substantive law. Hence, a party's silence is not used to bind him to a contract
except in those few instances in which the law of contracts provides for that
result.
The potential for conflict between the doctrines of evidence and contracts,
however, does not occur when a party's silence is urged to be admissible
because it is operative conduct that binds him to a contract, but rather results
when it is urged that a party by his silence admitted that he was bound by
another, substantively binding act. For example, suppose that instead of rely-
ing solely on B's silence in the hypothetical situation set out above, A alleges
formation of an express contract, accepted orally by B in a telephone call. B
denies that he accepted, alleging either that there was no phone call, that he re-
jected A's offer, or that he remained silent in response to all offers. At the trial,
A offers to prove the existence of the alleged oral agreement by showing his sec-
ond letter to B "confirming our prior agreement," which letter A now claims
to have written and sent soon after the alleged phone call, and to which B failed
to respond." Should the court admit A's letter and B's silence as proof of the
alleged agreement? B's silence cannot be considered an operative fact because
no circumstances are suggested to make it so. A is a stranger to B, has not
alleged any reliance on B's failure to respond, and has conferred no goods, nor
any other benefits in the form of services, on B. 56
 B's silence, however, may not
be urged to be an operative fact but only evidence of his former, binding act. The
issue presented, then, is whether the evidence will be admitted as an exception
to the hearsay rule, or excluded because contrary to contract law policy.
Not surprisingly, sampled decisions were split on the question of the ad-
missibility of adoptive admissions in contract cases according to which doctrine
was focused on by the court. Those courts which seemingly viewed the question
as involving solely the proper use of the hearsay exception held the evidence ad-
" Facts almost identical to the hypothetical situation may be found in the following
cases: Fentron Architectural Metals Corp. v. Romagnino, 69 N.J. Super. 410, 174 A.2d 491
(App. Div. 1961), cert. denied, 36 N.J. 297, 177 A.2d 341 (1962). In Romagnino, the plaintiff sub-
contractor alleged oral agreement made on telephone by which defendant contractor guaranteed
plaintiff would be given the subcontract if defendant were to win a bid. Id. at 413, 174 A.2d at
493. The defendant denied that any agreement was made. Id. at 414, 174 A.2d at 493-94. The
only evidence of the oral agreement was testimony by plaintiff. The plaintiff offered to prove his
letters confirming alleged telephonic agreement and defendant's silence in response to them. Id.
at 417-18, 174 A.2d at 495-96. In A.B. Leach & Co. v. Peirson, 275 U.S. 120 (1927), the plain-
tiff alleged that defendant's agent agreed to repurchase bonds at the same price that defendant, a
bond house, sold them to plaintiff. Id. at 127. The defendant denied that his agent made such an
agreement and alleged the agent lacked the authority to make it. Id. The plaintiff offered to prove
his letter confirming alleged agreement and defendant's nonresponse thereto. Id. In Trainer v.
Fort, 310 Pa. 570, 165 A. 232 (1933), the plaintiff-broker and defendant-seller disagreed on
terms of an oral brokerage contract made on telephone. Id. at 572, 165 A. at 233. No statute of
frauds question was raised. Proof on both sides consisted solely of the parties' testimony. The
defendant offered to prove his "confirmatory" communication containing terms consistent with
defendant's version, and plaintiff's nonresponse, to prove that the agreed terms were as defend-
ant alleged. Id. at 574-75, 165 A. at 234.
56 See supra note 52.
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missible. 57 Those courts which broadened their inquiries to include the rules of
contract formation relating to acceptance by silence held the evidence inad-
missible." There was only one exception to this dichotomy among the opinions
examined. 59
A narrow focus on the hearsay exception for admissions by silence and its
rationale readily explains the sampled decisions admitting the evidence of
silence in response to a confirmatory communication. In each of these cases,
there was a sufficient foundation for use of the hearsay exception." There was
evidence, independent of the confirmatory letter, to prove that the parties had
some agreement, if only the testimony of A to the offer and acceptance. There
was a showing that B received the confirmatory communication, had
knowledge of its contents, and an opportunity to respond. 6 ' As a matter of
human experience many people — especially those who do not order their
" Megarry Bros., Inc. v. United States, 404 F.2d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 1968); Hellenic
Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 340 F.2d 398, 401 (2d Cir. 1965), aff'd, 359 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1966);
Golden West Constr. Co. v. United States, 304 F.2d 753, 756 (10th Cir. 1962); Willard
Helburn, Inc. v. Spiewack, 180 F.2d 480, 482 (2d Cir. 1950); McCoy v. Alsup, 94 N.M. 255,
260, 609 P.2d 337, 342 (Ct. App. 1980).
38 A.B. Leach & Co. v. Peirson, 275 U.S. 120, 128 (1927); Fentron Architectural
Metals Corp. v. Romagnino, 69 N. J. Super. 410, 417-18, 174 A.2d 491, 495-96 (App. Div.
1961); Anderson v. Cactus Heights Country Club, 80 S.D. 417, 425, 125 N.W.2d 491, 495-96
(1963).
38 Trainer v. Fort, 310 Pa. 570, 578, 165 A. 232, 235 (1933), held evidence of plaintiff's
silence admissible despite express recognition that the plaintiff had no duty under contract law to
respond to the communication. The reasoning is almost diametrically opposed to that presented
in this section.
Yet while in law silence often has great evidentiary value, it has little or no con-
tractual value . . . If in the case before us the plaintiff had promptly protested
defendant's memorandum of December 22d, it clearly would have been for the
jury to decide whether the oral contract . was . . . made. The plaintiff's failure
to reply to the memorandum does not alter the situation except in this respect:
Plaintiff's case is less convincing because there was only silence where naturally
... we would expect a protest . . . The proposition that plaintiff's [silence
amounted to an acceptance] must be rejected. The significance of silence is for the
triers of the facts.
Id. at 578-79, 165 A.2d at 235.
60 Most thoughtful commentators, discussing use of the exception generally urge that
admissibility be conditioned at least on a showing that the statement was made, that the silent
party heard the statement, had personal knowledge of the subject, and an opportunity to re-
spond. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 424, at 291-96; 4 WEINSTEIN's
EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 801(d)(2)(B)[01], at 801-145 to 801-151. But see 4 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 42, S 1072, at 116-17 & nn.4-7 (arguing, in context of silence allegedly indicating adoption
of oral statements, that some of these requirements may be too strict).
Some of the cases admitting the evidence have been cited approvingly in evidence
treatises as examples of the sort of detailed inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the silence
that courts should make. 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, T 801(d)(2)(B)[01], at 801-146
(citing Megarg Bros., Inc. and Hellenic Lines, supra note 57, infra note 63; 4 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 37, S 424, at n.26 also citing Willard Helburn, Inc., supra note 57, infra note
63. The cases so cited might also be construed as reaching the right result under substantive prin-
ciples as well as evidentiary principles by slightly different reasoning. See the discussion of these
cases, infra note 63.
81 See cases cited supra note 57.
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behavior to the letter of the law — would presumably respond with a denial of a
"confirmatory" communication if they did not believe it to be true. 62 Ap-
parently reasoning solely from such general observations of human behavior,
these courts concluded that in such circumstances it would be natural for B to
deny the contents of the letter if he disagreed with it." Courts accepting this
approach, therefore, hold that a party's silence properly may be considered by
the Trier as an indication that the party acquiesced in the truth of the adverse
party's confirmatory communication. 64
u See supra note 57.
6 ' See cases cited supra note 57. In three of the sampled decisions admitting confirmatory
communications and silence in response to them, it appears, from the facts articulated in the
opinions, that the courts might have found the silence admissible as an "operative fact." All
three courts used solely an evidence rationale, however, although one recognized the operative
fact rationale as an alternate ground for admissibility. In Megarry Bros., Inc. v. United States,
404 F.2d 479, 481-83 (8th Cir. 1968), Hellenic Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 340 F.2d 398, 399-400
(2d Cir. 1965), aff'd, 359 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1966), and Willard Helburn, Inc. v. Spiewack, 180
F.2d 480, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1950), the parties agreed that there was some contract between them.
In Megarry and Willard Helburn the parties disagreed about the terms of the contracts; in Hellenic
Lines, they disagreed about the existence of an additional contract allegedly covering other related
matters. In each case, the party who wrote the confirmatory communication at issue received no
reply, and either performed or continued to perform his alleged contractual obligations, thereby
arguably conferring benefits on the silent party. While the facts are not clear, it is arguable that
the three courts might have reasoned that the Trier reasonably could have found that the silent
party, knowing that performance was being rendered under a mistaken impression that the terms
in the confirmation were satisfactory to the silent party, had a duty to respond. Failure to object,
therefore, might have been held to create an estoppel. It is unclear from the cases whether there
was enough in the facts to justify a finding that the party who sent the communication was under
such a mistaken impression. In Willard Helburn, Inc., the court recognized this as an alternate
ground for admissibility. 180 F.2d 482-83.
While courts are not necessarily to be criticized for reaching the right result (ad-
missibility, if it was justified in these cases) for the wrong reason, the failure to examine more
carefully the relationship between the evidence ruling and substantive framework in which the
evidence is urged has obscured the analysis enough to lead to apparently wrong results in at least
one other case. E. A. Meyer Constr. Co. v. Drobnick, 49 Ill. App. 2d 51, 199 N.E.2d 447, 451
(App. Ct. 1964). There the court held that the trial judge properly admitted a confirmatory com-
munication because defendants did not present the "right" objection to the court. The letter was
apparently admitted over defendants' objection that their failure to answer did not indicate
agreement. Id. On appeal, they argued that the letter was self-serving. Id. According to the ap-
peals court, the latter ground was the "right" objection, the former was not. Id. By compartmen-
talizing its ruling on an "evidence" objection separately from its knowledge of contract law, the
court failed to realize that these were simply different articulations of the same objection. See
quotation from A.B. Leach & Co., infra note 70.
64
 That the preliminary fact necessary to the soundness of the inference (the prior exist-
ence of an agreement) is identical to that which the hearsay is offered to prove does not appear
any more troublesome for these courts in this context than in the many other contexts in which
such a coincidence occurs. That coincidence has, however, given commentators and courts some
difficulty in certain areas of the law and has led to special rules relating to, for example, the use of
agent's statements under the admissions exceptions where the "agent's" agency and/or scope of
authority is in issue, and the use of a "coconspirator's" statements implicating a defendant as a
coconspirator where the defendant denies his participation in the conspiracy. See infra text and
notes at 176-77. There is much thoughtful comment in this area. See 1 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 34, § 33 and sources cited therein; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note
29, at 36-49 and sources cited therein. If there is any problem in the instant cases, it is
presumably cured by the testimony of the offering party who lays a sufficient foundation for use
of the statement to prove agreement by his own testimony that there was such an agreement.
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On the other hand, widening the preliminary inquiry to include the law of
contract formation, reveals that such proof probably should be excluded. Con-
tract law imposes no duty on B to respond to the confirmation letter in order to
avoid being bound by its terms. 65 If B is bound to a contract, it must be solely
because of his alleged oral acceptance. B's later behavior, unless it constitutes
an express acceptance of the terms of the confirmatory communication, has no
substantive meaning. Just as a later repudiation by B could not relieve him of
the binding effect of an earlier acceptance, B's later silence could not turn an
earlier rejection of the offer into a binding acceptance. 66
In these circumstances, B's silence is at best ambiguous behavior. While B
might have felt the need to respond with a denial, he had no substantive duty to
do so. 67 Thus his silence can mean that he thereby conformed his behavior to
contract law to avoid being bound to a contract, as easily as it can mean that he
thereby acknowledged the existence of an earlier oral agreement.
The law of contracts rejects silence as insufficient to constitute an ac-
ceptance precisely because it is ambiguous." Under the hearsay exception,
however, ambiguity of inference will not generally render the hearsay inad-
missible. Rather, as long as the inference of acquiescence from the party's
silence is reasonable, the choice between acquiescence and competing inferences
is left to the jury." Clearly, however, an inference of acquiescence from a par-
ty's silence cannot be reasonably drawn if to do so would interfere with the
operation of the substantive law.
It might be argued that the mere use of a party's silence in response to the
adverse party's letter of confirmation as evidence to prove a preexisting con-
tract does not change the letter of contract law rejecting silence as acceptance.
There is undoubtedly a conceptual difference between a rule that would admit
a party's silence as evidence of a previous, substantively binding, acceptance and
one that would hold it sufficient to constitute an acceptance. In practical effect,
however, they are here the same. If in all cases B's non-response were held ad-
65 See supra text and notes at notes 48-52.
66 See supra text and notes at notes 48-52, and compare test with reasoning in Trainer v.
Fort, 310 Pa. 570, 165 A.2d 232 (1933), discussed in notes 51 and 59 supra.
" See supra text and notes at notes 48-52.
68 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 46, $ 72, at 306.
69 See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 42, 1072, at 129 (noting that although in some cir-
cumstances the inference of acquiescence is not very strong, it may always be explained away),
and compare with sources in note 60 supra. Although commentators urge the courts to scrutinize
carefully the circumstances to determine whether a "reasonable" person would have denied the
statement, (see, e.g. , G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE $ 56, at 195-96
(1978); MCCORMIcK, supra note 7, 270, at 653), no one has suggested that acquiescence need
be the only inference. Applying a very strict standard in a criminal case, the court in United
States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976), stated
that a sufficient foundation was laid when there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable in-
ference that the accused heard, understood and acquiesced in the statement.
See also Saltzburg, Standards of Proof, supra note 32, at 275 & n.14 (There is no single solu-
tion for all preliminary questions of fact "unless it is the notion that relevant evidence may be ex-
cluded from consideration at trial if some social policy outweighs the need for evidence." Id. at
275 (footnote omitted)).
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missible to prove B's earlier acceptance, the everyday behavior of at least those
who know and rely on the law would be affected, if not changed. The law of
contracts might proclaim that A cannot force B to "take a pen in his hand,"
but a cunning A would know otherwise. B, of course, would be a fool to count
on contract law if his non-response could be used in evidence against him in a
suit by A. A mere ruling on the admissibility of evidence could thus substan-
tially interfere with the operation of the substantive law. 7°
It is conceivable that the courts which admit evidence of B's silence are at-
tempting thereby to change the law of contracts, although little hint of such a
motive was found in the cases examined. If so, the change seems to have re-
mained a secret. Even the standard literature on the subject reports the con-
tract rule unchanged." Certainly announcements of substantive changes are
better made in a substantive, rather than evidentiary, context so that the
changes may be noticed and examined by those familiar with the subject, and
understood by persons whose conduct may be affected. 72
More likely, those courts that admit the evidence simply do not recognize
the connection between their evidentiary rulings and the law of contract forma-
tion. By failing to recognize the connection, the hearsay exception was applied
as it would have been in any other case, with the potentially unhappy and
unintended result noted. If the judicial rule of thumb in all cases for applying
hearsay exceptions included inquiry into the relationship between use of the
hearsay and the substantive law, courts could more readily avoid such
unintended consequences."
B. Lost and Destroyed Wills
Just as there is a potential conflict between evidentiary and substantive
doctrines in the proof of a contractual agreement by silent adoption of
7°
 Perhaps avoiding this collision between evidence and substance was what Justice
Holmes had in mind in A.B. Leach & Co. v. Peirson, 275 U.S. 120 (1927), when he held the
plaintiff's confirmation letter and the defendant's silent response to it inadmissible to prove that
the parties had a contract:
A man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the
statements that he wishes to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by send-
ing it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the facts. He no more can impose a
duty to answer a charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore, a
failure to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further circumstances
making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as an admission. (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 128.
" See sources cited supra notes 48-52.
72
 It is not suggested here that the law of contracts and the doctrine of estoppel are
perfect. Indeed, experts in those fields might wish to change them to conform to the observations
of ordinary human nature underlying the hearsay exception for admissions by silence. The
wisdom of such a change is beyond the scope of this article and, it is suggested, beyond the scope
of evidence law. To effectuate adjective purposes, the rules of evidence must serve, not replace or
change, rules of substance.
73 Perhaps the confusion that occurs when a party makes the same objection in the
parlance first of one law, and then another, might also be avoided. See discussion of P.A. Meyer
Constr. Co. v. Drobnick, supra note 63.
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another's statements, there is also a potential for conflict in the use of hearsay
generally admissible under an exception to the ban in cases where the probate
of a lost or destroyed will is sought.
Unlike those courts which failed to notice the problem in the contracts
cases, in cases involving lost wills most courts seem aware of the potential for
subversion of the substantive doctrine. These courts make no apologies for ad-
justing the use of hearsay otherwise admissible under the state of mind excep-
tion to suit the policies of the substantive laws. The hearsay exception is not
permitted to threaten the policies of the law, but may be readily used when no
threat is posed. The holdings thus reflect a conscious and careful attempt to ac-
commodate the competing rationales for the hearsay exception and the
substantive laws involved.
Moreover, these courts demonstrate a willingness to express the influence
of substantive policies on their evidentiary rulings. This openness prevents
given decisions from being mistaken as broad precedent for use when the same
hearsay is offered in a different substantive context. Thus a state of mind hear-
say declaration which is inadmissible in a case involving the probate of a lost or
destroyed will is fully admissible in a tort suit against the individual charged
with the will's destruction! The wisdom of this apparently inconsistent use of
the state of mind exception may be seen by a brief examination, first, of the use
of such declarations in probate actions, particularly the probate of lost and
destroyed wills, and, next, in the comparison between tort and probate actions
involving destroyed wills.
1. The State of Mind Exception in Wills Cases
a. Generally
The hearsay exception for declarations of a person's own mental condition
(state of mind) ostensibly makes admissible in all cases the declarant's
statements of his feelings, motive, plan or design." Statements such as "I love
X," "I wish I could have all of X's money" and "I intend to go to the movies
tonight" are admissible under this exception when the declarant's state of
mind is in issue. The exception is justified on several grounds. First, it is likely
that utterances reflecting the declarant's then existing state of mind constitute
the most reliable evidence of his inner thoughts obtainable. Thus, such
statements are considered better evidence of the declarant's mental state than
any circumstantial evidence based on observations of his attitude or behavior."
74 See, e.g. , FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (making admissible "a statement of the declarant's
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition, such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health, but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will"). The federal rule has been adopted in one form or
another in 21 states. For other versions of the state-of-mind exception see CAL. EVID. CODE 5
1250 (West 1966); N.J.R. EVID. 63(12). See generally 6J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 7, 55
1714-1740, at 89-189.
75 6 J. WIOMORE, supra note 7, 5 1714, at 90-98; Slough, Spontaneous Statements And State
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Indeed, even the declarant's testimony, subject to memory flaws, may be less
reliable than his out-of-court utterances made closer in time to the mental state
in issue. For the latter reason, the declarant's unavailability, a prerequisite for
the use of some hearsay exceptions, is not required to trigger the use of the state
of mind exception:" Second, such statements are not subject to the vagaries of
inaccurate perception and memory, 77 at least not when they are offered to
prove the mental state asserted." Lastly, since these statements are regarded as
the most reliable evidence obtainable, they are needed to protect the integrity of
Of Mind, 46 IOWA L. REV. 224, 230 (1961) (Other evidence may be either nonexistent or inade-
quate).
16 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, 5 1714, at 90.
" For this reason, some commentators have urged that statements circumstantially in-
dicating a declarant's state of mind, when that state of mind is in issue, should be treated as not
hearsay. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, S 249, at 590-91; 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note
14, 1 803(3)[02], at 803-94 to -96; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, 5 1715, at 98-100. One commen-
tator has urged that direct assertions of state of mind should fall outside the hearsay rule as well.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZEURG, supra note 7, at 346. The author is of the opinion that the
statements are properly classified as hearsay because all hearsay dangers should be recognized in
the definition. See supra note 7. Only then can an intelligent assessment of reliability of the state-
ment in relation to the issues at trial be made. The following commentators (who discuss this par-
ticular issue in some depth) seem in accord on the proper classification of these statements as
hearsay although they have some disagreements on marginal issues. 4 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 441, at 532-33, and S 417; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra note 2,
(points of difference between Morgan and Mueller are noted in 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
supra note 37, 5 417, at 122); Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 394
(1934). The argument that statements circumstantially indicating state of mind are not hearsay is
one sub-part of a larger debate about the appropriate hearsay classification of all conduct not in-
tended as an assertion, offered circumstantially to prove some other fact. In such cases the first
step in the inferential process is from the actor's conduct to his belief in some external fact and
then to the perceptions and memories on which the belief is based. The Federal Rules of
Evidence make all such conduct "not hearsay," FED. R. EVID. 801(c), on the theory that prob-
lems with the actor's narrational skills and sincerity are minimized because no assertion is in-
tended. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee note. Statements circumstantially in-
dicating a declarant's state of. mind, therefore, technically are not hearsay under the federal
rules, although direct statements of his state of mind are hearsay and admissible only under the
exception for statements of state of mind, FED. R. EVID. 803(3). See generally 4 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 14; M0CoRmIcK, supra note 7, SS 244-253, at 579-613; and R. LEMPERT
& S. SAurzsuac, supra note 7, at 330-508. On the general debate over the proper classification of
non-verbal conduct offered as an assertion, compare MCCORMICK, supra note 7, S 250 at 596-601;
4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 1 801(c)[01], at 801-70; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, 5
1788, at 313-14; with 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 414, at 82-90; Finman, Im-
plied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. Rev. 682
(1962).
78 The number of hearsay dangers involved varies with the fact the statement is offered
to prove. When a declarant's statement such as "I feel pressured by Joe" is offered to show
declarant's feeling of pressure, there is no problem with perception nor memory. When it is of-
fered to show that Joe exerted some pressure on declarant, however, all hearsay dangers are pres-
ent because the inference is from declarant's feelings to his observation and memories of Joe's
conduct. See generally Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra note 2, at 189-90, 201. In cases where a will
is contested on the grounds of undue influence, both the testator's state of mind and the actions of
another producing that state of mind are in issue. Courts hesitate to allow the use of the statement
to prove the alleged conduct of the third person because of the hearsay dangers (although it might
come in under FED. R. EvID. 803(3)). See, e.g., Stephenson v, Stephenson, 62 Iowa 163, 165, 17
N.W. 456, 457 (1883); In re Estate of Lehner, 70 N.J. 434, 436, 360 A.2d 383, 384 (1976);
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the fact-finding process in the many cases, including will contests, where
resolving declarant's mental state may be crucial in deciding the applicability
of the substantive law."
Statements reflecting a declarant's then existing state of mind also
generally are admissible to prove the declarant's mental and emotional state
both at a time after and, with some hesitation, before the making of the state-
ment." There is no greater hearsay danger in such use than when the state-
ment is used to show a contemporaneous state of mind. There may, however,
be some question of the value of the statements as probative of a continuing
mental attitude. Nonetheless, when the circumstances indicate that it is
reasonable to expect some continuity in the declarant's mental state over the
period in question the statement is usually considered probative and admissible
under the exception. 8 '
These rationales for the reliability of state of mind hearsay declarations
notwithstanding, in wills cases courts must apply the exception in a discrim-
inating manner to avoid direct conflicts with the statute of wills. The statute of
wills requires that ordinary wills be in writing, attested by a certain number of
witnesses, and signed or acknowledged by the testator in the attesting
witnesses' presence. 82 The purpose of these requirements is to assure that the
Buchanan v. Davis, 12 S.W.2d 978, 982-83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). See also T. ATKINSON, LAW
OF WILLS, 5 100, at 539 (2d ed. 1953); A. CLAPP, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION, S 61, at 144 (5
NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, 3d ed. 1962); 4 D. LOUISELL St C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 443, at
589; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, 5 1738, at 178; McCormick, Evidence Of Declarations of Testators
in Taws, 4 TEx. L. REV. 170-71 (1926); Note, Admissibility In Indiana of Declarations Made Before or
After Execution Of a Will, 35 IND. L.J. 391, 392 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Note, Admissibility in In-
diana].
19 R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 7, at 345-46 ("The substantive law takes
intent into account for so many different purposes."); McCoRmIcK, supra note 7, 5 249, at 590
("The substantive rules often make rights and duties depend on the existence of particular states
of mind or feeling."); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, 5 1714, at 90 (Statements showing state of
mind are more reliable than other evidence).
90 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 441, at 529-530; 6 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 7, 5 1714, at 90. There are two reasons for the hesitation about using declarations of
state of mind that are urged to be probative of declarant's mental state at a prior time. When the
statement expresses a then existing state of mind it is only a single inferential step to its continua-
tion into the future. When the same declaration is offered to show a consistent mental attitude in
the past, its probative value is somewhat weakened by the needed extra inference, not proved by
the making of the statement, that the declarant's attitude arose prior to the making of the state-
ment, at or before the relevant time. Hinton, supra note 77, at 400-07. Moreover, a statement of
memory or belief about a past state of mind contains an extra hearsay danger. Set infra text at notes
90-92 and 115-20.
91 FED. R. EVID. 803(3); see also 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 441, at
529; 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 1 803(3)[02], at 803-98.
92 T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 55 63-73, at 294-348. There is presently a statute of
wills in every jurisdiction. They all contain requirements of formality similar to those discussed in
the text. The singular is used throughout because it is believed that none of the minor differences
between these statutes would have much effect on the reasoning herein. See generally, T. ATKIN-
SON, supra note 78. It should be noted however, that at least in New Jersey, the policy of the law is
undergoing a change and, contrary to the reasoning in the text infra, the courts there are more in-
terested in the subjective intent of the testator. See infra note 123.
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testator's property is distributed according to his true intentions. The courts,
therefore, will treat as a will only those instruments executed with testamentary
intent: a settled intention of the testator to transfer his property in accordance
with the terms of the instrument. Courts will not probate as a "will" the infor-
mal statements of a testator indicating merely a wish to make a will or dispose
of property in a particular way, even when such statements are in writing."
Strict insistence on the statutory formalities is said to have two functions:
ritual and evidentiary. B4 By requiring the would-be testator to satisfy most, if
not all, of the statutory rituals," the statute and the courts impress on him the
significance of his act. When the ritual has been observed, the court is justified
in treating the document as one deliberately intended as a will.° 6 Additionally,
the requirements of a writing and signature insure that evidence of the
testator's intent is "cast in reliable and permanent form."' Since the testator
himself is dead, and memories of his less formal statements may have faded or
been colored by avarice and self-interest, the insistence on a formally executed
document safeguards against fraud, perjury and the possibility of a disposition
contrary to the testator's final wish."
To appreciate the possible conflict between the policies of the statute of
wills and the use of the state of mind exception in lost wills cases, a brief review
of some of the settled distinctions the courts have drawn when using the excep-
tion in wills cases generally is helpful. For example, under the hearsay excep-
tion each of the following statements might be urged admissible in proceedings
involving wills: "I am leaving my estate to X because I love her," "I intend to
leave my estate to X because I love her," and "I left my estate to X because I
loved her." The admissibility of such statements in wills cases will largely de-
pend on underlying substantive policies.
Accordingly, courts will almost always admit such statements when of-
fered to support or rebut a challenge that the testator lacked mental capacity,
or was subject to undue influence or fraud at the time he executed the will."
Use of the statements for this purpose causes no conflict with the statute of
wills, since there is no danger of distribution according to the informal state-
83 Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L. J. 1, 3 (1941); T.
ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 41, at 207-10, and S 75, at 356 & n.7; A. CLAPP, supra note 78, S 41,
at 105. The balance of the text of this article relating to wills draws heavily on the rationale of the
Statute of Wills developed in the Gulliver and Tilson article.
B. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 83, at 3-4.
66 Apparently some states permit holographic wills, but these must be in writing and
signed. T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 75, at 355-62. Some permit noncupative wills if a variety
of formalities are met. Id., S 76, at 363-67. Soldiers' and sailors' wills are exempted from formali-
ty requirements altogether. Id., S 77, at 368-74.
86 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 83, at 4.
17 Id. at 6.
11 Id. at 6-9; 2 PAGE ON WILLS, 5 19.4, at 66 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960); A. CLAPP, supra
note 78, 5 197, at 907 -09. .
6° See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, SS 51-56, at 232-69 and S 100, at 536-39; R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 7, at 347; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, 5 1738, at 178-88.
There is, however, some conflict relating to whether or not such statements can be used to show
the conduct that caused the feeling of undue influence. See note supra 78 and sources cited therein.
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ment rather than the formally drawn will. Instead, since the statement is likely
to be the best evidence available of the testator's state of mind, its use further
assures that only those instruments executed with the appropriate intent are
given effect. Thus, hearsay admissible under the state-of-mind exception will
be allowed by courts when such use does not conflict with the policies underly-
ing the statute of wills.
Furthermore, even hearsay statements arguably not admissible under the
exception generally may be allowed by these courts. For example, the eviden-
tiary value of the third illustrative statement above, "I left my estate to X
because I love her," depends on the accuracy of the testator's memory. While
that extra hearsay danger probably would make the statement inadmissible
under the state of mind exception in most other cases, 9° there is a special need
to use the statement in wills cases due to the unavailability of the testator." In
addition, the statement may be the most reliable evidence of the testator's in-
tention available. For these reasons, many courts apparently admit such
statements to show the testator's mental condition at the time he wrote the
While each is admissible when no substantive policy is subverted thereby,
none of the illustrative statements, however, would be admissible on most
issues involving the construction of a will. Such statements would be inadmissi-
ble because of the requirements of formal execution contained in the statute of
wills. Where, for example, a will admitted to probate contains a blank space in-
stead of the name of a beneficiary beside a particular bequest, the courts will
not admit the testator's statements to show that he intended a disposition to
X. 93
 Use of an informal statement to fill in such a blank would be directly con-
trary to the mandate of the statute of wills." Similarly, courts refuse to receive
direct statements of intention to clarify most ambiguities that appear in other-
wise duly executed wills." Only in a small number of cases, where the
testator's true intentions cannot be resolved otherwise, will courts admit such
9° FED. R. EvID. 803(3); 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, S 441, at 529.
But see CAL. EVID. CODE S 1251 (West 1966) (statements of memory of a previous mental state
are admissible where the mental state is in issue and declarant is unavailable).
91 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 443; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, S
271, at 577-78 (1954); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, S 1738, at 180.
92
 CAL. EVID. CODE S 1251 (West 1966); T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 100, at 538;
and cases cited in 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, 55 1739-40, at 188-89.
93
 There is no remedy in probate or equity for mistakes of omission (absent fraud)
because the will must be in writing. T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 58, at 274-75; A. CLAPP, supra
note 78, 5 197, at 309-10; 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 2473, at 250 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (it
depends on whether the blank space is an equivocation).
44 See sources cited in note 93 supra.
55
 T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 60, at 281-88; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 92, SS
2471-72, at 238-50. According to Atkinson and Clapp, the courts, however, do receive evidence
of the testator's indirect assertions from which his settled intent may be inferred. See infra note 96.
The reason may be partly that such statements are not considered hearsay since there need be no
reliance on the declarant's narrational skills nor, in some cases, the honesty of his assertions. See
sources and discussion in note 77 supra. Also, there is apparently no danger of a conflict with the
formalism required by the statute of wills in the use of indirect statements because their use could
not logically result in disposition according to the terms of the statements.
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statements." Apparently the courts believe that the formality mandated by the
statute proscribes not only the actual probate of informal statements, but also
the use of these statements to explain the settled and final intentions incor-
porated into the formal document. 97
96 Prof. Robert Carter of the Rutgers Law School faculty, has observed that in most of
those instances in which the courts hold the declarations of the testator inadmissible, (1-3 below)
there are ample means for construing the disposition and disposing of the testator's property
under the will, without considering the testator's statements. Private conversation (July, 1981).
In cases of patent and latent ambiguities, (4 and 5 below), however, indirect statements and cir-
cumstantial evidence may be of little, or no help. The disposition would probably have to fail
unless the testator's direct statements of intention are considered and the courts are thus more
likely to receive the statements in these cases.
A description of a beneficiary or property in a will may be urged to be mistaken for at
least one of several reasons. (1) The description may accurately describe one person or thing, but
the opponent wishes to show that the testator customarily described another person or thing by
the terms used in the will. Sometimes the courts will not allow.such an attack on the grounds that
to do so would disturb the "plain meaning" of the will. Where courts do allow such an attack,
however, they apparently won't admit evidence of the direct statements of the testator, relying in-
stead on circumstantial evidence of usage, T. ATKINSON, Supra note 78, 5 60, at 285-86; A.
CLAPP, supra note 78, 5 198, at 316-17 & n.4. If the circumstantial evidence is not convincing the
court can dispose of the property without use of the testator's direct declarations according to the
will as written. Since the bequest will not fail, the testator's declarations are not needed. (2) A
description may fit an existing person or property in part, but be incorrect in part. The example
given by Atkinson is "a testatrix devised her seven houses on a certain street when she really
owned eight houses there." T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, S 60, at 283. Apparently most courts
will not admit proof of the testator's direct statements of intention, preferring instead to put itself
in the position of the testator. In such a case the disposition need not fail because it can be con-
strued as giving all eight houses to the named beneficiary. Id. Wigmore agrees in principle, 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 93, 5 2471, at 238, but uses a similar hypothetical (where the devise is
"one of my seven houses") as an example of an incomplete testamentary act which fails for that
reason. Id., 5 2472, at 251. (3) The description may inaccurately describe a person or thing, but
there is only one possible claimant to the will, e.g., where a charitable institution is misnamed in
the will. Apparently the courts will correct the error but refuse to admit evidence of the testator's
statements. T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 60, at 285. (4) In cases of "patent" ambiguities, e.g.,
where the legacy applies on its face to more than one person, many courts do not admit the
testator's declarations and so the legacy must fail. T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 60, at 287-88; 9
J. WIGMORE, supra note 93, S 2474, at 253-59. Not surprisingly, the modern view is to the con-
trary, and the rule is changing. Wilson v. Flowers, 58 N.J. 250, 263, 277 A.2d 199, 207 (1971)
(abolishing the distinction between latent and patent ambiguities for purposes of admitting direct
statements of testator's intent); A. CLAPP, supra note 78, S 197, at 136-37 & n.3 (Supp. 1980). (5)
Where the legacy applies on its face to only one person but there are two people of the same
description (latent ambiguity) most courts apparently admit the declarations of the testator
directly stating his intentions. T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 60, at 287; A. CLAPP, supra note 78,
5 197, at 311-12 & n.18; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 93, S 2472, at 243.
97 As Wigmore has observed:
The reason is hardly to be found in any prohibitory rule of evidence, for
such declarations are admissible under the hearsay exception.... Nor is it that
these declarations are not useful, for together with others they would certainly help
to throw light on the question [what was intended by the testator]. The true reason
is found in another rule, already considered — the rule which prohibits setting up
any extrinsic utterance to compete with and overthrow the words of a document which solely
embodies the transaction .... The effect of that rule is to deny any jural effect to
just such declarations. It is true that where the act is required by statute to be in
written form — as, a will — there is the additional reason that the oral utterance
would fail to fulfill that formality. But even without such a statutory requirement
the other rule would be adequate to prohibit. When a transaction has been even
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b. Lost Wills Cases:
i) The Policy of Ritual
A claim that a testator's will has been lost through accident or the
fraudulent design of another presents some peculiar problems for both the law
of wills and the law of evidence. Understandably, courts are reluctant to
probate an allegedly lost will; 98 yet, they also are mindful of the need to prevent
frustration of the testator's true intent. 99 An accommodation has been made
between these competing substantive policies in most jurisdictions, either by
statute or by common law."° While rules vary from state to state, it is generally
required that the party propounding the lost will must prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence: (i) that the will was executed in accordance with the usual
statutory requirements, (ii) that a diligent and unsuccessful search was made
for the lost will, and (iii) that, with some degree of certainty, the terms of the
will were as alleged."' If the testator had access to the will before his death, the
party seeking to probate the lost will must also overcome with convincing proof
a presumption that the will was revoked by the testator. 102
To carry this heavy burden, proponents of lost wills frequently offer
statements similar to the three illustrative examples above.'" The evidentiary
voluntarily embodied in a single document, no other utterance of intent or will on
the same subject can be given jural effect. Hence, such a declaration is excluded
from consideration even in the process of interpretation, not because it would not
for that purpose be useful, but because it would be improper for the other purpose.
There being two conceivable purposes for which it could be used, the one proper,
the latter improper, it is excluded because of the risk that the latter would
dominate and that the temptation to abuse would be too strong.
This conclusion might have been declined by the courts; and certainly the
rule as it stands does not obey the principle . that a fact relevant for one purpose
but not for another may still be received for the former. Nevertheless, the rule is
intelligible and its policy rational. It rests on an attempt to insure an observance of
the integration rule ... even at the cost of losing some useful data for the process
of interpretation.
9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 93, S 2471, at 238-39 (citations and footnotes omitted).
See also In re Cook, 44 N.J. 1, 11-13, 206 A.2d 865, 870-71 (1965) (Hall, J., dissenting);
A. CLAPP, supra note 78, at $ 197, at 309 ("The reason for excluding the testator's direct
statements of his intention is because the Wills Act has required the wishes of the testator to be in-
tegrated into a formal document, as a safeguard against fraud .... ").
98 T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, $ 97, at 506 (The will may never have existed, been
validly executed, or the testator himself may have destroyed it.).
99 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 83, at 6-7.
100 3 PAGE ON WILLS, 55 27.3-.4 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1961); T. ATKINSON, supra note 78,
$ 97, at 506-13.
101 T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, $ 97, at 508-11; 3 PAGE, supra note 100, $$ 27.1-.6,
27.11. Atkinson says that the proof must be "clear and convincing." T. ATKINSON, supra note
78, 5 97, at 508. Clapp alludes to cases in which the requirement was claimed to be "beyond a
reasonable doubt." A. CLAPP, supra note 78, S 145, at 271-72 & n.22. See also Hollon's Ex'r v.
Graham, 280 S.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Ky. 1955); In re Will of Roman, 80 N.J. Super. 481, 483,
194 A.2d 40, 41 (Hudson County Ct. 1963); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 393, at 191-93 (1955 & Later
Case Ser. 1980). See generally Evans, The Probate of Last Wills, 24 NEB. L. REV. 283 (1945).
102
 See sources cited supra note 101.
105 See cases cited infra notes 123-25.
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issue — the appropriate use of the state of mind exception — is now somewhat
different from the previous examples. Here the proponent generally offers the
testator's utterances not to show the testator's state of mind, because that is not
usually contested, but to prove the material facts necessary for probate: the due
execution, the contents and the nonrevocation of the allegedly lost will. The
proponent thus seeks the benefit of favorable inferences from the testator's in-
formal utterances to prove that the testator performed certain acts conforming
to the thoughts so expressed.
There is strong support in the general body of evidence law for the use of
all of these statements. The admissibility of each, however, is rationalized on
its own distinct basis. Statements allegedly made contemporaneously with the
doing of an act (e.g., "I am leaving my estate to X," if spoken at the time the
testator allegedly signed the will) have long been admitted because they are
viewed as part of the res gestae. 104
 When there is other evidence of the act, and
there usually is, the statements are admitted technically only to explain the act,
and not as evidence of it."' For this reason, and for reasons explained more
fully below, admissibility of these contemporaneous statements presents no
problems in lost wills cases. 106
Forward- and backward-looking statements such as "I intend to leave my
estate to X" and "I left my estate to X," however, are not received readily on
all issues in lost wills cases. The reason, however, is not traceable to the law of
evidence. Forward-looking statements of intention were held generally ad-
missible under the state-of-mind exception to prove a declarant's subsequent
conduct more than a century ago in the famous case Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Hillman.'" There the defendant life insurers claimed that a body found at
Crooked Creek, Kansas was that of one Walters, and not the insured,
Hillman. To prove the point, the defendants offered in evidence two letters
written by Walters and mailed from Wichita to his fiancee and sister stating his
intention to go to Crooked Creek with Hillmon. 108
 After observing the inherent
reliability of statements of intention and the difficulty of proving mental state
"4
 The term "res gestae" is used with various meanings, see Morgan, A Suggested Classi-
fication Of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922) [hereinafter cited as
Morgan, Suggested Classation]; Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REV. 91 (1937) [hereinafter
cited as Morgan, Res Gestae].
"" It is usually required that the statements have accompanied the act, or been near
enough in time to the act to be viewed as part of it. See, e.g., In re Morrison's Estate, 198 Cal. 1,
7-8, 242 P. 939, 941-42 (1926) (statement of testator that paper he showed to witnesses was his
will). See also explanation in Morgan, Suggested Classification, supra note 104, 232-33; Morgan, Res
Gestae, supra note 104, 92-94.
06
 See infra text at notes 126-28. If there is acceptable evidence of the making of the will
in the form of eyewitness testimony to the event, then the courts will admit the testator's contem-
poraneous utterances. In re Burbank, 104 A.D. 312, 93 N.Y.S. 866 (1905) (testator's statements
are generally inadmissible unless part of res gestae) aff'd mem., 185 N.Y. 559, 77 N.E. 1183 (1906).
1 p7 145 U.S. 285 (1892). For a complete history of the Hillman case see J. WIGMORE,
PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 856-96 (1913). For a very interesting and thorough discussion
of Harlon and its doctrinal ramifications see 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, SS
441-443.
1" 145 U.S. at 287-89.
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when the condition itself is in issue, the Supreme Court ruled the letters ad-
missible even though Walters' state of mind was not an ultimate issue in the
case. 109 The letters were "competent" evidence because they made it "more
probable both that [Walters] did go [to Crooked Creek] and that he went with
Hillmon, than if there had been no proof of such intention. „110
While the Court's holding was criticized for expanding the state of mind
exception to include statements not needed to effectuate substantive
purposes,"' it generally has been followed112 — but not in lost wills cases. That
the reason for the refusal to admit such statements in lost wills cases lies in the
substantive policies reflected in the statute of wills is partly indicated by the
absence of any reason under normal evidentiary principles for the exclusion.
Indeed, in lost wills cases, there is an even stronger evidentiary argument that
expansion of the exception is needed to assure that most such cases do not fail
for lack of evidence. While state of mind is not the central issue, absence of the
actual will often makes proof of the testator's utterances the only evidence
available on the questions of due execution and contents. Moreover, in lost
wills cases, just as in the use of Walters' letters to prove that he went to
Crooked Creek, there is no extra hearsay danger involved in the use of
forward-looking declarations to prove due execution and contents. The Trier
need not rely upon the testator's perception or memory. Rather, in crediting
the statement, the Trier relies solely on the sincerity and narrational skills of
the testator in the same way it would rely on these skills if state of mind were
the issue. The statement is then probative of the testator's later conforming act
by a process of inference from belief in the sincerity of the statement to the
probability that he acted on his intentions. No further reliance on the testator's
credibility is necessary for the second step."s The strength of the inference to
be drawn from the statement of intention to an act of execution or to conform-
ing contents, of course, necessarily would vary from case to case. Where the
declaration of intention is uttered close to the time of the act alleged, however,
and no further circumstances are shown that shed doubt on the testator's good
faith or ability to act, the statement would be admissible under general prin-
ciples of relevance." 4
As with forward-looking hearsay statements, backward-looking state-
ments of a testator such as "I left my estate to X" have been urged admissible
109 145 U.S. at 295-96.
"° 145 U.S. at 296.
1 ” See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, S 442 n.91; Hinton, supra note 77,
at 404 et seq.; Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations On The Law Of Evidence — State Of Mind To
Prove An Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283, 285-88 (1929); Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26
HARV. L. REV. 146, 155-56 (1912).
FED. R. EVID. 803(3); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, S 1714, at 90-98; MCCORMICK,
supra note 7, 5 295, at 697-701.
" 9 Hinton, supra note 77, at 404.
"' For an interesting discussion of the factors that might be considered in evaluating the
probativeness of the statement, see 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 442, at
549-58.
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in wills cases by most eminent evidence scholars" 5 and now are admissible in
such cases under the federal rules of evidence." 6 In other cases, however, these
statements are usually banned, because of their inherent unreliability."' In-
deed, the strongest criticism of Hillman was addressed to the seemingly offhand
holding that Walters' letters could be used to show that Hillmon went to
Crooked Creek, too. 18 Viewing Walters' letters as probative of Hillmon's ac-
tions requires reliance not just on Walters' sincerity and narrational skills, but
also on his perception and memory of Hillmon's conduct or communications.
Although it has been argued that by treating the backward-looking statement
as only circumstantially probative of the acts that caused the memory asserted
the Trier could avoid these extra hearsay steps, the point is hard to grasp.'" To
15 See sources cited supra note 91, and MCCoRmICK, supra note 7, S 296, at 701-04.
18 FED. R. EVID. 803(3). The rule is rather strange since the federal courts have no
jurisdiction over probate matters. The rule, however, may influence the way state courts view the
matter. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 443, at 586.
" 7 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 106 (1933); FED. R. EVID. 803(3). In a very
few cases they have been admitted. See, e.g. , United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 377-78
(2d Cir.) (declarant's statement of memory of another's conduct included in utterance expressing
declarant's existing intention to do an act, admitted to show both declarant's later act and prior
conduct of other person), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961); Nuttall v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546,
551-52 (3d Cir. 1956) (deceased worker's statements saying he was being forced to work by
employer's agent despite his illness admitted in FELA action to prove agent's conduct). Other
cases are collected and discussed in 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, SS 442-43, at
562-83.
"I 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 442, at 558-64; Hinton, supra note
77, 409-20. The federal rule appears to exclude statements offered to show the conduct of
another. But see 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 442, at 560-64, and cases cited
and discussed therein.
15 For attempts to explain the reasoning, see Seligman, supra note 111, at 151-53 and
Hinton, supra note 77. In Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933), the defendant claimed
his decedent wife committed suicide. Id. at 102. The prosecution charged the death was murder.
Id. at 98. The trial court permitted the prosecution to show a statement the decedent made to her
nurse, "Dr. Shepard poisoned me," as a dying declaration. Id. The Court of Appeals upheld the
conviction. Id. at 102. The appeals court ruled that the statement was not a dying declaration (as
offered) but determined that it was nevertheless admissible under the state of mind exception to
show a belief inconsistent with a suicidal frame of mind. Id. The Supreme Court, after observing
that the defendant "would have no grievance" had use of the statement been "narrowed to that
point," id. at 104, then went on to rule, in seemingly unequivocal language, that the statement
was inadmissible as either circumstantial evidence of Mrs. Shepard's will to live or her memory of
Dr. Shepard's conduct.
It will not do to say that the jury might accept the declarations for any light that
they cast upon the existence of a vital urge, and reject them to the extent that they
charged the death to someone else. Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the
compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating clang of those accusatory words
would drown all weaker sounds. It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysis, that
our rules of evidence are framed. They have their source very often in considerations of
administrative convenience, of practical expediency, and not in rules of logic.
When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, the
evidence goes out....
The ruling in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon marks the high water line
beyond which courts have been unwilling to go .... Declarations of intention,
casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of
memory, pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or nearly that,
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avoid destroying the hearsay rule entirely, therefore, backward-looking
statements, at least those expressly articulated as utterances of memory, are
almost always inadmissible.' 2 °
While the use of backward-looking statements in most instances is unsup-
ported by evidentiary principles, in wills cases it has been argued that the oppo-
site is true. In wills cases, the person with the most intimate knowledge of the
events, the testator, is always unavailable; his prior statements about the ex-
ecution and contents of the will are likely to be the most reliable evidence of his
conduct available."' This proposition is especially true in cases where the
alleged will has disappeared. Thus in such cases there is ample justification
from the standpoint of evidence doctrine for the special exception in the federal
rules for the backward-looking statements of the testator. 122
Despite this wealth of evidence law authority, only one jurisdiction seems to
admit freely the forward- and backward-looking statements of a testator in
proof of the execution and contents of lost wills. 123 In another jurisdiction they
are completely inadmissible, 1 Z 4 and in most they are granted only a limited
to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were ignored.
The testimony now questioned faced backward and not forward. This at
least it did in its most obvious implications. What is even more important, it spoke
to a past act, and more than that, to an act by some one not the speaker. Other
tendency, if it had any, was a filament too fine to be distinguished by a jury. [em-
phasis added] [citation omitted].
Id. at 104-06.
120 See quotation from Shepard v. United States, set out in supra note 119. FED. R.
EVID. 803(3); FED. R. EvID. 803(3) advisory committee note.
121 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, S 443, at 585-89. See also MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 7, 5 296, at 636-39; 6 J. WiGmoRE, supra note 7, 5 1738, at 180.
122 FED. R. EvID. 803(3). The advisory committee note, however, contains the follow-
ing enigmatic language: "The carving out, from the exclusion [of statements of memory and
belief], of declarations relating to the execution, revocation, identification or terms of declarant's
will represents an ad hoc judgment . . . resting on grounds of necessity ... rather than logic."
FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee note.
The Federal Rule has been characterized as a complete repudiation of Throckmorton v.
Holt, 180 U.S. 552 (1901), which was widely understood as making inadmissible the testator's
statements of execution or contents to prove or disprove the genuineness of a will contested as a
forgery. See 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 5 803(3)[05], at 103-10. Courts seem to
have qualms about the admissibility of statements similar to those articulated in the lost wills
cases. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 855, 866-73 (1958). There may be less danger, however, in the
use of such statements where the issue is forgery. If the will offered is duly executed on its face,
the testator's statements will not be used as a substitute for the will; the disposition will be by the
terms of the document if it is not held to be a forgery, or intestate if it is held to be a forgery.
123 In New Jersey these statements appear to be freely admissible to prove execution and
contents of the will. McTamney v. McTamney, 138 N.J. Eq. 28, 30-31, 46 A.2d 444, 446 (Ch.
1946); In re Schnebel's Will, 141 A. 313 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1928), aff'd, 104 N.J. Eq. 488, 146 A.
916 (1929); Campbell v. Cavanaugh, 125 A. 569, 570 (N.J. Ch. 1923), aff'd sub nom. Campbell
v. Smullen, 96 N.J. Eq. 724, 125 A. 926 (1924); A. CLAPP, supra note 78, 5 145, at 273 and cases
cited therein. In New Jersey, however, the usual policy of the law relating to formalism is chang-
ing generally. The courts there are apparently more interested in the testator's subjective desires.
A. CLAPP, supra note 78; S 196 at n.10.5; 5 197 & n.3 (Supp. 1980).
124 In New York these declarations, unless part of the res gestae, are inadmissible to prove
due execution and contents. In re Will of Bonner, 17 N.Y.2d 9, 11, 214 N.E.2d 154, 155, 266
N.Y.S.2d 971, 973 (1966); In re Burbank, 104 A.D. 312, 323, 93 N.Y.S. 866, 873 (1905), aff'd
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form of admissibility.'" None of the cases examined distinguish between
forward- and backward-looking statements. The rules apply to all informal
statements of the testator except those considered part of the res gestae, where
there is eyewitness testimony of the acts. The prevailing rule, whether man-
dated by statute, statutory interpretation or common law development, ap-
pears to be that a will's due execution and contents must be proved by the
testimony of one or two witnesses with direct knowledge of the making of the
will. 126
 The testator's informal statements are admissible solely to corroborate
the eyewitness testimony.'" In some cases, the statements are inadmissible
unless the eyewitness testimony is produced. In other cases the statements are
admissible, but are held by themselves to be insufficient proof of due execution
or of contents. 128 The courts, however, admit more freely the testator's declara-
tions to support and rebut the presumption of nonrevocation. 126
 Thus, despite
the presence of evidentiary principles to support the use of hearsay in all in-
stances, the prevailing rule is to allow such evidence only to show non-
revocation, and to reject such proof to show due execution and contents.
The reasons for this unequal treatment of hearsay statements relate direct-
ly to the courts' awareness of the relationship between the use of the evidence
and the policies underlying the statute of wills. When the testator's statements,
mem., 185 N.Y. 559, 77 N.E. 1183 (1906); In re Yanover's Will, 16 Misc. 2d 128, 131, 182
N.Y.S.2d 961, 965 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Co. 1959); In re Karcher's Estate, 172 Misc. 947, 949, 16
N.Y.S.2d 577, 578 (Sur. Ct., Bronx Co. 1939); In re Estate of Pardy, 161 Misc. 77, 81, 291
N.Y.S. 969, 974 (Sur. Ct., Clinton Co. 1936). See also Brownfield v. Brownfield, 249 S.W.2d
389, 391 (Mo. 1952).
125 T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 97, at 509; 3 PAGE, supra note 100, S 27.3; Annot.,
126 A.L.R. 1139, 1156-58 (1940); Cases collected in Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 393, 399 (1955).
123 See sources cited supra at note 125. In New York, the matter is governed by statute.
See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACTS 1407, (McKinney 1980-1981) (requiring two "credible"
witnesses or one witness plus a draft). The courts assume, without discussion, that the statute
means eye-witnesses to execution and contents. See cases cited supra in note 124. See also the follow-
ing cases as examples of sufficient evidence under the statute: In re Graeber, 53 Misc. 2d 640, 279
N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sur. Ct. 1967); In re Will of Haefner, 4 Misc. 2d 835, 162 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct.
1956). In Oklahoma, the question is apparently considered to be a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion. Cf. In re Estate of Robb, 581 P.2d 1327 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (statutory words "clearly and
distinctly proved by two witnesses" held to mean that witnesses must have direct knowledge of
execution to satisfy statute). In New Jersey, a rule requiring at least one attesting witness was
developed by common law, but it has now been expressly eradicated by Rule 71 of the N.J. Rules
of Evidence. See A. CLAPP, supra note 78, 5 145, at 126-27 n.30 (Sapp. 1980).
127 See sources cited supra in notes 124-26. See also Sparks, Admissibility of Oral Declarations
Of A Testator To Prove A Lost Will In Kentucky, 36 KY. L. J. 431, 436 (1948).
126 See sources cited supra notes 125 and 126. Compare In re Estate of Robb, 581 P.2d
1327, 1328-29 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (evidence admissible but insufficient to prove execution),
with Loy v. Loy, 246 S.W.2d 578, 579-80 (Ky. 1952) (evidence admissible only in corroboration
of testimony of direct eyewitnesses). A perusal of the cases collected at 41 A.L.R.2d 393, 399,
410 (1955) showi that many courts are themselves confused about whether they are applying a
rule of admissibility or sufficiency.
123 T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, at 5 97; Hollon's Ex'r v. Graham, 280 S.W.2d 544,
549 (Ky. 1955); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 943 (1949). T. ATKINSON; supra note 78, S 97, at 511;
Sparks, supra note 127, at 434-36; Note, Admissibility in Indiana, supra note 78, at 395-97. But see In
re Will of Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 406-07, 174 N.E.2d 499, 503, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405, 410-11 (1961); In
re Yanover's Will, 16 Misc. 2d 128, 131-32, 182 N.Y.S.2d 961, 965 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 1959).
July 1982]
	
THE HEARSAY RULE	 887
"I intend to leave my estate to X" or "I left my estate to X," or even, "I have
(or have not) revoked my will'" 30 are offered on the issue of revocation of the
lost will, the statements are admissible because there is no danger of a conflict
with substantive policies. The testator's statement itself cannot constitute the
act of revocation because statutes almost always require revocation to be ac-
complished by one or more specified acts (e.g., burning, mutilation, tearing)
that do not include informal words."' The formal act, however, must be ac-
companied by a deliberate intention to revoke)" As a result, proof that the
requisite intention was lacking makes the formally sufficient act ineffective.'"
Thus the testator's declarations are not used in proof or disproof of the ritual
requirements of the statutes relating to revocation." 4 Moreover, if confined to
the issue of revocation, there is no danger that these informal statements would
form a substitute basis for distribution of the testator's assets contrary to the
mandated distribution by a formally executed will)"
Use of the same statements to prove due execution or contents of a lost
will, however, could result in a conflict with the policy of ritualism expressed in
the statute of wills. The danger is that an informal statement, rather than the
statutorily prescribed formal will, would become the basis for distributing the
testator's assets. The possible conflict with the statute in the use of such
statements, however, is not direct. The testator's utterances are not made ir-
relevant by the statute. Unlike cases involving ambiguities in a will, where the
testator's direct statements are regarded as offering substitutes for language in-
corporated into a formally executed will, the statements are here urged admis-
sible only to prove compliance with the statute. The testator's statements are
circumstantial proof of both the ritual conduct required by the statute of wills
and the language formally incorporated into the document in accordance with
the ritual requirements."
10 The first two statements might be misconstrued as not hearsay because they do not
directly state the intention to revoke, but only a state of mind inconsistent with an intention to
revoke. The last statement, however, is a direct statement of the matter, and almost everyone
would classify it as hearsay. See supra note 77, and sources cited therein.
131 T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, SS 84, 86; 2 PAGE ON WILLS, SS 21.24, .36-.37 (Bowe-
Parker rev. 1960) [hereinafter cited as 2 PAGE]; 3 PAGE, supra note 100, S 29.143, at 707 & n.2;
Sparks, supra note 127, at 433.
"2 T. ATKINSON, supra note 78, 5 84, at 420-22; 2 PAGE, supra note 131, S 21.24, at 384
& n.12; 3 PAGE, supra note 100, SS 29.139-.141, .143-.146.
133 See sources cited supra notes 131 and 132; In re Spiegelglass, 48 N.J. Super. 265, 268,
137 A.2d 440, 441-42 (1958).
"4 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, 5 1757. Sparks, supra note 127, at 433-34; Note, Admis-
sibility in Indiana, supra note 78, at 397.
1 " In other words a statement "I revoked my will" or language from which the fact may
be inferred, would not, if held sufficient only on the issue of revocation, result in disposition of
the property according to the language in the statement. Where statements of intention or
memory of the execution and contents of a will are used to prove those facts, the statement itself if
relied upon, may become the equivalent of the operational language according to which the prop-
erty is distributed if there is no other direct evidence of these facts. That usage would violate the
principle of formality. Use of the same statements in cases where issue is genuineness of a duly
executed document is discussed supra note 122.
'" See cases cited supra at notes 124-26 and 137..
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Nonetheless, the courts view the temptation to rely heavily on such
statements in the process of weighing all the bits and pieces of evidence pro-
pounded on the issues as presenting a grave risk of abuse.' 37 If the testator's
statements were at all decisive in the weighing process, those statements could
replace the statutory formalities by facilitating dispositions according to the in-
formal, unsettled desires of the testator'm whenever a will allegedly disap-
peared. Thus the prevailing rule of limited admissibility may be seen as one
that effectuates the substantive policy of formalism. 139
ii) The Evidentiary Policy — Relative Reliability
The limited admissibility rule in lost wills cases also has been justified as
one that preserves the evidentiary policy of the statute of wills. Despite the per-
suasive arguments of evidence commentators, and even the Supreme Court,
that state-of-mind declarations are reliable and necessary, 140 probate courts ap-
parently consider both the testator's declarations and the testimony reporting it
too unreliable to credit."'
The admission of oral declarations of a deceased person in corrobora-
tion of other evidence of the main facts to establish a lost will is a broad ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. To weaken this rule by allowing the contents of a
lost will to be proved only by the oral statements of a testator would make the
establishment of spurious wills a comparatively easy matter. Third persons
would be given an opportunity to testify without fear of contradiction as to
the oral statements of the maker of the missing will after his own lips have
been sealed by death. Persons often make false or misleading statements
when talking about their own wills for the very purpose of concealing the
truth. There is probably no secret that is more jealously guarded than the
contents of one's will. It would be dangerous indeed to permit the statements
a testator might have made with the intent to mislead or to mystify curious
or expectant relatives to be used as the truth in establishing the contents of
his lost will after his death."'
These observations are especially interesting since there is no apparent
reason for limiting them to lost wills cases. Witnesses with motives to falsify
their testimony appear in all sorts of trials. The sincerity of almost every "state
of mind" declaration can be questioned. For social and family reasons, people
137
 See, e. g. , In re Will of Bonner, 17 N.Y.2d 9, 11, 214 N.E.2d 154, 155, 266 N.Y.S.2d
971, 973 (1966); In re Burbank, 104 A.D. 312, 319-22, 93 N.Y.S. 866, 869-72 (1905).
' 38
 Wigmore makes almost the same argument to show why statements of intention
should not be used, even as evidence, to correct ambiguities in otherwise formally executed wills.
See supra note 97.
1 " See Sparks, supra note 127, at 438.
140
 In addition to sources cited throughout this section, sec Hinton, supra note 77, at
412-13 (discussing lost wills cases, as well as others, seems critical of the "inconsistencies" in use
of the exception for state of mind, but resigned to accepting them as "accidental anomalies").
14 ' Loy v. Loy, 246 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Ky. 1952). See also Sparks, supra note 127, at 438,
441-42.
1 " Loy v. Loy, 246 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Ky. 1952). But see Goodale v. Murray, 227 Iowa
843, 859, 289 N.W. 450, 457-58 (1940).
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"mislead" and "mystify" their friends and relatives about all manner of
things: their feelings and affections; their intentions to perform chores, get
haircuts, pay their debts; their commitments to previous social engagements;
their motives for attending or not attending at work, social gatherings, appoint-
ments with dentists and doctors; their reasons for failing to accept and return
phone calls. Indeed, Walters may not have intended to go to Crooked Creek at
all! It is hardly unusual for persons distant from their fiancees to express their
plans with less than perfect candor. In most situations, however, cross-
examination and criminal penalties are considered adequate safeguards against
perjury, 143 and declarations of state of mind are touted as highly reliable
evidence.
Why, then, is a declaration of intention reliable enough to get Walters —
and even Hillmon — to Crooked Creek, but not reliable enough to prove the
execution or contents of a missing will? The reason for the distinction cannot be
supported readily by vague and subjective notions of intrinsic and circumstan-
tial trustworthiness. Rather, by examining the differing substantive ends for
which the statements are offered, a more simple and, hopefully, rationally ap-
pealing explanation can be found.
II. RELATIVE RELIABILITY
A. A Comparison Between Use of State-of-Mind Declarations in Cases
Involving Probate of Lost and Destroyed Wills and Those Involving the
Tort of Wrongful Destruction of a Will
In some substantive contexts hearsay declarations are viewed as reliable
and admissible. In others the same statements may be inadmissible or deemed
worthy of only the slightest credit. That the difference cannot be explained by
the inherent trustworthiness of the statements is illustrated by comparing the
treatment of a testator's state of mind declarations offered in actions to probate
lost or destroyed wills with the treatment of the same statements in tort actions
for the malicious destruction of a will. In the probate action, a testator's
declaration offered to prove the execution or contents of a will is inadmissible
or granted only "limited admissibility.'" 44 Conversely, in a tort action it is not
only admissible, but is probably sufficient proof on both issues, i.e., that there
143 In federal courts, and in most jurisdictions (except to the extent that dead man's
statutes apply), a witness is not rendered incompetent to testify because of an interest in the out-
come of the litigation, FED. R. EVID. 601 & advisory committee note. Punishment for perjury is
possible as long as the witness takes an oath, FED. R. EVID. 603 & advisory committee note; 6 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 7, SS 1831-1832. In most lost wills cases, although the rule is not altogether
clear, interested persons are permitted to testify. See cases cited in Annot., 41 A. L.R.2d 393,
400-01 (1955) and later cases service. Apparently some jurisdictions may still have dead man's
statutes that affect the question. See cases cited at 41 A.L.R.2d 393, 401 (1955). See also Callihan
v. Luster, 305 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Ky. 1957); Gibbs v. Terry, 281 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Ky.
1955).
144 See supra text at notes 123-39.
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was a duly executed will and that the contents were as alleged. Although iden-
tical statements are involved, the substantive bases for the suits are different.
Thus, the reason for the inconsistent treatment of the hearsay must lie in the
change of substantive context.
The cynic might conclude that free use of hearsay in one case and limited
use in another case means that courts care less for the substantive law in the
former area than in the latter. Further, by making the due execution and con-
tents of destroyed wills more difficult to prove in probate than in tort actions,
the courts may be regarded by the cynic as biased in favor of intestate heirs or
against defendants in tort cases.
While the cynical view may make sense in cases other than those involving
probate and tort actions on destroyed wills,' 45
 there is in the present context
only a benign and sensible reason for the different treatment of the testator's
hearsay declarations. The origins of the tort of wrongful destruction of a will
and the goals which that tort effectuates warrant this difference. The unusual
tort of malicious destruction of a lost will is a recent development of the action
on the case.'" Like all case actions, it is "an outgrowth of the principle that
whenever the law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it will also afford a
remedy." 147
 The tort action performs what one expert has called "the classic
function of the law of torts, providing a safety net under the law [of wills]. "148
To achieve this goal the courts must admit, and rely on, the type of proof most
likely available to the wronged plaintiff: the hearsay declarations of the
testator.
In wrongful destruction of wills cases, plaintiff bears a burden analogous
to that borne by plaintiffs in actions for the willful interference with prospective
business advantage' 49
 and willful suppression of evidence.'" To prevail, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant's intentional and unjustifiable destruc-
tion of the will resulted in a direct loss to the plaintiff."' To avoid awarding
145 Set cases and sources cited infra notes 163-248.
a46
 Cases on the tort seem rare. Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W. 817 (1929)
(the opinion notes that authorities prior to this case were sparse) 248 Mich. at 428, 227 N.W. at
818-19; Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1119 (1930); Dublin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 90 S.E. 689 (1916). See
also Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N.E. 591 (1931) (allowing tort action where forged
will admitted to probate and time for contesting it had elapsed); 2 PAGE, supra note 131, S 24.3, at
604. See generally Note, Destruction of Evidence, 30 HARV. L. REV. 527 (1916).
' 47
 Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 430, 227 N.W. 817, 819 (1929).
1 " The language is a direct quotation from a private lecture by Prof. Robert Carter.
149
 Harper and James discuss the tort of willful destruction of a will under the general
heading "Interference with Reasonable Economic Expectancies," 1 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS, 5 6.11, at 510, 512 n.9 (1956). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, 5 130, at 950-51 (4th ed. 1971).
"° The courts appear to treat the gravamen of the injury as the destruction of evidence.
See Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 609, 90 S.E. 689, 689-90 (1916); Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich.
425, 429, 227 N.W. 817, 819 (1929). See also Evans, Torts To Expectancies In Decedents' Estates, 93
U. PA. L. REV. 187, 198 (1944); Note, Tort Action in Kentucky for the Wrongful Destruction of a Will,
36 KY. L.J. 299 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tort Action in Kentucky].
I"
 Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 428, 227 N.W. 817, 818-19 (1929); 1 HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 149, S 6.11, at 510-12.
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damages based on mere speculation, the court may require the plaintiff to
prove that his benefits were "substantially certain." Thus, recovery may be
limited to those instances where the possibility of revocation of the will had
disappeared, as where it was destroyed after the testator's death.'" The
gravamen of the complaint is that the defendant's wrongful action has deprived
the plaintiff of his right to a legacy which vested at the testator's death." 3 Since
there would be no deprivation if the destroyed will or legacy could be proved in
probate, the plaintiff must either seek probate first"* or show that it would be
useless.'"
If the wronged legatee were required to prove his injury in tort with the same
degree of exactitude required in probate, the tort action would afford no
remedy, merely another right. Accordingly, courts that have confronted the
issue hold that lesser proof of due execution and contents are sufficient in the
tort action.'" A plaintiff may prevail on a preponderance of the evidence
rather than on the more burdensome "clear and convincing" evidence stand-
ard required in the probate action."' Consistent with evidence rules in
analogous tort actions, it is assumed that once the defendant's wrongful
destruction of the testator's purported will is shown, a presumption, or at least
a permissible inference, arises that the will and its contents were as represented
by the plaintiff. 1 S 8
Furthermore, on general evidentiary principles, the testator's out-of-court
declarations are freely admissible in the tort action under the state of mind ex-
ception to prove the will's due execution and contents.'" The declarations
often will be the most probative evidence available to the plaintiff, because the
wrongdoer's simultaneous destruction of the operative instrument and the best
1 " 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 149, $ 6.11, at 512 & n.9.
166 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 149, S 6.11, at 512.
"4. Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 243, 197 S.W.2d 424, 426 (1946).
"5 Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 431-32, 227 N.W. 817, 820 (1929). But see McGregor
v. McGregor, 201 F.2d 528, 529 (10th Cir. 1953) (apparently ruling that probate must be sought
first to avoid a jurisdictional conflict between probate courts and law and equity courts). The
reason for the rule urged in the text above is suggested in Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 431-32,
227 N.W. 817, 820 (1929). That reason seems more sound because it .also avoids potential res
judiersia/collateral estoppel problems when the probate court refuses the will and the plaintiff seeks
the tort remedy. In Creek v. Laski, a strong dissenting opinion argued against the majority's
resolution of the jurisdictional and estoppel problems. See 248 Mich. 425, 434-36, 227 N.W. 817,
820-21 (1929) (Wiest, J., dissenting).
16 Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 433, 227 N.W. 817, 820 (1929); Dulin v. Bailey, 172
N.C. 608, 609, 90 S.E. 689, 690 (1916) (cases holding a single attesting witness' statement suffi-
cient where probate rules required two witnesses). Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 243,
197 S.W.2d 424, 426 (1946) (since petition not adequate to show an excuse for failing to proceed
in probate first, no question of sufficiency of proof presented, although "it is possible" proof in-
adequate to support probate might be sufficient in tort action).
1" Id.
135 Note, Tort Action in Kentucky, supra note ISO, at 300-01. Harper and James and Pros-
ser by categorizing the tort under the same heading with the other torts involving interference
with prospective advantage, which are sufficiently proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
seemingly agree. See supra note 149.
19 See infra note 160.
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evidence of it have put more reliable proof beyond the plaintiff's reach, In com-
bination with the inference permissibly drawn from the defendant's un-
justifiable act, therefore, the statements would probably be held sufficient to
prove the case against him.' 6°
The uneven treatment accorded the hearsay exception in probate and tort
actions may be thus seen as necessary to assure the results fostered by both
substantive laws. In the probate action, exactitude of proof is demanded to ef-
fectuate vital policies of formalism: to protect decedents' estates and benefici-
aries from fraud, and to assure distribution according to the settled intentions
of the testator. In the tort action, a much lesser degree of exactitude is tolerated
in order to effectuate the vital policies of that law: providing the wronged
legatee with a remedy and depriving the wrongdoer of the fruits of his
wrong."' Thus, identical treatment of the hearsay exception in tort and pro-
bate cases seemingly would achieve procedural symmetry, but only at the ex-
pense of one or the other of the substantive rules. A discriminating application
of the adjective rule instead assures results consistent with the underlying
policy aims of both laws.' 62
B. A Comparison Between Use of Hearsay to Prove Conspiracy in
Antitrust Cases and General Criminal Cases
Two substantive laws may include within them the same operative ele-
ment but the utility of the element may be different in each context. That
judges do recognize such differences, and adjust evidentiary rulings according-
ly, is demonstrated by examining the very different approaches to admissibility
of hearsay offered to prove conspiracy in antitrust cases and general criminal
cases. These cases illustrate that uneven treatment is necessary to assure the
realization of the policies of both laws. Unlike other instances of divergent
treatment, however, the courts in the conspiracy cases do not recognize
expressly the uneven treatment accorded identical hearsay statements.
Technically, any relevant declaration that fits within a recognized exception is
admissible to prove conspiracy equally in both antitrust and general criminal
cases. Nevertheless, a comparison of rulings on admissibility of identical hear-
say under these laws shows that courts require different foundational proof and
different degrees of reliability in the two cases. By examining the function of
the conspiracy element in the two laws, the reason for the different treatment of
hearsay evidence may be demonstrated.
The general criminal law makes it unlawful for a person to "conspire" to
commit a crime."' Under the federal antitrust laws, criminal and civil sanc-
' 6° Evans, supra note 150, at 198; Note, Destruction of Evidence, 30 HARv. L. REV. 527
(1916); Note, Tort Action in Kentucky, supra note 150, at 301.
' 6 ' Note, Tort Action in Kentucky, supra note 150, at 305. On the general principle of lesser
evidence, see sources cited in notes 149-150, 156 supra.
163 The drafters of the Model Probate Act suggested that the evidence rules of proof for
probate of lost wills should be relaxed, and that the need for relaxation was demonstrated by the
tort cases cited in this section. MODEL PROBATE CODE, app. A 5 77, part II (A.B.A. 1946).
1" MODEL PENAL CODE S 5.03 (1962); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW, 5
62, at 470-74 (1972).
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tions are available against those who engage in a "conspiracy" to restrain
trade.'" Conspiracy, as defined in both the general criminal law and the
federal antitrust statutes, includes any form of agreement, express or tacit. 16'
There is, however, one significant difference. The general crime of conspiracy
involves an agreement to commit an act which is itself unlawful, even if en-
gaged in by an individual acting alone.' 66 Conversely, under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, conspiracies to restrain trade include agreements to commit acts
which would be lawful if engaged in by individuals who had no agreement be-
tween them. 167
The difference between these two types of conspiracy mandates a different
approach in each case to determine the sufficiency of the foundation laid to
justify use of coconspirators' statements under the federal rules of evidence.'"
The federal rules technically define as not hearsay statements of a party's
coconspirators made in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy.' 69
Since only the most strained reasoning can justify the "not hearsay" defini-
tion, such declarations more usually are regarded as hearsay but admissible as
an exception to the rule.'" Whether classified as not hearsay or an exception,
164
 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (Supp. 1976). This provision is S 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S
15 (Supp. 1976), provides that any person injured "in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore ... and shall recover three fold the
damages by him sustained." This provision is 5 4 of the Clayton Act.
163 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) (under 15
U.S.C. S 15 tacit understandings between horizontally arranged competitors are sufficient); W.
LAFAVE & A. Scarr, supra note 163, S 61, at 460-61 (criminal conspiracies generally may be ex-
press or tacit).
166 See sources cited supra note 163. See also Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy,
61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1143-46 (1973) (The author points out that in theory the object of a con-
spiracy need not be a crime, but "no informed body of opinion today supports the rule that a
conspiracy may be criminally punishable even if its object is only a civil wrong." Id. at 1144).
'67 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (Supp. 1976). It is a truism, for example, that a seller may lawfully set
his own price. See generally Turner, The Definition Of Agreement Under The Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism And Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). It is per se unlawful, however, for
unrelated suppliers of the same product, at the same level of distribution to agree amongst
themselves about almost anything even remotely related to the price, or terms and conditions of
sale of their products. The crux of the crime is the injury to competition that occurs solely by vir-
tue of the combination. The actual price charged, the motive for the agreement, its power to af-
fect competition, or its actual effect on competition are all irrelevant. See United States v. Topco
Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1972); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593, 599 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 283
(6th Cir. 1898) aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, 1 317 at 345-46
(3d ed. 1981).
Like all truisms, the one above is limited. Provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. 5 13 (Supp. 1976), make certain independent pricing decisions unlawful (price
discrimination) and 15 U.S.C. S 2 (Supp. 1976), makes illegal all monopolization and attempts
to monopolize, (including "predatory pricing"). See P. AREEDA,  supra, 214, 700-01.
168 FED. R. Evin. 801(d)(2)(E).
168 The federal rule makes the statement not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is
"a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the con-
spiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
"° To the extent that the statement is offered to prove the truth of its contents, thus re-
quiring reliance on the perceptions and memory of the declarant, this article defines the state-
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admissibility is said to be justified because the coconspirator's statement is
deemed an admission of the party.
Evidentiary attribution to one party of his coconspirator's hearsay
statements has been rationalized in part by reference to the criminal law of con-
spiracy. The criminal law holds one coconspirator liable for all acts in fur-
therance of the conspiracy committed by all other members of the
conspiracy."' The criminal law is sometimes explained, in turn, by analogy to
the laws of partnership. In most cases, however, this analogy is little more than
a fiction.'" Furthermore, this substantive rule of coconspirators' liability has
ment as hearsay. See supra text and notes at notes 7-13. Sometimes the statement of a
coconspirator may have a non-hearsay use as well, as where it is an operative fact because it con-
stitutes the words of agreement, or is itself an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The federal
rule exception is not confined to the latter use. For a very thoughtful discussion of this point, see 4
D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, S 427, at 357-62 (1980). See generally 4 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 1 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-166-185; R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG,
supra note 7, at 374-80; Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues Of Fact In Conspiracy Litigations:
Putting The Conspiracy Back In The Coconspirator Rae, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1976) (non-hearsay
categorization seems to have arisen from fact that all admissions, of which coconspirators'
statements are a part, were originally not encompassed in hearsay rule); Note, Developments in the
Law, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 984-88 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Criminal Conspiracy]; Comment, The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators' Declarations, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 531 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators'
Declarations].
'" Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946); W. LAFAVE & A. Scum
supra note 163, 5 65, at 512-13.
"1 "When men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc
agents for one another, and have made a 'partnership in crime.' What one does pursuant to their
common purpose, all do, and as dedarations may be such acts, they are competent against all."
Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926) (Learned Hand, J.).
The laws of agency and partnership relating to lawful commercial enterprises generally
operate to avoid creation of fictional agency relationships, but even they have been bent out of
shape from time to time to foster or implement other substantive policies. J. SLAIN, C. THOMP-
SON & F. BEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND EMPLOYMENT, chs. 1, 2, 4 and 5 (1980).
Nevertheless, a criminal conspiracy "partnership" may be fairly characterized as "fictional"
because its existence can usually be determined only as a matter of surmise from evidence
presented at trial. Even assuming certitude about the existence of a conspiracy to achieve an
unlawful end, the precise scope and terms of that conspiracy are rarely known. Thus the acts
ultimately held to be "in furtherance" of a conspiracy may have had nothing to do with the
"real" conspiracy, whose true scope is known only to the criminal defendants. While it is possi-
ble that one partner in a lawful commercial enterprise may be erroneously held responsible for
the acts of another partner that were actually outside the scope of the partnership, there will
usually be some basis in knowable, frequently stipulated, fact that causes the Trier to make a
connection between the act and the partnership business (like use of a partnership car). In many
conspiracy prosecutions the connection must presumably be made without such references.
Furthermore, the criminal conspiracy doctrine that places responsibility on one member
of the conspiracy for the acts of the others treats all who are involved in the "conspiracy" as
equals. A retailer or even a messenger for a drug ring, for example, may become liable for every
sale of narcotics made by every retailer and seller in the ring despite his lack of knowledge about
the number of the sellers and retailers or their identities. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
163, 5 65, at 514, and cases cited therein; MODEL PENAL CODE S 2.04 Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1953); Johnson, supra note 166, at 1147-49 and cases cited therein. Here the parallel to the
usual rules of partnership seems to dissolve. The normal partner may be generally characterized
as the owner of a business who becomes vicariously liable for the contracts and torts of his
employees and partners. A messenger or retailer in a large drug ring is not analogous to the
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been criticized severely as unnecessary to achieve criminal law purposes.'"
The exception for coconspirators' statements also has been criticized because it
goes beyond even the substantive fiction by attributing to the party respon-
sibility for the verbal declarations of his coconspirators.' 74 Under the
coconspirators' exception, statements which are not themselves acts to which
criminal liability would attach regularly are admitted. Coconspirators'
statements may evidence the terms or existence of the conspiracy or a defend-
ant's participation in it. As such they are proof from which the defendant's
criminal responsibility may be inferred, but are not themselves acts for which
the defendant is separately responsible. Nevertheless, the fictional agency
which makes one coconspirator liable for the acts of all others is extended by
the hearsay exception to make him responsible for all statements by the others
about matters concerning the conspiracy and made in the course and in fur-
therance of it.'"
In applying the hearsay exception to general criminal conspiracy cases,
preliminary facts must be shown to establish a foundation for the use of a
coconspirator's statements. Hence, for a statement made by one alleged
coconspirator to be admissible against another who is charged as a defendant in
the case, separate proof of the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's
participation are required.'" The prevailing rule in criminal conspiracy cases
is that the independent proof must be sufficient to justify a finding of these
preliminary facts by a preponderance of the evidence.'" The requirement of
owner, but much more realistically analogous to an employee. By virtue of the illegality of the
employment, the "employee" in a criminal conspiracy ends up liable for the crimes of his
employer and all his co-employees.
1 " W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 163, 5 65, at 514-15; Johnson, supra note 166.
174 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 427, at 363; Levie, Hearsay and Con-
spiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159
(1954); Note, Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 170, at 988-89; Comment, The Hearsay Exception
for Co-Conspirators' Declarations, supra note 170.
A truly bizarre extension of all these fictional agency concepts is found in United States
v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.), cm. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980), where Renfro is claimed to
have conspired to sell heroin, and the buyer's agent's statements are attributed to Renfro.
The Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) and (D) may be similarly criticized for their
expansion of hearsay exceptions for employee statements beyond the rationales of the agency
principles which allegedly justify them. See . J. SLAIN, C. THOMPSON & F. BEIN, supra note 172, at
4-104 to -129 (1980). There is an interesting discussion of how and why limits might be placed on
that expansion in making preliminary rulings under 801(d)(1)(D) in 4 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 37, 5 426, at 311-30.
"5 FED. R. Evil). 801(d)(2)(E). Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6
(1974); United States v. Cryan, 490 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.
1980). See also sources supra cited in notes 170 and 174.
16
 United States v. Cryan, 490 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1211 (3d
Cir. 1980); 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 34, 5 35 (1977); S. SALTZEURG & K.
REDDEN, supra note 34, at 462-69; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERCER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
104[05] (1981); 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, i 801(dX2)(E)[01] at 801-116 & n.5.
177
 Prof. Saltzburg has argued that the standard of proof is properly tied to substantive
concerns. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof, supra note 32, at 302-04.
For purposes of clarity, the text somewhat oversimplifies what the courts do. Courts do
not always make separate rulings on the sufficiency of the foundation before admitting the
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separate proof avoids the unseemliness of the statement's "bootstrapping"
itself into admissibility.'"
The evidence held to constitute a sufficient showing of these preliminary
facts, however, is sometimes surprising. For example, in United States v. Dalzot-
to, "9 the named defendant and a codefendant, Young, were convicted of con-
spiracy to sell PCP, but were acquitted of the substantive offense of distribu-
tion."° One Holden testified that on September 30, 1976, Dalzotto supplied
him with three ounces of the dangerous substance."' On February 11, 1977,
Young supplied him with eight ounces of the same substance.'" Holden also
testified that sometime after the first sale Dalzotto named Young as his (Dalzot-
to's) supplier.'" The latter out-of-court declaration was admissible against
Dalzotto as his own admission.'" It was only admissible against Young under
the exception for coconspirators' statements, however, on a showing by a
preponderance of independent evidence that there was a conspiracy between
Young and Dalzotto. 185 Despite the defendants' acquittal of the substantive of-
fense of sale,' 86 the court of appeals held that a sufficient showing of a con-
evidence, but frequently admit it subject to a later ruling if sufficient evidence is shown. The later
ruling, if counsel remembers to request it, may then be improperly influenced by the statement
itself. If the ruling is to strike the proof of the statement, no jury can be expected to follow an in-
struction to that effect. See sources supra cited note 176.
Even the standard being used is somewhat difficult to determine in many cases. A show-
ing of independent evidence is uniformly required throughout the circuits, but the weight is
variously described. Bergman, The Coconspirators' Exception: Defining The Standard Of The Independ-
ent Evidence Test Under The New Federal Rules Of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 99, 101-02 (1976).
Preponderance of the evidence is apparently the most popular. See United States v. Geaney, 417
F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970). According to one commentator, it is
also the minimum which must be met. Bergman, supra, at 102. The maximum standard, according
to the same commentator, is apparently the prima facie case standard articulated in United
States v. Oliva, 497 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1974), which was there explained as proof sufficient to
support a finding by the jury that the defendant was himself a conspirator. Id. at 132-33.
Whatever that means, it doesn't appear to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
102-03.
The Bergman article presents an interesting argument that judges should consider the
hearsay statement itself in determining whether to admit it, and then only admit it where, in
combination with other admissible evidence, the court is satisfied that there is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy. The argument is rebutted
in 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, Supra note 34, S 35.
179 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 34, S 35. Some commentators seem to
believe that bootstrapping has risen to epidemic proportions anyway. Bergman, supra note 177,
at 101 (bootstrapping is inevitable because judges cannot perform "mental gymnastics" required
to avoid it.); Levie, supra note 174, at 1176 (bootstrapping can also occur if other hearsay is con-
sidered to establish foundation); Note, Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 170, at 987 (bootstrapping
problem exists when courts provisionally admit evidence subject to later ruling on admissibility).
19 603 F.2d 642 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979).
1" Id. at 646.
181
 Id. at 643.
"2 Id.
1 " Id.
184 Id. at 644.
195 Id. at 643-44.
' 8° Id. at 643. The court explained the well-established rule that acquittal does not bar
conviction for conspiracy as follows: "Since conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable
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spiracy and Young's participation in that conspiracy had been made by the
coincidence of the sales of PCP by each defendant to Holden, and Holden's
and a police officer's testimony placing Dalzotto in a car by the side of a road
while Holden and Young, outside the car, were arranging Young's sale to
Holden.'" Young also testified that he had known Dalzotto for some months
prior to the latter meeting, and they apparently left the rendezvous point
together in the same car.'"
While it was deemed adequate in Dalzotio, this evidence would not have
been sufficient to establish a conspiracy by anything near a preponderance of
the evidence if, instead of being charged with conspiracy to sell PCP, the
defendants there had been charged with an antitrust offense, like a concerted
refusal to deal. Under antitrust law, absent an agreement, or an intent to
create or maintain a monopoly, a supplier of a product is privileged to sell to
whom he pleases, on any terms he likes.'" For example, suppose supplier A,
doubt, it follows that acquittal on a substantive count does not bar a preliminary finding of con-
spiracy, which need only satisfy the lesser 'preponderance' standard." Id. at 646.
187 Id. at 644-45. The police officer testified that he saw all three talking together outside
the car, but he apparently did not hear what was being said. Holden's version is reported in the
text since he was a direct participant in the alleged conversation and his version is not inconsis-
tent with the three talking outside the car at some point. Id. at 644.
188 Id.
189 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). See also Theatre Enters. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a
directed verdict in its favor on a showing that all defendant motion picture distributors had
deprived plaintiff of first-run films, since it would be lawful for each motion picture distributor
independently to restrict first-run motion pictures to downtown theatres thereby depriving plain-
tiff's suburban theatres of such films, but unlawful for several to agree amongst themselves to do
so).
Concerted refusals by suppliers to deal with retailers are per se unlawful, however.
Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Express agreements between a buyer and
seller have also been banned. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911). Nevertheless, there is some question whether such an agreement is now per se unlawful,
or only unlawful if "unreasonable." Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
P. AREEDA , supra note 167, 'Pr 503-521. The hypothetical in the text is'designed to avoid any im-
plication of vertical agreement.
Under certain circumstances a court might be willing to find a prohibited vertical agree-
ment to fix retail prices where one of the parties to the alleged agreement either has no anti-com-
petitive motive or only unwillingly agrees. For example, in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968), plaintiff newspaper distributor at first acceded to the defendant's demand, but was later
discontinued for refusing to maintain maximum retail prices on the defendant publisher's
newspapers. Id. at 147. The plaintiff's allegation of an unlawful agreement between the defend-
ant and a short-term distributor defendant had hired to solicit customers on the plaintiff's ex-
clusive route (in an effort to force the plaintiff to lower his prices) was upheld. Id. at 147, 149.
The court also said that the plaintiff could have claimed a combination between himself and the
defendant, "at least as of the day [the plaintiff] unwillingly complied with [the defendant's]
advertised price." Id. at 150 n.6. The court also characterized as "not ... frivolous" the plain-
tiff's allegation that there was an unlawful agreement between the defendant and those of the
plaintiff's customers the defendant had thus spirited away. Id. In United States v. Parke Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), the court found an unlawful agreement between the defendant drug
manufacturer and its wholesalers and retailers to maintain minimum retail prices because the
defendant did not content itself with "announcing its policy regarding retail prices and following
this with a simple refusal to have business relations with any retailers who disregarded that
898	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:855
one of several suppliers of product X, refused to sell to retailer C on September
30, 1976 and supplier B refused to sell product X to retailer C on February 11,
1977. Suppose further that A and B happened to know each other and were in
one another's company (say, at a Trade Association meeting) immediately
prior to B's communication to C stating his refusal to sell to C. Absent some
further evidence of an agreement, a showing of these facts and nothing more,
would not get C past a motion for summary judgment in a civil action against
A and B under the Sherman Act section 1.' 9° Therefore, it is highly unlikely
that in a criminal action for the alleged antitrust law violation the showing
would be held to demonstrate a conspiracy, or B's participation in it, by the
"preponderance" required as a foundation for receipt of a coconspirator's
statement."' Although C might have proof of a statement by A, such as "B
and I have agreed that we will not sell to you," it would not be admissible
policy." Id. at 45. Instead, the defendant's use of its refusal to deal with wholesalers to "elicit
their willingness to deny ... products to retailers and thereby help gain the retailers' adherence
... created a combination with the retailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail prices and
violated the Sherman Act." Id.
These last cases are interesting in that they present a different approach to what may be
perceived as a problem similar to that in the general criminal conspiracy cases. Here the courts
have all but written out of Sherman Act 5 1 the element of conspiracy, or at least redefined it in a
rather unique way. The reason appears to be that they believe that the suppliers' conduct, to the
extent that it results in minimum or maximum price uniformity at the retail level should be
unlawful even in the absence of any traditionally-formed conspiracy or agreement. In other
words, the substantive element is minimized or made nonexistent bycommon law development
where effects believed to be anti-competitive can be traced to other conduct by the defendant.
That, it should be carefully noted, is not quite the same thing as allowing in unreliable proof of
the extant element of conspiracy in the general criminal conspiracy cases. In the antitrust cases
the crime itself and the conduct that gives rise to it has been substantively redefined. Antitrust
defendants must still be proved, by whatever the applicable standard (preponderance.or beyond
a reasonable doubt) to have engaged in some prohibited conduct that caused price uniformity or
another anti-competitive effect. In the general criminal conspiracy cases the object of the con-
spiracy is frequently unprovable by the standard required, and the conspiracy itself, which re-
mains an element of the substantive crime charged is provable primarily by the use of the
coconspirators' statements.
"° It should be noted that the hypothetical situation in the text does not specify whether
A and B were aware of one another's refusal to deal, nor whether B's action was in any way
motivated by A's. Even a showing of conscious parallelism, however, is not enough to support a
finding of an agreement under Sherman Act S 1, 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1976). See, e.g., Theatre Enter-
prises v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954); Delaware Valley Mach.
Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
839 (1962). But see Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
Evidence of conscious parallelism may, however, along with other evidence, serve as cir-
cumstantial evidence, from which an agreement may be inferred. Theatre Enterprises v. Para-
mount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S, 537, 540 (1954). Such other evidence might include facts
showing, for example, that it was against each defendant's individual financial interest to refuse
to deal unless each was certain that the others would do the same, Interstate Circuit v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1939), and/or that the conduct complained of was so unusual,
idiosyncratic or complicated that it is unlikely that more than one of the defendants could have
conceived of it without consultation. Id; Trist v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 466 F. Supp. 578,
581-84 (E.D. Pa. 1979). On all of the above, see P. AREEDA, supra note 167, 11319-325; Turner,
77ur Definition Of Agreement Under The Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism And Refusals To Deal, 75
HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). The hypothetical situation in the text contains none of these "plus"
factors.
151
 See infra text and note at note 206. The same standard, "preponderance of the
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against B on such a flimsy foundation,' 92 although it would be admissible
against A as an admission.'"
The different results in the two cases cannot be attributed to differences in
the cogency of the inferences from the circumstantial evidence to the existence
of a conspiracy, for the inferences are identical. In Dalzotto it was plausible to
conclude that the coincidence of sales of the same drug to Holden• by the two
defendants were made pursuant to a common plan. In the hypothetical an-
titrust case it is equally plausible to conclude that the coincidence of the refusals
to deal by the two defendant suppliers were pursuant to a common plan. In
both cases, too, there are inferences that point in the opposite direction. The
businessmen-suppliers in the hypothetical situation may have many independ-
ent reasons for refusing to deal with the retailer other than an agreement be-
tween them. Likewise, they may have many common interests to share at trade
association meetings, aside from any unlawful agreement to refuse to deal. The
defendants in Dalzotto also may have had many independent reasons for selling
PCP to Holden exclusive of any agreement between them. They, too, may
have had common interests to share in their car trip away from Young's
meeting with Holden that had nothing to do with an agreement between them
to distribute PCP.
evidence" is used to describe the plaintiff's burden of persuasion in civil antitrust cases. See cases
cited supra note 190. If the evidence is not sufficient to get a plaintiff past a motion for summary
judgment in the civil case, therefore, it would probably not be held to be preponderance of
evidence in a criminal case. See sources infra note 206.
152 See Trist v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 466 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1979). On its
denial of a motion for summary judgment, the Trist court held that the plaintiff had shown
enough evidence from which a jury might properly infer (by a preponderance of the evidence) an
agreement among the defendant banks to collect certain charges in advance from mortgagors at
closings. Id. at 583-84. The plaintiff had proof that (1) the method for computing the charges was
idiosyncratic; (2) it was improbable that 20 defendants could have arrived at the identical practice
without consultation; (3) the defendants had a financial motive to enter into the agreement and
(4) the defendants had many opportunities to discuss these matters at trade association meetings.
Id. at 581-92. The court noted, however, that proof of any one of these factors alone would not be
sufficient to support an inference of agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, and em-
phasized that the simple opportunity to meet at a trade association was not alone sufficient. Id. at
590. See also supra note 190 and infra note 206.
193 It is admissible against A under one or all of the usual rationales for admissions by a
party-opponent: (i) that the statement is not hearsay because A has an opportunity to explain the
statement and no need to cross-examine himself, 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 42, S 1048, at 4; or
(ii) that A is loosely "estopped" because he can hardly object for lack of cross-examination of
himself or that he is unworthy of credence unless under oath (even though the statement is hear-
say), MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE, 266 (5th ed. 1962); or (iii) that A's statement is
not hearsay because it is the equivalent of conduct inconsistent with a belief in the truth of his posi-
tion at trial, Strahorn, A Reconsideration Of The Hearsay Rule And Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV.
564, 570 (1937). The first of these rationales is particularly inappropriate in a criminal trial where
A must give up his right to remain silent in order to "explain" the statement. If A did not make
the statement he cannot explain the perceptions, narrational skills, memory and sincerity
underlying it, he is certainly not estopped from complaining of lack of cross-examination of these
"dangers" and, the statement is hearsay as to him and not the equivalent of conduct inconsistent
with a belief in his position at trial. See generally Rein, Prior Inconsistent Statements: The Hearsay Rule,
801(dXIXA) and 803(24), 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 967 (1979). In civil cases, the possibility _ that A
made the statement may be seen as probative enough to admit it on the theory that the system
should jealously guard against abuse by persons who, rightly or wrongly, do not believe that they
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The divergent conclusions in the two cases are better explained by the
substantial difference in the function of the conspiracy element in general
criminal law and in antitrust law. In general criminal law, the separate crime
of conspiracy has been justified in part by the observation that combinations of
persons with a criminal design are more dangerous than those acting alone.'"
Most observers agree, however, that this is not the true utility of the law. In-
stead, the function of the law of conspiracy is to facilitate convictions, and
enhance the punishment of persons who are suspected of involvement in one or
more substantive crimes but who otherwise cannot be linked directly to the
criminal acts.'" The head of an organization of criminals, who may order but
never directly participate in any other crime, is a good example. 196
Either to facilitate this end, or as a cause of it, the addition of a charge of
conspiracy to an information or indictment carries with it procedural advan-
tages not otherwise available to the prosecution. It enables a prosecutor (i) to
choose a venue more favorable to it than permitted for the substantive offense
that is the alleged object of the conspiracy; (ii) to take advantage of a joint trial
of defendants with the concomitant likelihood that in the confusion the jury will
be unable to separate evidence admissible solely against one defendant from
that admissible against the others; 197 and, most importantly here, (iii) to use
the coconspirators exception making admissible the hearsay statements of one
alleged coconspirator against the defendant charged as a conspirator at tria1. 198
While, the general law of conspiracy may well be offensive to the accepted pur-
poses and aims of the larger body of criminal law,' 99 fuller exploration of this
are entitled to recover. In a criminal case, however, the purpose of the law is not furthered by con-
victing people who may wrongly believe that they should be convicted. Since admissions — even
if the defendant uttered them — are of only dubious probative value of the objective truth that is
all important in most criminal cases, they should probably be held inadmissible. But see the
discussion of real values in general conspiracy cases in text and notes at notes 246, 247 infra.
196 MODEL PENAL CODE 5 5.03 comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). W. LAFAVE & A.
Sccrrr, supra note 163, 5 61, at 458-59; Johnson, supra note 166, at 1143; Note, Criminal Con-
spiracy, supra note 170, at 923-24.
196 See Note, Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 170, at 922. See generally Johnson, supra note
166, at 1141-64. Judge Learned Hand once called the crime of conspiracy "that darling of the
modern prosecutor's nursery." Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). Cf.
W. LAFAVE & A. scorr, supra note 163, 5 61, at 455 (it is clear that a charge of conspiracy gives
the prosecution a unique and undue advantage).
196 It is the example given in Johnson, supra note 166, at 1143-44, and Note, Criminal
Conspiracy, supra note 170, at 992.
197 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 163, 5 61, at 458-59; Johnson, supra note 166, at
1172, 1177; Note, Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 170, at 975-91.
196 See sources cited supra in note 197. Recent Supreme Court decisions have relaxed
hearsay and constitutional barriers to the use of out-of-court declarations of one defendant
against another even where conspiracy is not charged, and the coconspirators' exception is not
urged as the appropriate vehicle for use of the statement. See Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62
(1979); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
199 The failure of the general law of conspiracy to serve any of the acceptable aims of the
criminal law is fully demonstrated in Johnson, supra note 166. Conspiracy law seems to be used in
many cases to convict people where their allegedly "real" crimes (the objects of the conspiracy)
cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt using normal rules of evidence. The normal rules of
hearsay, by barring unreliable and therefore excessively prejudicial evidence in criminal cases,
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point is beyond the scope of this article. 2" Instead, the focus here is on the rela-
tionship between the hearsay rule and the various substantive purposes for
which hearsay may be used.
Assuming, therefore, that the function of the general conspiracy law is to
facilitate the conviction of defendants whose criminal activities otherwise might
go unpunished, the use of coconspirators' statements in evidence may be seen
as a necessary aid to it. Reliability of the hearsay statements is probably of no
concern to a law thus justified. In light of the admitted lack of reliable evidence
tying the defendant to any other crime, these hearsay statements may be as
good, or better, evidence of his involvement in criminal activity as any
available."'
In contrast, the function of conspiracy in antitrust law is to define a crime
which injures competition. 202
 The utility of the substantive law, therefore, is to
facilitate greater competition. Competition is believed best fostered by the
aggregate of many suppliers making selfish, independent, profit-motivated
also help to ensure that defendants are not convicted unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The suspension in conspiracy cases of normal evidence rules through use of the
coconspirators' exception in the manner set forth herein along with the suspension of other rules
of procedural fairness, thus serve to implement suspension of the reasonable doubt standard in
proving the crime of conspiracy. The decision to do so, however, is a "substantive" decision.
The procedural rules are justified or manipulated to achieve the perceived purpose of the
substantive law.
The substantive law leaves the decision whether to add a "conspiracy" charge on a day-
to-day basis to the prosecutor. Since no crime has at that point been proven against a defendant
by the normal reasonable doubt standard, the prosecutor and the judge (by ruling on use of the
hearsay and the other procedural questions) may thus be characterized as determining, in
whatever intuitive way these matters are determined, whether this defendant deserves the benefit of
a reasonable doubt or not. The suspension of the reasonable doubt standard, it must be recog-
nized, may result in (1) increasing the risk of convicting a defendant for a crime he did not com-
mit and (2) increasing the risk that a defendant will be convicted although no crime ever
occurred. The latter is a special danger in political conspiracy cases. This substantive law policy
is hard to characterize even by so mild a criticism as subject to abuse. The law itself seems, by
leaving these matters to an ad hoc subjective determination, to abuse all normal notions of
substantive and procedural fairness.
2G° Generally, adjective rules should serve the substantive law and not make it. Here,
however, the substantive law is based on a fictional principle apparently composed largely to
justify the creation and implementation of adjective rules which, in turn, can be explained by
neither normal adjective nor acceptable substantive principles. There may be some sense here for
a backward attack on the faulty substantive principle through the adjective rules since they are its
most tangible manifestation. At least one criminal law expert has argued, however, that chipping
away at adjective rules is not the best approach. Johnson, supra note 166. Prof. Saltzburg has
argued that despite reliability problems and potential- prejudice in use of coconspirators'
statements, no increased standard of proof should be applied to preliminary fact determinations.
"Although the need for a conspiracy offense has provoked controversy, as long as legislators are
convinced that the need exists, evidentiary rules that might completely frustrate the ability of the
prosecution to prosecute successfully should not be established." Saltzburg, Standards of Proof,
supra note 32, at 303.
201 See Saltzburg, Standards of Proof, supra note 32, at 302-04. Discussions about how use
of these statements might be justified on grounds of reliability and necessity may be found in 4 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 37, S 427, at 364-67; 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note
14, 1 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-169 to -170; Note, Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 170, at 989.
202 See supra text and notes at notes 167-69, 189-92.
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decisions about virtually everything relating to the price and terms on which
they sell, including the identity and location of their wholesalers and
retailers. 203
 If two or more suppliers facing the same or similar competitive
pressures each separately determines that his selfish advantage lies in dealing
or not dealing with retailer C, the decisions are not only lawful, but laudable.
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act only an agreement turns these otherwise
pro-competitive refusals to sell into an anti-competitive offense.'" Hence, in-
dependently legal acts become unlawful under the antitrust provisions only
when carried out in furtherance of an agreement between two or more persons.
Because the acts are not in themselves unlawful, courts are properly loath
to permit an inference of conspiracy solely from two competitors' parallel,
otherwise lawful conduct. Even the combination of their lawful actions with
evidence that they had an opportunity to meet and conspire in an otherwise un-
suspicious atmosphere would not be permitted to raise the value of the in-
ference of unlawful behavior to a preponderance of the evidence.'" To hold
otherwise would result in penalizing conduct that was intended to be affirm-
atively encouraged by the law. If that result in turn caused businessmen to pur-
posefully avoid activities otherwise dictated by their desire for competitive
advantage, the law would be stood on its head.
It might be argued that such untoward consequences could not follow sole-
ly from a holding that blameless circumstantial conduct sufficiently proves con-
spiracy for purposes of laying a foundation for use of the hearsay exception. In
theory, a ruling that such preliminary facts suffice to support the admission of
coconspirators' hearsay statements does not mean that the preliminary proof
itself is necessarily sufficient to prove conspiracy on a motion for directed ver-
dict or acquittal. Thus, this argument concludes, unless courts found that such
evidence was sufficient by itself to prove an unlawful conspiracy, there would
be no effect on behavior in the business community.
There are two reasons, however, why this normal distinction between ad-
missibility and sufficiency does not hold sway here. The first is the coincidental
use of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard for determining both the
admissibility of coconspirators' statements and for holding defendants liable in
civil cases for antitrust conspiracy. It is unlikely that the standard is understood
to have one meaning when applied to questions of the admissibility and
another when applied to questions of the sufficiency of evidence. At least one
court has held expressly that an identical standard applies in both contexts. 2°6
203 See generally P. AREEDA, supra note 167, Ti 114-135 and sources cited therein; W.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 426-74 (11th ed. 1980).
2" 15 U.S.C. S 1 (Supp. 1976). See supra text and notes at notes 167-71, 189-92, 203.
2°5 See supra text and notes at notes 189-92.
2" United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 1 F.R.D. 1, 3-5 (1939). At least one com-
mentator has also concluded that the standards are identical. Comment, The Hearsay Exception for
Co-Conspirators' Declarations, supra note 170, at 536 n.39 (1958). Of course, the coincidental use of
the words need not indicate identity in the standard, and in light of the observations made in the
sources cited at note 177 it may be hazardous to assume exact congruence in every case. The
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Moreover, precedents established in antitrust criminal and antitrust civil cases
on almost all issues are used interchangeably, despite the allegedly greater
burden of persuasion necessary to prove the criminal offense.'" It would be
counterintuitive, therefore, to assume that this precedent, if established, would
be treated differently.
Second, and more importantly, antitrust policy would be undermined if
conspiracy could be sufficiently proved by combining such foundational facts
with the evidence whose admissibility they support. There is no reason to
believe that coconspirators' statements are generally reliable. Indeed, these
statements usually are proved by the testimony of another coconspirator who at
the time has every motive to lie about whether the statements were made. In
criminal cases generally, the statements frequently are reputed to have been
made by one of the defendants on trial who is known or suspected to be of a
criminal disposition, and who, to further his own criminal purposes, may have
misrepresented the involvement of others in his design. 208
 In an antitrust case,
a supplier's out-of-court statement might well be similarly motivated. A state-
ment to a retailer, for example, that another supplier also will not deal with the
retailer might be uttered solely for the purposes of coercing the retailer into
behavior financially advantageous to the declarant. 209
Using evidence of suppliers' parallel lawful behavior as a predicate for ad-
mitting highly unreliable evidence and then, combining these two bits of
evidence to prove an unlawful conspiracy, would not serve the ends of antitrust
law any better than a direct holding that the lawful behavior alone proves the
unlawful agreement. Mistaken imposition of liability for lawful behavior would
become prevalent. The business community, ever alert to the nuances of an-
titrust law, would change its behavior to avoid liability. Thus, the competitive
argument in the text herein, however, persuades this author that if the courts do not apply the
same standard generally, they should do so. See also note 225 infra.
One reason that it is hard to be absolutely certain that the courts are applying the same
standard is that a fairly extensive search of recent cases revealed absolutely no antitrust case in
which a coconspirator's statement was offered on anything even close to the paltry foundational
proof urged in United States v. Dalzotto, 603 F.2d 642 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.-994
(1979). Rather, in the few cases found where there was a ruling on admissibility under the
coconspirators rule, there was, comparatively, an enormous amount of independent proof shown
of conspiracy and participation in it. See, e.g., United States v. David E. Thompson, Inc., 621
F.2d 1147, 1152-54 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Continental Group, 603 F.2d 444, 452-54
(3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980). This may reflect an assumption by counsel
preparing these cases that such a showing would be required, the more extensive discovery and
time for it generally undertaken and allowed in antitrust cases, or simply luck of the draw.
"7 A perusal of the citations and reasoning in any of the cases cited in this article at
notes 167-71, 189-92, supra, or almost any other case arising under the Sherman Act, will verify
the observation.
208 Making related observations: 4 WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 14,
801(dX2)(E)[01], at 801-170 to -171; Levie, supra note 174, at 1165-66; Comment, The Hearsay
Exception for Co-Conspirators' Declarations, supra note 170, at 541.
ng See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 196 (9th Cir.) (statements by
agents), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958) and discussion of possible motives for those statements
suggested by P. AREEDA, supra note 167, 1 322.
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behavior the antitrust law initially intended to encourage would in fact be
discouraged. 210
The dichotomous treatment of hearsay evidence mandated by variances in
the substantive policies of antitrust and general criminal conspiracy laws is not
restricted to the exception for coconspirators' declarations. Rather the different
functions of the conspiracy doctrine in these two substantive areas also compel
different results under the class of hearsay exceptions which expressly require a
preliminary ruling that the hearsay offered is reliable. Here, however, while at
least some courts seem motivated by substantive differences, they fail to articu-
late their holdings in those terms, relying instead on usual evidence parlance.
This lack of direct expression may indicate either an unawareness of substance
as an influencing factor or a reluctance to confront directly the controversy sur-
rounding the criminal conspiracy doctrine. That some courts are in fact in-
fluenced by substantive law differences, however, may be demonstrated by
comparing two cases decided by the United Staths Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit involving the use of hearsay offered under the business records
exception to prove conspiracy.
Under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, records kept in
the regular course of a business are admissible to prove the truth of the matters
reported therein. 2 " Ordinarily the custodian of the records must testify that it
is the usual routine of the business to keep such records accurately and to
record the transactions reflected therein at the time of their occurrence or
shortly thereafter. Like other hearsay exceptions, the business records excep-
tion is justified on grounds of reliability and necessity. Business records are
thought to be highly reliable proof of the information reflected therein if the
persons who participated in compiling the entries were under a duty to the
business to perform their respective tasks accurately. Necessity for the records
lies in the inconvenience of producing the declarants, the practical unavailabili-
ty of many of them due to lack of memory, and the difficulties in identifying all
those in the reporting chain. 212
In Standard Oil Co. of California v. Moore, 213
 the Appeals Court for the Ninth
Circuit held that for a record to have been made in the "regular course" of a
business it must reflect only those day-to-day commercial operations "in which
it is directly concerned as a participant."'" In that case, the records of seven
oil company defendants were offered to prove that they had unlawfully con-
spired to maintain artificially high prices and to favor those service stations
they individually owned."' The plaintiff's competitive retail gasoline station
210
 A similar argument may be made to counter use of coconspirators' statements in
political conspiracy cases. There, mistaken conviction is directly connected to discouraging peo-
ple from exercising their first amendment freedoms. Johnson, supra note 166, at 1153-56.
211 See, e.g. , FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
212 Seeoc  generally MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE SS 304-314 (2d
ed. E. Cleary 1972); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE $S 1517-61 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
215
	 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958).
214 Id. at 213.
215 Id. at 195-97, 212-13.
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closed after one of the defendants stopped dealing with him and the others
refused to supply his station. 216 The plaintiff claimed that the defendants'
parallel refusals to deal were pursuant to the price fixing conspiracy alleged."'
At trial, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff," 8 the
district court allowed the plaintiff to introduce hundreds of exhibits which the
defendants admitted were accurate reproductions of documents that came from
their files. 218 A large number of the exhibits dealt with the "pricing and
marketing policies of oil companies other than the one in whose files the
writings were found. ”220 Others dealt with the practices of service station
operators who were not customers of the oil company in whose files the records
were found."' Although the records might have been offered to establish a pat-
tern of business conduct or as admissions by each of the defendants from whose
file each record came, they were not offered as such. 222 Instead, in each in-
stance the records were offered to prove the truth of the matter contained in
them: the marketing practices of the other defendant companies and their
retailers . 2 " Reversing the district court, the appeals court held that the records
were not admissible because they reflected activities in which the business was
not engaged. The circuit court reasoned that exclusion was compelled because,
first, much of the information in the record was supplied by persons not
employed by the company that maintained the records, and, second, in some
instances it was not shown that the employees who compiled the records were
under a duty to maintain them accurately. 224 The judgment against defendants
was accordingly vacated . 2"
The Ninth Circuit's ruling itself is unexceptionable. The records of an
alleged coconspirator, Defendant 1, ultimately might be admissible to prove
the actions of another coconspirator, Defendant 2, where there is sufficient in-
dependent proof of the conspiracy. First it must be shown, however, that
216
 Id. at 195-97.
2 " Id. at 196-97.
216 Id. at 198.
215 Id. at 212.
220 Id. at 213.
221
222 Id. at 217 n.36.
225 Id. at 213.
2" Id. at 214-16.
225 The court held that if none of the inadmissible exhibits had been received, the
evidence would have been insufficient to sustain the jury's finding of conspiracy by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 217. Since the court could not tell from the record whether
any of the exhibits offered could have been received on other grounds, or whether a proper foun-
dation might have been laid for them, it remanded for a new trial. Id. at 217-18, 223. The
holding that admissible evidence of conspiracy in this case was not sufficient to prove conspiracy
by a preponderance of the evidence is also an indication of the very different views of reliability
courts have of evidence used to prove antitrust conspiracies and general criminal conspiracies.
The admissible evidence is reviewed at pages 198-212 of the court's opinion and in the text infra
and may be contrasted with that which sustained the convictions beyond a reasonable doubt in
United States v. Dalzotto, 603 F.2d 642 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979), and United
States v. Smith, 609 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Defendant 1, not some volunteer, kept these records as part of its business and
relied on thern. 228
 Moreover, where, as in Standard Oil v. Moore, the court holds
the evidence independent of the records insufficient to establish a conspiracy,
at least some of the documents must qualify independently of the cocon-
spirators exception to provide the sufficient independent foundation. That
presents a multiple hearsay problem. Defendant 1's business record says that
Defendant l's employees say, that someone outside Defendant's business said,
that Defendant 2 is operating according to the terms of the conspiracy.
As in any multiple hearsay problem, each level of hearsay must be ad-
missible for the whole to be admissible. 227 Thus, for Defendant 1's business
record to be admissible under the business records exception to prove Defend-
ant 2's operations, all levels of included hearsay must be shown to conform
with either the mandate of the business record exception or some other hearsay
exception. 228 To satisfy the first hearsay level, each of Defendant 1's employees
in the reporting chain must be acting pursuant to a business duty to report ac-
curately. To satisfy the second hearsay level the information supplied to
Defendant 1's employees must issue from a declarant who is either under a
business duty to supply it to Defendant 1, or who has uttered it under cir-
cumstances fitting within another exception. Under the latter alternative, if the
original declarant who supplied the information to Defendant 1's employees
was an employee of Defendant 2 acting in the course of his duties to Defendant
2, the second level of hearsay would presumably be covered by the exception
for admissions of a party's employees. 229
 As was recognized by the court in
Standard Oil v. Moore, each hearsay step in the chain would have to fit within a
hearsay exception before the business record could be viewed as reliable
enough to be admitted for its truth.
226 This seems to be the meaning of the court's rulings regarding use and admissibility of
each defendant's records against the others as coconspirator's declarations. Standard Oil, 251 F.2d
at 210, 218-19.
It is interesting to note, however, that when more directly confronted with the question,
at least one court has held, and another indicated, that employers are liable for the anti-
competitive activity of employees — even if the employees are acting directly contrary to express
instructions and for personal reasons. United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Western Inel Hotels v. United States, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). Cf.
Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1960) (failure to object
to acts and subsequent "ratification" sufficient to make employer liable). But see United States v.
Ward Baking Co., 243 F. Supp. 713, 717 (1965) (employee's acts were not attributable to the
corporation because the employee had no authority to set prices).
The court's ruling that there was an insufficient showing that the employees were acting
pursuant to a duty to maintain these records accurately despite the sheer volume thus may reflect
a reluctance to hold the employers liable for employees' intentional and unauthorized wrongful
activities. Such a reluctance would not be unique to antitrust law (although the courts sometimes
overcome it for reasons unrelated to their dislike of the agency doctrine). See J. SLAIN, C.
THOMPSON & F. BEIN, supra note 172, at 1-76 to -125, 4-120 to -121, 1-26 to -33 and sources
cited therein.
227
	 R. EVID. 805.
226 Id .
229 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) (defines such admissions as not hearsay).
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Its holding in Standard Oil v. Moore notwithstanding, the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Smith ., 23° held similar records admissible without such a
showing."' The court in Smith upheld the defendants' convictions for con-
spiracy to possess heroin and cocaine with intent to distribute, which convic-
tion was obtained with the aid of certain documents."' The challenged
documents were the registration and billing records of certain hotels at which
defendant Lama allegedly had attended meetings relating to the conspiracy."'
Those documents were offered under the business records exception to cor-
roborate the testimony of two self-confessed coconspirators that Lama par-
ticipated in the conspiracy. 294 The guest name signed on the records and the
address given therein were names and an address that Lama sometimes
used.'" The signature, however, was apparently not authenticated as Lama's
since the records were not offered as his admissions.'" Lama argued that the
records were not admissible under the business records exception on the same
grounds urged in Standard Oil Co. u. Moore, namely, that the hotel clerk who
made the record had no duty to verify the identity of the signator and that the
person who supplied the information reflected in the record had no duty to ac-
curately report it to the hotel."' Lama also complained that the hotel
employees who testified at trial in authentication of the records were not even
employed by the hotels at the time the records allegedly were made.'" The ap-
peals court, however, rejected Lama's arguments and held that the records
were "properly admitted into evidence without direct evidence as to their
authenticity. Circumstantial evidence connecting Lama with the documents
was sufficient. "239 The circumstantial evidence held sufficient by the court con-
sisted of the very testimony of the two government witnesses that the records
were supposed to corroborate and the coincidence of the names and address in
the hotel register with those that Lama sometimes used.'"
The court distinguished Standard Oil by reasoning that in Smith the records
related to "the registration and billing of guests, a matter in which the hotel
was a direct participant. " 241 This distinction, however, does not withstand
analysis. There is nothing in the case that suggests that the hotels were in the
business of accurately identifying their guests. They therefore were not direct
2" 609 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
231 Id. at 1301.
232 Id. at 1297.
23' Id. at 1301.
234 Id.
"5 Id.
296 Id. at 1301 n.7.
231 Id. at 1301-02.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 1301.
2" Id. at 1301-02. Furthermore, the court held that the statements of the hotel employ-
ees, who were available for cross-examination, demonstrated that the records were those of the
hotels. Id. at 1302.
2" Id. at 1301.
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participants in the matters reflected in the records within the meaning of Stand-
ard Oil. Unless the hotel employees were operating under a duty to record the
information accurately and the original declarant was under a duty to supply
the information accurately, or was covered by some other hearsay exception,
the multiple hearsay in Smith did not conform to the requirements for ad-
missibility relied on in Standard Oil.
Moreover, even if connecting the defendant with the event reflected in the
record could properly replace the foundation requirement for the business
record exception, that connection was stronger in Standard Oil than in Smith. In
Standard Oil there was testimony and non-hearsay evidence from the plaintiff
and other dealers that demonstrated that many of the defendants refused to
deal with price cutters, that complaints were made to the headquarters of
several defendant companies about price cuttings by retailers not connected
with the companies to which the complaints were made, that one defendant's
employees bragged about their power to cause all the defendant retailers to
keep the price up, and that price-cutting signs mysteriously disappeared from
several of the defendant companies' retail outlets, after phone calls or promises
made by other defendants' sales representatives. 242
 Certainly this evidence was
of at least equal weight to connect the defendants to the matters reflected in
those records as was the testimony of the two informants to connect Lama to
the matter reflected (presence) in the hotel records in Smith. Furthermore, in
Standard Oil the large number and continuity of the business record entries in
question could have been held to establish coincidentally that it was the prac-
tice of the businesses involved to keep such records and that their employees
were under a duty to do so. 243
 In Smith, on the other hand, the testimony of the
two informants relied on did not attest to the only issue relevant to admissibility
— the accuracy of the record-keeping methods of the hotels. The coincidence
that the names signed on the records were the same as those Lama sometimes
used did not verify the record as an accurate reflection of the truth of the matter
contained in it. Rather, the coincidence merely made the record, had it been
shown to be accurate, probative of the contention that Lama was at the hotels.
These two cases, therefore, cannot be reconciled by any differences in the
proof offered to satisfy the reliability requirements of the hearsay exception. In-
deed, there was a better foundation in Standard Oil, the civil antitrust case,
where the evidence was held inadmissible than in Smith, the criminal case,
where the records were held admissible. In both cases the issues which the
records were offered to prove were the existence of a conspiracy and defend-
ants' participation in it. The court's divergent treatment of the records might
be explained by noting that in Smith the record was kept by a disinterested hotel
employee, and in Standard Oil the records were kept by employees of alleged
coconspirators. Were more known about the manner in which the Standard Oil
conspiracy allegedly was implemented, there might appear some motive for the
242 Standard Oil, 251 F.2d at 198-213.
2" See discussion of alternative reasons for courts not so holding supra at note 226.
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employees of each alleged coconspirator to report falsely in their employers'
records the operations of the other alleged coconspirators.'" The scenario is
unlikely, however, since most of the records were compiled by lower echelon
employees and since any pecuniary advantage to each of the seven defendants
in conforming to the terms of the alleged conspiracy would depend heavily on
accurate information about the conformance or nonconformance of the others.
Such a conspiracy, therefore, would create incentives for accurate, rather than
inaccurate, reports. Thus, it is unlikely that the motives of the employee
declarants explain the different results.
Instead of comparing foundational proof, focus on the different substan-
tive contexts is of much more help in explaining the different holdings in Stand-
ard Oil and Smith. The conspiracy alleged in Standard Oil had to be proven by
more reliable evidence than the conspiracy alleged in Smith because a mistaken
finding of conspiracy in an antitrust case undoubtedly is perceived as a greater
danger than a mistaken finding of conspiracy in a heroin distribution case. 245
244
 Alternatively, the employees might have been overzealously pursuing their own
ends, or what they perceived to be their employers' interests, by creating a mini-conspiracy of
their own. If the court suspected these motives, and there is no hint of such suspicion in the opin-
ion, then the cases and discussion in note 226 supra may be at least equally relevant to explain the
court's insistence on strict adherence to the business records exception requirements. It doesn't
explain, however, the failure of the court in Smith to demand at least some showing of the reliabili-
ty of the records there.
245 It is not hereby suggested that hearsay exceptions are always strictly applied in an-
titrust cases — only that they are more strictly applied than in general criminal conspiracy cases.
For example, in cases where a judge is sitting without a jury, especially where an injunction
against anti-competitive activity (preventive relief) is sought, rather than damages, the courts
have bent many hearsay exceptions — especially the business records rule. See, e.g. , Schine
Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116-17 (1948); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F,2d 93, 118 (6th
Cir, 1944), aff 'd, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). (Levie criticized these cases for going beyond the "in
furtherance" requirement of the coconspirator's exception, Levie, supra note 174, at 1170.) The
reason the courts do so may be the lesser importance of exacting truth where the only effect can
be to enjoin allegedly anti-competitive activity. If a defendant is not actually engaging in the
unlawful activity, the holding that it is may not be perceived as deterring the company from
lawful behavior. While taking passing notice of the above, however, Judge Wyzanski carefully
reasoned that the use of admissible hearsay in these cases is more the result of the courts' concur-
rent jurisdiction with the Federal Trade Commission which is not bound by the hearsay rules.
It is difficult to imagine any satisfactory ground for deciding that evidence which is
admissible before the Federal Trade Commission is inadmissible before a judge
sitting without a jury in a civil anti-trust case brought by the Government. There
is no difference between the substantive anti-trust law applied by the Commission
and that applied by the Court. In a civil anti-trust case the Government has the
unfettered choice of going before a Commission or before a court without a jury.
The Commission's cease and desist order may in many cases be as drastic as the
decree of a District Court, except for the one point that the District Court's decree
unlike the Commission's order can be used as prima facie evidence in a private
treble damage suit. 15 U.S.C.A. S 16. The Commission's hearing officer may be
no more experienced or skillful than a District Judge in sifting the reliable hearsay
from the untrustworthy hearsay. And the admission of hearsay evidence by a
Commission undercuts just as effectively as the admission of hearsay evidence by a
Court the fundamental objective of the hearsay rule — the opportunity to hear the
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In the antitrust case, a mistaken imposition of liability could undermine the
policy of the law and the behavior the law seeks to encourage. In the criminal
conspiracy case, however, the court does not seem to perceive a similar danger.
As the court in Dalzotto observed in justifying the comparatively paltry
foundation laid for admitting a coconspirator's statement against the defend-
ant, general criminal conspiracy cases are not like cases where the hearsay
evidence is sought to implicate "otherwise innocent" parties.'" The certainty
of the court that the defendants involved have committed some, albeit un-
provable, crime related to the conspiracy charged is a premise that provides
justification for the use of the hearsay exceptions in these cases. 247 The courts
consider the possibility of mistaken convictions for general criminal conspiracy
through use of evidence of dubious reliability a risk worth taking. While the
reasoning is debatable, accepting a high risk of mistakes may be rationally
perceived as a better inducement to lawful behavior and deterrence of crime
than not taking the risk; the opposite result would be achieved in the antitrust
cases.
It may thus be seen that whether the courts will regard hearsay as reliable
enough to fit within an exception cannot be determined by simply comparing
the "circumstantial" or "inherent" reliability of the declarations. Reliability
can be meaningfully determined only by examining the declaration in light of
the substantive context in which the hearsay is offered and inquiring into the
relationship between the use of the hearsay and the goals of the substantive
law. 248
witness under oath and to subject him to cross-examination.
[T]he original demand for administrative adjudication was traceable,
in part at least, to the unwillingness of courts to admit evidence which they allowed
administrative agencies to receive and act upon. And that demand would be rein-
forced if the courts were to continue to say that in social and economic controver-
sies where the remedy is not imprisonment, or fine, or damages but an order
prescribing future conduct, a court sitting without a jury cannot receive hearsay
evidence even though without statutory authority an administrative agency could
do so. To preserve their own jurisdiction the courts must in this type of controver-
sy relax the rigidity of the hearsay rule.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 356 (D. Mass. 1950).
246 603 F.2d at 645.
247 Professor Alan Schwarz of the Rutgers Law School faculty, has observed that it may
be logical to conclude that if this assumption is the premise in conspiracy prosecutions, there may
be reason to believe that hearsay and other evidence rules are regularly bent in other cases in
which a court believes that the defendants are guilty of some crime (or liable for some civil wrong)
but where careful application of evidence rules would make proof of the defendant's guilt or
liability impossible. Private conversation July, 1981. For example, wouldn't a court be more
willing to take less reliable hearsay in an antitrust case where it believes that the defendants are
guilty of a prohibited conspiracy than in those antitrust cases where the court does not believe the
conspiracy existed? While the subject is beyond the scope of this article, it may be observed that
even if found true in some cases, it is to be hoped that it is not a regular pattern. Such a
manipulation would be wejurnfied by the substantive law in most cases. In criminal conspiracy
cases the law is the vehicle that justifies, and indeed commands, the manipulation.
246 Although not specifically comparing antitrust and criminal conspiracies, Prof.
Saltzburg's observations on adjustments of standards of proof on preliminary facts to account for
factors such as need to avoid frustrating prosecution of criminal conspiracies seem in accord.
Saltzburg, Standards of Proof, sutra note 32, at 302-04.
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It may not be possible in every case for the courts to identify with exacti-
tude why a particular hearsay declaration seems reliable, when a similar
declaration offered in another case is not reliable enough. Instead, standard
references to circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness may have to suffice
in some cases. Where there is a substantive distinction between the cases,
however, it would certainly facilitate understanding and predictability to have
express recognition of the substantive distinction if it is a motivating factor.
While it is possible that the Smith court was unaware that it was responding
to the divergent substantive laws, it seems more likely that the court was un-
willing to address this difference directly because the court was unwilling to
confront the controversy surrounding the criminal conspiracy doctrine. The
cloaking of its reasons in code words relating to "reliability," however, only
makes the ultimate decision more suspect than it need be. Only slightly worse,
it destroys the semblance of predictability of decisions and misleads the practi-
tioner attempting to prepare a case, producing unnecessary objections and
arguments over the admissibility of evidence. Finally, while the court may be
saved the trouble of having to explain why antitrust and criminal conspiracies
are different, its very failure to attempt the explanation may keep it wedded to
a substantive principle that, on more careful examination, it might decide to
change.
C. A Comparison of Hearsay to Prove Falsity in False Pretenses Actions
and the Central Elements of Other Claims
In the same way that identical hearsay fairly may be treated differently in
two cases when the issues on which it is offered seem identical, identical hear-
say also may be treated differently when the issues on which it is offered in two
cases are radically different from one another and the laws and policies in-
volved display that same divergence. In the antitrust and general criminal con-
spiracy context it was not hard to imagine some embarrassment at articulating
a rationale for the different treatment accorded identical hearsay evidence. In
the case involved in this section, however, it is very hard to imagine any em-
barrassment at drawing substantive distinctions, because the utility of using
hearsay is bound to vary where laws and issues are different. Where, as here,
all the laws are perceived as "fair," admissibility or inadmissibility cannot be
reasonably misconstrued as improperly motivated.
Nevertheless, the decision discussed in this section is probably a fair repre-
sentative of most courts' failures to draw express substantive distinctions when
ruling on the admissibility of hearsay. Courts are either unaware of substantive
influences or are unwilling to utter even so mild a statement as, "In cases in-
volving false pretenses only very reliable hearsay, if any, will be admitted to
prove that defendant's statement was false. Hearsay may be more readily used
in auto negligence cases to prove fault." By not drawing such distinctions,
however, courts may be forced to unduly complicated and prolix opinions. In
the attempt to articulate distinctions in evidence terms, even the appearance of
912	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:855
uniformity in application of hearsay exceptions dissolves. Worse still, a deci-
sion not confined to the substantive issues involved may become precedent
"against itself ' by then being cited as a general standard for receipt of hearsay
in other cases involving very different substantive laws. State v. Moore249 il-
lustrates this point.
In Moore, instead of a simple statement along the line suggested above to
justify holding certain hearsay statements inadmissible, the court attemped to
articulate an evidence rationale for distinguishing a series of decisions on three
New Jersey evidence rules: 25° the hearsay exceptions for business records, 25 '
the exception for reports of public officials, 252
 and the rule relating to findings
of preliminary facts. 2" As a result of its unnecessarily strained reasoning, the
court managed to rule the hearsay inadmissible, but only on the narrowest and
most questionable grounds available. A cure of the technical defect that pro-
vided the excuse for inadmissibility, however, will ,not achieve the court's ob-
jective, namely, an enhanced assurance of reliability or an increased oppor-
tunity for defendants to show errors in the hearsay declarations used to support
prosecutions for false pretenses. A more direct ruling couched in terms of the
goals of the substantive law involved would have better achieved that purpose.
The substantive issue in Moore was relatively simple. The defendant was
convicted in a nonjury trial of obtaining unemployment compensation by false
representations, a misdemeanor. 254 The prosecution claimed that the defend-
ant falsely stated that he was not working for Barrett & Co., Inc. (hereinafter
Barrett or employer) from June through November, 1972. The defendant
allegedly made the false representation periodically during those months, at
least each time he signed a certification on the back of unemployment compen-
sation checks payable to him."'
245
 158 N.J. Super. 68, 385 A.2d 867 (App. Div. 1978).
255 Id. at 75-81, 385 A.2d at 871-74.
251
	J.R. EviD. 63(13), set out infra in note 263.
252
 N.J.R. EV1D. 63(15), set out infra in note 267.
2"	 J.R. EVID. 8.
254 158 N.J. Super. at 72, 385 A.2d at 870. N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 2A:111-2 (West 1969)
provided:
Any person who, knowingly or designedly, by means of any false state-
ment made orally or in writing, or by means of concealing or failing to disclose a
material fact which it is his duty to reveal, obtains for himself or for any other per-
son from any agency of the State or from any county or municipality, or from any
agency of such county or municipality, or from any private or charitable organiza-
tion or association of any kind, under pretense that he or such other person is poor
and needy or out of employment, any money, property or other thing of value, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
This statute was repealed in 1978 and replaced by N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2C:20-4 (West 1981).
255
 158 N.J. Super. at 72-73, 385 A.2d at 870. The defendant admitted at trial that he
was called to work two or three times for Barrett during this period. He testified that each time he
worked two or three days and was laid off again. The prosecution's theory was that the defendant
worked almost full time for the entire time. The record [form S-27] showed that the defendant
worked all but one of the weeks during this period; sometimes "less than a full week," sometimes
"almost a complete week." In any event, the trial court found that the defendant concealed the
fact that he was employed during the period from clerks of the Unemployment Compensation of-
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Ordinarily, the most readily available evidence of the defendant's employ-
ment during this period would have been the employer's business records . 256
By the time of the trial, however, the prosecution learned that Barrett's original
records were lost and the company, "if it was in existence at all," no longer
had a place of business in New Jersey. 257 The prosecution therefore offered its
next "best evidence," an alleged copy of Barrett's time and payroll records
relating to the defendant which appeared on a standard form S-27 used by the
Division of Unemployment Benefits in its fraud investigation. 258 The form was
compiled by the Division's claims investigator, who testified to the method of
preparation, accuracy and authenticity of the S-27 form. The claims in-
vestigator testified that he had been assisted in copying the relevant portions of
the company's time and payroll records by Barrett's head bookkeeper and of-
fice manager. 259 The Barrett's employee then signed the S-27 form "in cer-
tification of its accuracy. 260 No representative of the alleged employer,
however, was called to testify about the record-keeping methods of the com-
pany.
The record thus presented a multiple hearsay problem: form S-27 said
that Barrett's business records said that employees said that defendant worked
for Barrett between June and November, 1972. If each level of the hearsay was
admissible under an exception, the S-27 form was admissible to prove the truth
of its contents. 261 As the court acknowledged, established precedents on the
hearsay question strongly supported admissibility. 262 The first level of the hear-
say, Barrett's record, was admissible under New Jersey's version of the
business records exception, which does not expressly require the testimony of
the custodian of the records to establish admissibility. 263 Under the state's rules
Tice and "positively represented that he was not employed." That finding was left undisturbed in
the appellate court opinion. 158 N.J. Super. at 72-74, 385 A.2d at 870-71.
256 In the more usual case, persons who worked with or supervised an alleged employee
mght also have been available. Of course, their memories of the dates and times of employment
might be hazy, especially if it is conceded that the employee worked at the same place at some
time, and the issue is narrowed to particular dates or times, as it apparently was here. See supra
note 255. In this case, the alleged company employer was no longer in existence and its former
owner had moved to Pennsylvania. See infra text and notes at notes 307-08. It is probably not
wise, however, to admit business records to prove employment in cases involving false pretenses
where, as here, the truth of the matter reflected in the record is disputed. See infra text at notes
281-87.
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N.J. Super. at 83, 385 A.2d at 875.
"" Id., 385 A.2d at 875. Another Claim's Division record, Form S-28, was also intro-
duced. It showed "what was done during the investigation," and the Division's claims in-
vestigator's testimony apparently was consistent with the information contained therein. Id. at
72, 385 A.2d at 870.
259 Id. at 73, 385 A.2d at 870.
'6° Id. at 76, 385 A.2d at 871, 872.
261 See discussion of multiple hearsay analysis supra in notes and text at notes 228-29.
262 See cases cited in 158 N.J. Super. at 75-76, 385 A.2d at 871-72, and infra text and
notes at 263-75.
263 N.J.R. EvID. 63(13) states:
A writing offered as a memorandum or record of acts, conditions or
events is admissible to prove the facts stated therein if the writing or the record
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the foundation may be laid by any proof that establishes the necessary
preliminary facts, including hearsay and otherwise inadmissible evidence. 264
 In
Moore the preliminary facts appeared to be sufficiently shown by the evidence
set out in the margin. 265
 In any event, the court explained, there was ample
authority for using admissibility of the second level of the hearsay to admit in-
cidentally the included hearsay, Barrett's business records, without separate
foundational proof for the latter.'"
The second leg of the hearsay in Moore, form S-27, was clearly admissible
under either the business records exception or the exception for reports of of-
ficials. 262
 The claims investigator's official duties unquestionably included
compiling the record and observing the matters reflected in it. The court
upon which it is based was made in the regular course of a business, at or about the
time of the act, condition or event recorded, and if the sources of information from
which it was made and the method and circumstances of its preparation were such
as to justify its admission.
See also 1963 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, 1963 Report
Rule 63(13) comment, at 179-80 (1963), quoted in 158 N.J. Super. at 77 n.1, 385 A.2d at 872
n.l.
264 	EvID. 8(1) provides:
When the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the admissibility of
evidence, or the existence of a privilege is stated in these rules to be subject to a
condition, and the fulfillment of the condition is in issue, that issue is to be deter-
mined by the judge. In his determination the rules of evidence shall not apply ex-
cept for [rules of relevance and privilege].
See also cases cited in 158 N.J. Super. at 81-84, 385 A.2d at 874-75. Of special interest is
State v. Cardone, 146 N.J. Super. 23, 28-29, 368 A.2d 952, 955 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 75
N.J. 3, 379 A.2d 234 (1977) where the author of the opinion in Moore, Judge Botter, held a
manufacturer's certificate verifying the accuracy of breathalyzer equipment sufficient to lay a
foundation for receipt of results of breathalyzer test.
7" The trial court had before it (i) the bookkeeper's verification of form S-27, (ii) the in-
vestigator's testimony, apparently based on his own observations and representations to him by
Barrett's bookkeeper, that the records "were those maintained by Barrett & Company in the or-
dinary business — as an ordinary business record," 158 N.J. Super. at 76, 385 A.2d at 872, and
(iii) the employer's statutory duty to maintain accurate employment records for purposes of such
inspection. Id. at 76-77, 385 A.2d 871-72. The court observed that the investigator's testimony
was not given until after the trial court had ruled on the defense's objection to the report and then
later observed, "[t]here was no evidence, hearsay or otherwise, describing the procedures used in
making the records . [although] [s]ome conclusions can be drawn from [the investigator's]
testimony." Id. at 84, 385 A.2d at 875. Since the investigator's testimony on the point would
have been sufficient, along with the circumstantial evidence noted above, to justify receipt of the
included hearsay, (and the court suggests that it would have been if "necessity" for form S-27
was shown under the best evidence rule) the point is hard to grasp. The exact reason for reversal
at the end of the opinion is not entirely clear. The most likely meaning of the court's language is
set out infra in the text accompanying notes 309-12. If the reason for reversal was the trial court's
failure to consider the claims investigator's testimony before ruling form S-27 admissible, then
the holding of the appellate court would be even more counter-productive than it appears to be,
since the "error" had already been cured.
266 See 158 N.J. Super. at 77-78 & n.1, 385 A.2d at 872 & n.1 and sources cited therein,
some of which are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 276-305.
262 Id. at 75, 385 A.2d at 871. N.J.R. EvID. 63(15) provides:
[A] statement is admissible if in the form of (a) a written statement of an
act done, or an act, condition or event observed by a public official it was within
the scope of his duty either to perform the act reported or to observe the act, condi-
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acknowledged that the S-27 form "appears to satisfy the quest for accuracy and
reliability."269
Instead of the double, or included hearsay analysis followed in the cases
cited in the opinion, however, the Moore court analyzed the offer as a single
hearsay step. The court ultimately excluded form S-27 on the questionable
ground that a proper foundation had not been laid under the best evidence, or
original writings rule. 269 The court's articulated reason for avoiding the double
hearsay analysis was to sidestep "the troubling question of the admissibility of
a report made by an agent investigating a possible violation of the law ad-
ministered by that agency." 27° The reasoning is not persuasive. While a
"troubling question" would be presented in cases where the investigator is not
present for cross-examination since, in the court's words, "his conclusions and
motives may be questioned, ""' Moore was not such a case."' The investigator
was present and testified to facts consistent with those reported in the docu-
ment. His motives and conclusions were fully open to cross-examination. In-
deed, depending upon the extent to which he claimed a present memory of the
information reflected in form S-27, some portions of the form might have been
admissible under the exception for past recollection recorded. 273 Other portions
might have been characterized as not hearsay at al1, 274 or admitted only to
refresh the witness' recollection. 273
The Moore court's route of analysis through the best evidence rule to inad-
missibility, however, provided it with a means for skirting precedents it cited
tion or event reported and to make the written statement, or (b) statistical findings
made by a public official whose duty it was to investigate the facts concerning the
act, condition or event and to make statistical findings.
268 158 N.J. Super. at 84, 385 A.2d at 875.
269 See N.J.R. EVID. 70. See also discussion of court's analysis on this point infra in text
and notes at notes 306-12.
275 158 N.J. Super. at 75, 385 A.2d at 871.
271 Id.
272 FED. R. EVID. 803(8) excludes from the hearsay exception for reports of public offi-
cials "in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel." The language was originally proposed in a debate in the House of Representatives
and seems to have been motivated by the same concerns expressed in Moore and the text. See 4
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at 803-16 to -17 and j 803(8)[01], at 803-194 to -195. See
also United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66-68 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing a criminal conviction for
erroneous admission of a chemist's report, but ultimately defendant was convicted when chemist
testified) 445 F. Supp. 351 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1332 (2d Cir. 1978). There is some
disagreement about what reports are excluded by the rule. See 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra
note 14, 1 803(8)[04] and cases cited therein.
2" N.J.R. EVID. 63(1)(b). The exception generally admits a witness' own writing of an
event, made when the witness' memory was fresh if the witness now has no memory or only a
very limited memory of the event and testifies that he knew the writing was correct when he made
it. Cross-examination of the witness' motives, habits for accuracy and accuracy on the occasion
he made the writing are thus possible.
274 See Bein, supra note 193, at 1004-07.
275 Generally, a memorandum used to refresh a witness' recollection is not considered
"evidence." The witness' testimony, with his memory thus refreshed, is the evidence. United
States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949). See also Kazan-
jian v. Atlas Novelty Co., 34 N.J. Super. 362, 370, 112 A.2d 592, 596 (App. Div. 1955).
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that would have rendered the hearsay admissible. Solely in evidence terms,
four of the cited cases the court thus avoided involved hearsay issues that were
all but indistinguishable from those in Moore."6 There is no hint in the Moore
opinion that the court disagreed with the results of those cases, so presumably
direct confrontation with their holdings would not have been a desirable path.
Direct confrontation was, however, unnecessary. The substantive laws and
issues involved in the four sidestepped cases were radically different from those
in Moore. Thus, the court could have easily supported the distinction on
substantive grounds. This analysis also would have effectuated the court's ex-
press determination that the hearsay was too unreliable to be used as "the only
evidence ... to prove an essential element of the crime," 277 better than the
narrow path taken.
Of the four precedent cases thus avoided by the Moore court, the one most
closely similar involved a prosecution for drunk driving. 278 In that case, a
hospital record incorporated into a police department file was held admissible
to prove that tests showed the defendant's blood alcohol level to be 0.222% by
weight. 279 As in Moore, the hearsay was offered to prove an essential element of
the crime, the defendant's drunkenness, and no declarant connected with the
lab test nor the entries in the record was called to testify. 28° Narrowly viewed,
the evidence issue thus was virtually identical to that in Moore. The two cases,
however, were distinguishable on at least two grounds. First, the two defend-
ants' stakes in the outcome were different. While they both faced identical legal
sanctions on conviction, 28 ' the social stigma attached to a conviction for false
pretenses arguably is greater than the stigma attached to a drunk driving con-
viction. Second, different degrees of reliability were necessary to make the
proof probative of the substantive issues in the two cases. Had the Moore court
279 See infra text and notes at notes 277-306.
2" 158 N.J. Super. at 84, 385 A.2d at 875. See also id. at 77-78, 385 A.2d at 872.
"9 State v. Martorelli, 136 N.J. Super. 449, 346 A.2d 618 (App. Div. 1975), cert. denied,
69 N.J. 445, 354 A.2d 642 (1976). The Moore court distinguished Martorelli as follows:
We do not imply that all cases require proof that each item of included or multiple
hearsay in business records or reports of public officials satisfies the included hear-
say rule or that in all situations copies of the original documents contained in or at-
tached to business records must independently satisfy the best evidence rule.
158 N.J. Super. at 77 n.1, 385 A.2d at 872 n.1. It should be noted that the case could not be
distinguished on the severity of punishment. Both cases carried the possibility of jail terms and
fines. In both, the defendants were fined, and jail terms suspended.
279
 136 N.J. Super. at 452, 346 A.2d at 620.
299 Id. The Martorelli court held the hospital record admissible apparently on only the
testimony of the police officer to whom the report had been given by the laboratory. Id. at 451,
346 A.2d at 620. The court discussed the reliability of procedures normally used in hospitals and
the simplicity of the diagnosis involved. Id. at 455, 346 A.2d at 621. The court observed that the
defendant was free to call any witnesses he liked, including the doctor and lab technician, to
rebut the report. Id., 346 A.2d at 622. Each observation might also have been made in the Moore
case. Time and payroll records are usually kept accurately by the businesses that keep them for
their own purposes, tax purposes, to comply with other federal and state statutes. The defendant
in Moore was also free to call any witnesses he could find.
291 See supra note 278.
July 1982]
	 THE HEARSAY RULE	 917
considered these two distinctions, a more durable rationale for its exclusion of
the offered hearsay could have been realized.
In Moore the hearsay was offered to prove the falsity of the defendant's
periodic representation that he was not working. The hearsay was urged to
reflect the objective truth against which the defendant's deviation was to be
measured. The very danger of hearsay, of course, is that it may deviate from
objective truth in any number of ways. In Moore, the absence of an opportunity
to cross-examine the hearsay declarants made it impossible for the defendant to
discover whether the report contained one or more of all the possible errors.
Given the number of likely declarants and layers of hearsay involved, the prob-
ability of some error was fairly high. A single correction, on cross-examination,
of any one of the number of possible errors in the report might have shown that
the truth was the opposite of what the report was offered to prove. Moreover, a
coincidence between one error and the defendant's assertions if shown, might
have proved that all or one of the defendant's representations were true, or ex-
plainable as an honest mistake. 282
In the drunk driving case, too, the hospital record might have deviated
from exacting truth in numerous ways. Only one, the least likely of the possible
deviations, however, would have completely destroyed the report as probative
of what it was offered to prove. Under the criminal statute, any alcohol weight
in excess of 0.05% was admissible and probative of drunkenness. 283
 While the
297
	
example, an error in the last digit of the year reported would have destroyed the
value of the report altogether as it was not denied that the defendant worked for Barrett prior to
the period in question. A mistake in one or more of the dates of the weeks and months the defend-
ant reportedly worked might have destroyed the value of the report or shown that some of his
representations were true (thus supporting a claim that the others were an honest mistake). A
mistake overstating the number of hours the defendant reportedly worked or the salary he re-
ceived might have proved that the defendant was honestly mistaken about whether he was
employed at the time he received unemployment insurance. The defendant admitted at the trial
that he had worked two or three times for two or three days each during that period in question
but believed that he was entitled to compensation anyway. The court held that while his claim for
those periods might have been based on a good faith belief in entitlement he nevertheless
represented that he was not working. See supra note 255. If revelation of errors in the hearsay record
supported the defendant's contention that he did not work for Barrett other than once or twice,
the court would presumably have been more willing to conclude that the defendant made a
mistake of fact that led to his erroneous statements, and not a mistake of law. Moreover, the
defendant was ordered by the lower court to make restitution in the amount he had allegedly
wrongly received. 158 N.J. Super. at 72, 385 A.2d at 870. That amount would have been
substantially reduced by such a showing.
"3 N.J. STAT. ANN. S 39:4-50 (West 1973) provided at the time that a person who
operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was subject for a first of-
fense to a fine of not less than $200 nor more than $500 or a term of imprisonment of not less than
30 days nor more than 3 months or both in the discretion of the magistrate. (The statute was
amended and penalties changed somewhat in 1977 to reduce to maximum fine to $400 and the
maximum jail term to 30 days. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West Supp. 1981)). Under N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West 1973), in effect at the time, in any prosecution under the
preceding section, (1) if there was .05%, or less, by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood,
"it shall be presumed that the defendant was not intoxicated" and (2) if there was in excess of
.05%, but less than .15% that fact "may be considered with other competent evidence in deter-
mining the guilt" of defendant. (In Marwrelli the police officers who arrested the defendant
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alcohol level shown in the lab report might have been inaccurate, overstating
the true percentage amount, only the grossest of errors could have resulted in
reporting an actual level of less than 0.05 % as 0.222%.
In both Moore and the drunken driving case, the number of ways in which
the report entries potentially might have misreflected objective reality probably
was identical. In that sense the reports were equally reliable or unreliable of the
truth of the assertions contained in them. In Moore, however, most of the possi-
ble deviations from the truth would have destroyed the probative value of the
report. Since the chance of at least one error was high, the report properly was
characterized as unreliable in relationship to what it was offered to prove. In
the drunk driving case, only one of the possible errors would have destroyed
the probative value of the report. While there was a good chance of at least
some error in that report, too, there was much less of a possibility that that er-
ror would turn out to be the only one that would make a difference in the prob-
ative worth of the report. 284
As argued more fully elsewhere, the lesser "utility" of cross-examination
to defendant in the drunk driving case than to defendant in Moore does not
justify denying either of them the opportunity. 285
 That is not the comparison
invited here, nor was it the issue in Moore. Instead, it is suggested that a hear-
say declaration may be characterized as "more reliable" when revelation of
most of its conceivable errors would have little or no effect on its value in prov-
ing the ultimate proposition it is offered to prove. The same statement might be
properly characterized as "less reliable" where demonstration of almost any of
testified that they saw his automobile weaving before a collision and that afterwards they smelled
alcohol on his breath. 136 N.J. Super. at 451, 346 A.2d at 619.) A weight by alcohol of .15% or
more gives rise to a presumption that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. (The
statute was amended in 1977 and the weight triggering the presumption lowered to .10%. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. S 39:4-50.1 (West Supp. 1981)).
284
 In addition to numerical differences, there may have been a "quality" difference in
the possible errors. The employer in Moore, for example, may have used various symbols or codes
to identify employees, time worked, payments, etc. There may thus have been a question of the
meaning of the entries that the claims investigator examined, not just a question whether he copied
them correctly. While the investigator was available for cross-examination of the accuracy of his
copy, he could only offer hearsay testimony on the meaning of the original entries. The lab report
in the drunk driving case, on the other hand, was in court and no mention is made in the opinion
of any coding or symbols in the report.
265 Bein, supra note 193, at 1026, 1034. The "utility" of cross-examination cannot be
measured by the scarcity of errors that may be found, for any one of them alone, or in combina-
tion with other matters shown or disproved by the defendant, could result in an acquittal to the
defendant. In the drunk driving case, cross-examination might have revealed an error resulting
in a misstatement of the alcohol weight by a percentage below that necessary to trigger the
statutory presumption. See supra note 283. While there was sufficient evidence independent of the
alcohol level there to convict the defendant in the testimony of the police officers, the probative
value of their testimony, too, might have been diminished by cross-examination.
The analysis used in the text herein is similar to that used by the Supreme Court in
Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). While not the author's preferred approach, the point is
that the analysis does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that hearsay must be admitted in every
case, or that it is constitutionally permissible to admit it. Rather, it may itself be used as a basis
for distinguishing some cases from others in terms that are acceptable to the current Supreme
Court.
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its conceivable errors would have the opposite effect. The admissibility of hear-
say would thus depend on the degree of accuracy mandated by the substantive
Iaw at issue.
The law of false pretenses, since it penalizes untruth, demands highly
reliable evidence to prove the "truth" against which the falsity of the defend-
ant's representation are measured. As illustrated by the cited case, the drunk
driving law demands less reliable proof, since drunkenness may be
demonstrated by any number of included possibilities that the hearsay was
reliable enough to prove. 286 Thus, the court in Moore might have distinguished
the latter case with the simple observation that a higher degree of reliability is
demanded where hearsay is offered to prove truth as a measurement of an
alleged untruth."'
The three other cases avoided by the Moore court were civil cases.'" All
three contained multiple levels of hearsay offered under the business records
286 An interesting counterpoint to the distinction drawn here is found in Courtney v.
Dollar Say. Bank, 54 A.D.2d 868, 869, 388 N.Y.S.2d 593, 595 (1976) where the court held that
the defendant could not show a hospital record to prove that the deceased had made material
misrepresentation in an insurance application. The defendant claimed that the deceased falsely
stated that he was not an alcoholic when he was. Id. at 869, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 595. The hospital
record showed that the deceased had a long history of an excessive alcohol consumption. Id. The
court refused the record on the ground that there was no showing as to the source of the state-
ment. Id. (Note: There were only two or three likely sources and each was covered by an excep-
tion — a statement by deceased or a member of his family for purposes of treatment and observa-
tion and tests of the doctor or hospital staff.)
281 Two other cases cited elsewhere in the Moore court's opinion could have been
distinguished on the same grounds. State v. Cardone, 146 N.J. Super. 23, 28-29, 368 A.2d 952,
955-56 (App. Div. 1976), (holding certificate of calibration and accuracy of radar machine
usable, despite its inadmissibility as hearsay, to provide foundation for admissibility of radar
readings in speeding cases) cert. denied, 75 N.J. 3, 379 A.2d 234 (1977); State v. McGeary, 129
N.J. Super. 219, 224-25, 322 A.2d 830, 833 (App. Div. 1974) (holding an authenticated state
police official's inspection certificate of breathalyzer machine admissible to help prove drunken-
ness).
Another case cited in the court's opinion, however, was better distinguished on eviden-
tiary than substantive grounds. State v. Reddick, 53 N.J. 66, 248 A.2d 425 (1968). In Reddick,
the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. Id. at 66, 248 A.2d at 425. There was testimony at
trial that he assaulted the decedent with a knife, but apparently the cause of the decedent's death
was the issue. Id. at 67-68, 248 A.2d at 425-26. The medical examiner who performed the autop-
sy had died and his report (with the opinion as to cause of death deleted) was admitted into
evidence to provide a foundation for the testimony of the state's expert as to cause of death. Id. at
68, 248 A.2d at 426. Reddick is cited in the portion of the Moore opinion dealing with the defend-
ant's confrontation objection, to support the Moore court's holding that there is no bar to receipt
of the hearsay under the confrontation clause. 158 N.J. Super. at 79, 385 A.2d at 873. While it is
always possible to argue that a higher risk of mistaken conviction for murder of known assailants
will not discourage lawful behavior as would a mistaken conviction for false pretenses, the argu-
ment has a hollow ring. Since the stakes were so much higher in terms of societal interest and
punishment in Reddick than in Moore, it is hard to rationalize receipt of the hearsay in Reddick on
that basis. In usual evidence terms, however, death of the medical examiner gave rise to an in-
disputable "need" for his report and to that extent the holding in Moore, requiring a greater
showing of necessity for use of the secondary proof is perfectly consistent with Reddick.
3" Schneiderman v. Strelecki, 107 N.J. Super. 113, 257 A.2d 130 (App. Div. 1969);
Brown v. Mortimer, 100 N.J. Super. 395, 242 A.2d 36 (App. Div. 1968); Fagan v. Newark, 78
N.J. Super. 294, 188 A.2d 427 (App. Div. 1963). These cases are discussed in further detail infra
at notes 291-305.
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exception. In all three, as in Moore, the declarants responsible for the original
level of the hearsay statements were unavailable to testify and the declarations
were offered to prove central issues in the cases. Each of these cases, however,
also involved issues, laws and substantive policies extremely different from
those in Moore.
The first case involved a claim against New Jersey's Unsatisfied Claim
and Judgement Fund. 289 The hearsay, a policeman's report of an auto acci-
dent, was based partly on an eyewitness account of a declarant not called to
testify.'" It was admitted to prove that the plaintiff-pedestrian's injuries were
proximately caused by an unidentified hit-and-run driver, and that the plaintiff
was not contributorily negligent."' The second case concerned a private auto
negligence action. 292
 The hearsay was a policeman's diagram of the vehicles'
positions and skid marks, drawn an hour after the accident. 293 It was admitted
to prove the direction in which the cars were traveling at the time of impact. 294
As in the first case the declarant policeman was not called to testify. 295
 The
third case involved a worker's compensation case in which the plaintiff alleged
that the decedent's death was caused by a work-related injury. 296
 The hearsay
admitted was a business record containing the decedent-worker's declaration
that he had suffered an injury (that might have contributed to his death) while
working. 297
289 Schneiderman v. Strelecki, 107 N.J. Super. 113, 116, 257 A.2d 130, 131 (App. Div.
1969).
298 Id. at 116, 257 A.2d at 131.
291 Id. at 117-18, 257 A.2d at 132. In Schneiderman, the court upheld a receipt of a
policeman's report, which was a "routine" report of an automobile accident, despite the fact that
the policeman testified (and thus there was apparently no need for it), and despite the fact that it
contained statements by the plaintiff consistent with her version of the accident. Id. at 119-20,
257 A.2d at 133. The court reasoned that even though there may not have been an exception for
the plaintiff's statement, it could not "understand how defendant was prejudiced by this in view
of the somewhat different version she testified to at the trial." Id. at 119, 257 A.2d at 133. The
report, however, apparently also was based on statements of an eyewitness to the event — and
there is no discussion of any exception under which that witness' declarations might have come
into evidence.
292 Brown v. Mortimer, 100 N.J. Super. 395, 399, 242 A.2d 36, 38 (App. Div. 1968).
293 Id. at 400, 242 A.2d at 38.
294 Id. at 406, 242 A.2d at 38.
295 Id. at 402, 242 A.2d at 39.
296 Fagan v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 297-98, 188 A.2d 427, 429 (App. Div. 1963).
297 Id. at 299, 316-17, 188 A.2d at 429, 438-39. This is a fascinating opinion by Judge
Conford discussing the requirements of the business records exception and the substantive utility
of hearsay exceptions. The deceased fireman died of a heart attack at home. Id. at 300, 188 A.2d
at 430. He was an "older" worker who had been assigned to a company not directly involved in
firefighting. Id. at 298, 188 A.2d at 429. According to the fellow fireman, who entered the de-
ceased fireman's complaint in the record, the deceased claimed that he injured himself carrying a
heavy fire extinguisher. Id. No one else saw the alleged injury occur. Id. at 299, 188 A.2d at 429.
Judge Conford was forced to conclude that the declaration does not technically fit under the res
gestae exception. Id. at 307, 188 A.2d 434. He argued, however, that "unwitnessed accidents in
employment eventuating ultimately in death to the employee are so frequent that unless a state-
ment by the decedent to fellow employees is admitted ... recovery will be denied so fre-
quently as to impair the basic objective of the workmen's compensation law." Id. at 305, 188
A.2d at 433.
It appears to us that the most candid approach to this problem would be for the ap-
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While the Moore court might have relied on the usual civil-criminal distinc-
tion to demand a higher degree of reliability, 299 it is not apparent that that
distinction alone would have justified inadmissibility of the hearsay at issue. 299
The civil-criminal dichotomy, however, when coupled with the other substan-
tive distinctions present, certainly would have justified a demand by the Moore
court for more reliable evidence than that admitted in the three civil cases. In
the civil cases, none of the particular facts which the hearsay was used to prove
had to be determined with the degree of exactitude required to prove the truth
in Moore. 300 In the private auto accident suit, where both parties probably were
insured, the policy of the law toward the need for correct answers to the ques-
tion of "fault" might be characterized as close to indifference. Recent
pressures and rationalizations for no-fault and other systems of social insurance
and general welfare legislation have made great inroads into traditional beliefs
propriate tribunal to make a value judgment as to whether the social policy
subserved by the compensation law warrants frank formulation of a special rule for
compensation cases, admitting declarations of deceased workmen made reason-
ably close to the time of the accident ... rather than to persist in these cases with
illogical application of the excited utterance rule.
it at 306-07, 188 A.2d at 433-34 (footnote omitted).
Judge Conford then ruled that the statement was admissible because it was made in the
course of the fireman's duty to report it. Id. at 316-17, 188 A.2d at 438-39. His finding that the
fireman had a duty to report the injury — and even that the person to whom he reported it had a
duty to write it down — is, however, clearly based on some legerdemain. Judge Conford was
able to infer that the writer had a duty to write it down, because the company journal contained a
number of "comparable entries of accidents or injuries to firemen in the course of duty." Id. at
316, 188 A.2d at 439. Such writings are therefore "obviously in the interest of prudent conduct of
the department." Id. The fireman, then, had a duty to report it if we accept the premise that it
was the general, known practice for injured firemen to report any injury or illness. This approach
should be contrasted with that in Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cm.
denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958), discussed in detail supra in text and notes at notes 209, 213-26, and
242-44.
296 See supra note 280 discussing the usual statements that more reliable proof is demand-
ed in criminal than civil cases. The doctrine is often recited in New Jersey opinions. See, e.g.,
State v. McGee, 131 N.J. Super. 292, 298, 329 A.2d 581, 585 (App. Div. 1974); State v. Taylor,
46 N.J. 316, 332, 217 A.2d 1, 10, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 855 (1966).
299 Because the claims investigator was available for cross-examination the defendant in
Moore had a better opportunity to cross-examine than in Brown v. Mortimer, 100 N.J. Super.
113, 242 A.2d 36 (App. Div. 1968). In Brown the investigating officer was serving in Vietnam at
the time of trial. Id. at 399, 242 A.2d at 39. The other two cases, Schneiderman v. Strelecki, 107
N.J. Super. 113, 257 A.2d 130 (App. Div. 1969) and Fagan v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 188
A.2d 427 (App. Div. 1963), contained an original leg of hearsay that did not even have sufficient
guarantees of reliability to make that leg admissible under an exception. The hearsay in Moore
might thus have been viewed as more reliable anyway.
'°° It should be noted carefully that other issues in cases involving accidents may re-
quire, if they are contested, more exacting proof to effectuate legislative policies. In auto accident
cases, for example, more reliable proof should presumably be required on the identity of the
defendant as the owner or driver of the automobile. In the state insurance scheme case,
presumably more exacting proof should be required of the difficulty of identifying the hit-and-
run driver or the uncollectibility of any claim against him. In the workers' compensation case the
status of the claimant as an employee should be determined with more exactitude. In most in-
stances, if these issues are contested, the testimony of the claimant based on his personal
knowledge would presumably be offered. If there is some reason for offering hearsay presumably
courts would, and should, demand some showing of its reliability greater than that required on
the issues addressed in the cases discussed in the text. See infra text and notes at notes 263-305.
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about the economic benefit and deterrent effect of carefully identifying which of
the parties' negligence caused a loss."' Whatever function a finding of fault
continues to play in such cases, presumably it is served well enough by allow-
ing those who bear the costs of the suit to choose the exactitude of the proof they
care to present." 2
 In addition, reliance on evidence that gives a roughly ac-
curate approximation of the truth on issues whose resolutions otherwise are
socially unimportant serves well enough the separate interest of the court
system in achieving accuracy of results.
In the workers' compensation and state insurance cases, there arguably is
a somewhat larger social interest in preserving the economic viability of the two
funds. Proof of "fault" in the state insurance case and work-relatedness in the
workers' compensation case is necessary for the same reason that those facts
are made elements of a cognizable claim, namely, to provide a measure of the
losses appropriately distributed or allocated in the manner provided for by the
statutes. The actuarial soundness of the two schemes, however, presumably
was not envisioned as turning on perfectly correct determinations of the ap-
propriateness of each claim. It seems apparent that a more certain measure
than "fault" or "work-relatedness" would have been used if absolutely correct
determinations were required. Instead, "roughly" correct answers to the in-
stant questions in most cases are deemed good enough to assure the social in-
terest in the viability of the schemes so long as the total of the losses so allocated
thereby is not made radically greater or less than that deemed appropriate
when the systems were enacted. 303
 On these issues then, too, it may be wiser to
leave the question of exactitude of the proof presented to the parties who bear
the costs of the suit. Indeed, increasing costs of these suits by forcing the parties
to present more exacting proof may be counterproductive. Requiring presenta-
tion of more reliable proof or live testimony may not produce any overall
benefit by making more exact the determination of appropriate total alloca-
tions. In addition, such a strict rule may lead to more incorrect results than
would have occurred otherwise due to the unavailability of such proof.'" In-
3°' G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (there is a critique of what the
author refers to as proposals for social insurance and general welfare legislation in the first
chapter); 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, S 11.5, at 743; S 12.1, at 744-47, and SS
13.1, 13.2, at 759-64 (1956).
302 While there is some public interest, similar to that noted in the text, see infra note 303,
in assuring that private individuals do not pay for more than the losses they cause, and that
private insurance schemes, too, do not fail, that interest is presumably best protected by the in-
dividuals and insurance companies involved.
503 See J. SLAIN, C..THOMPSON & F. BEEN, supra note 172, at 2-150 to -190 (1980);
Calabresi, Some Thoughts On Risk Distribution And The Law Of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 514, 518,
544-45 (1961).
304 The policies of courts applying both of these insurance schemes are generally be-
lieved to heavily favor inclusion of claims against the funds rather than exclusion, (once,
presumably, facts such as those outlined in note 300 supra are found). This policy, however,
should not affect rulings on the admissibility of evidence.
Rules relating to the sort of proof that may be presented are generally perceived as
designed solely to make the process of litigation fair and efficient, assisting in the search for
"truth" by giving parties a "fair opportunity to present their sides of the story," Ely, The Ir-
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deed, in the workers' compensation case noted, the court argued that there
should be a special hearsay exception created for statements by deceased
workers to avoid just that result." 6
A final and important distinguishing feature of Moore from each of the four
other cases is that the law of false pretenses penalizes making assertions which,
if not untrue, are to be encouraged, by the general policies of other laws (in-
volving commercial and social interactions). The costs of mistaken findings of
falsity thus are quite high for they potentially include discouraging behavior
considered desirable. In the other four cases, however, the costs of mistaken
findings on the issues for which the hearsay was used would not have included
potentially discouraging desirable behavior.
Instead of drawing the distinctions suggested above, the Moore court
distinguished the four precedent cases by viewing form S-27 as a copy of the
employer's business records offered as "secondary" evidence of that hearsay
under the best evidence rule." 6 The best evidence rule, which is intended to
repressible Myth Of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974). The policy of the substantive law in
workers' compensation and insurance cases favoring inclusion of most claims is presumably
reflected in the definition of, and burdens of persuasion necessary to show, work-relatedness in
the first case, and "fault" of the hit-and-run driver in the second. If hearsay exceptions were lop-
sidedly used, favoring reception of proof by plaintiffs on these issues and disfavoring identical
proof offered by defendants, then, if carried to an extreme, the substantive law would be thereby
changed to mean that all injuries are compensable by workers' compensation whether work-
related or not, and all pedestrian injuries are compensable whether caused by the hit-and-run
driver or not. While a decision to change substantive laws in this manner may seem desirable to
some, use of rules relating to presentation of proof is an inappropriate way to do it. Such
manipulation may cause unnecessary hardships, and, if not a hard and fast rule in every case,
could also be an ineffective way to implement such a change. See supra Section l(A)(1). The hear-
say rule and its exceptions are not generally perceived, nor should they become, substantive
rules. Rather they should remain rules that effectuate deliberately-made substantive policies.
It should be noted that recent innovations in the admissions exception, such as those
making admissible against an employer declarations by employees to the employer, FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2)(C) and FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C) advisory committee note, and statements
made by an employee about any matter within the scope of his employment, FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(D), may be perceived as resulting in such a lopsided application of evidence rules in
similar situations. The employer against whom such evidence is offered cannot take advantage of
the same exceptions against an opponent in the litigation. Thus a bus driver employee's state-
ment after an accident, it was my fault," will be admissible against the driver's employer. If the
employee instead said, it was not my fault" that statement probably would not be admissible if
offered on the employer's behalf. The reason is supposedly that, if offered by the employer, the
statement would be self-serving. That reasoning also applies if the statement is offered under the
next most likely exception available — the business records exception. See Palmer v. Hoffman,
318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943). Agency and tort policies favoring vicarious liability and placing losses
on the enterprises with which they are connected are said to justify the exceptions. 4
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 14, 11801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-160 to -164; 4 D. LOUISELL &
C. MUELLER, supra note 37, S 426 at 321-30. The hearsay exceptions, however, go beyond the
law of agency in attributing responsibility for these statements to the employer. The evidence ra-
tionale barring the statement as "self-serving" when offered by the employer also depends on at-
tribution of the statement to the employer, which attribution is not traceable to the law of agency.
See J. SLAIN, C. THOMPSON & F. REIN, supra note 172 at 4-97 to -120.
"5 See supra note 297. For reasons similar to those expressed in the text, most worker's
compensation claims are now handled by administrative tribunals where normal rules of hearsay
need not apply. See supra note 34.
3" N.J. R. Evin. 70.
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prevent fraud, requires proponents of writings to present the original writing
itself, unless some excuse is shown. Under the New Jersey rule, "showing that
the writing was not reasonably procurable by use of the Court's process or by
other available means" justifies admission of a copy. 907
By employing the best evidence rule approach, the Moore court narrowed
the issue to whether the prosecution had sufficiently shown that it was unable
to present the employer's original business records. At the trial, the prosecutor
had explained that Barrett apparently was no longer in business. Represent-
atives of Barrett's apparent successor did not have the original records. Fur-
thermore, the former owners of Barrett, by then located in Pennsylvania, in-
formed the prosecutor that many of Barrett's records had disappeared during
one of three or four moves. The former owners searched for the defendant's
records among those remaining and located only the defendant's W-2 form. 308
The Moore court held this showing insufficient to establish the unavailability of
the original records.
While all the precedents established that hearsay representations of an at-
torney were sufficient to establish the unavailability of evidence and witnesses
generally,349 the court in Moore held that this case was different because the
prosecutor's representations were used "to admit secondary evidence as proof
of hearsay. " 310 The court, therefore, remanded for a retrial. To use form S-27
there, the court declared, the prosecutor would have to make a greater showing
of his inability "reasonably to produce more and better evidence on these sub-
ject."'" The "subject" apparently included the "procedures used in making
[Barrett's business records]. ,,312
Curing the foundational deficiency thus described by the Moore court,
however, will not cure the unreliability of form S-27. The prosecution
presumably could offer its own affidavit and the affidavits of Barrett's former
owners swearing that the business records were unavailable. Those affidavits,
however, will not improve the reliability of form S-27. Alternatively, the pros-
ecution could find and produce a witness connected with the keeping of the
missing records. Yet, even the most knowledgeable of the possible witnesses,
the bookkeeper, could add little. Her certification on form S-27, already in
evidence, would be even more reliable than her in-court testimony based on
her subsequent memory. In the absence of original records, she would not be
able to verify in court even the apparent regularity of the relevant entries. In
any event, the availability of the keeper of the records for cross-examination
would be of no help. She could not testify to the only relevant question: which
of the many possible deviations from the objective truth did the records con-
307 Id.
3 °8 158 N.J. Super. at 83, 385 A.2d at 875.
"9 See cases and sources cited in 158 N.J. Super. at 82-84, 385 A.2d at 874-75, and
supra notes 262-75.
158 N.J. Super. at 84, 385 A.2d at 875.
3" Id.
312 Id. at 83, 385 A.2d at 875.
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tain. Like most custodians, it is unlikely that she had any knowledge of the
events reflected in the records.
Thus, the Moore court wove a tangled web to reach a result that cannot
remedy the real defect it perceived. Clearly the court was correct in its observa-
tions that the hearsay was too unreliable to prove the essential element of the
crime. Had it simply distinguished the cases that held differently on substan-
tive rather than evidentiary grounds and ruled accordingly, its opinion would
have presented no obstacle to future cases. On the other hand, since the opin-
ion is not expressly confined to one substantive area, it now will have to be
followed, distinguished or confronted in cases involving all substantive issues
and laws. Unless future courts are willing to articulate those substantive
distinctions, the effect of Moore in future cases may be diametrically opposed to
what the Moore court intended.
CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that failure to adjust rulings on the ad-
missibility of hearsay under exceptions to the rule to suit substantive policies
can result in undermining those policies. To avoid this result, identical hearsay
statements may be held admissible in some cases and inadmissible in others,
reliable enough for some purposes and too unreliable for others.
While the results of most cases examined in this article seemed to conform
to the substantive distinctions urged, `in only one of the areas examined, the lost
wills cases, did the courts consistently express the relationship between their
rulings and the substantive policies involved. It is hoped that this article
demonstrates that there is nothing to be lost and much to be gained by express
recognition of substantive influences on rulings about the admissibility of hear-
say. An unwillingness to express that influence can lead to unintended results,
lack of predictability, confusion and unnecessary and unfounded suspicion. As
long as the proof offered by litigants on both sides of an issue is treated
evenhandedly, there is no cause for complaint that similar proof is not treated
identically when offered on different issues involving different substantive laws
and policies.
Current rationalizations for exceptions to the hearsay rule and the indicia
of reliability they incorporate lend no meaningful guidance to judges attemp-
ting to conform rulings on admissibility to the concerns of substantive law.
Moreover, the present design of class exceptions is occasionally misunderstood
as embodying a legslative determination that use of particular classes of hear-
say will or will not facilitate substantive policies in every case. This legislative
inattention to the relationship between hearsay exceptions and the needs of
various substantive laws, coupled with the unwillingness of courts to articulate
substantive concerns, has impeded rational development of this area of
evidence law.
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The scope of this article has been limited to illustrating the connection be-
tween some substantive policies and the use of exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Before concrete suggestions about redesign of hearsay exceptions can be made,
more work must be done in (i) exploring the relationship between the use of
hearsay and other substantive laws and (ii) fashioning indicia of reliability that
obviate the concerns raised here. It is thus hoped that this article will stimulate
further research, thinking, and debate about these matters.
